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INTRODUCTION
Cyprus is intrinsically an inconsequential micro-state, 
but its geo-strategic location has made it disproportion­
ately vital in world politics. It is an island permanently 
disabled by its special vulnerability to foreign manipu­
lation and intervention. As a chronic international dis­
pute, the Cyprus conflict of the last twenty-five years has 
been analyzed from various perspectives, by academics, 
journalists, politicians, diplomats and strategists.
However, most serious studies produced to date have 
concentrated on one particular facet of the conflict, thus 
by-passing efforts to understand its labyrinthine inter­
locking aspects. The major works have focussed on themes 
such as the Cyprus conflict and Gr e e c e ; ^ ■ Turkey; the 
United Nations; the S u p e r p o w e r s ; B r i t a i n ;  ^  Inter­
national L a w ; P o l i t i c a l  Geography;^^ Constitutional-
( 8 ) ( 9 )ism; Nationalism. These works have helped to inter­
pret factors of primary importance from the various phases 
of the dispute. But the developments of the 1970s, cul­
minating in the 1974 crisis and its subsequent international 
repercussions, have resulted to date in only a small number 
of scholarly works ; and despite the far reaching inter­
national implications of the 1974 developments, most con­
temporary studies have continued to analyze various crucial
4 ( 11 )individual factors, bypassing a broad international
s tudy .
The present thesis will constitute a systematic 
attempt to help close this gap by developing a "macro" view
of the international implications of the Cyprus conflict 
with special reference to the 1974 crisis and its after- 
math. Particular emphasis will be placed on the linkage 
between the local, regional and global actors and deter­
minants of the dispute. In order to present a critical 
perspective, the study will examine not only the develop­
ments since 1974, but every major international crisis over 
Cyprus since its emergence as an international dispute in 
1954 .
Within its purview the thesis will also explore a 
number of issues that have not been adequately discussed 
in relation to the Cyprus conflict, from the general, such 
as Detente, World Order, Strategic Doctrines, Crisis 
Management, to the very specific, such as NATO, the 
Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Con­
ference, the EEC, the US Arms Embargo.
With the dispute still dangerously unresolved, most 
of the governments involved have imposed very strict guide­
lines on the availability of documents. In particular, 
secrecy has surrounded documents that deal with the July- 
August 1974 Cyprus crisis. Dr Kissinger’s refusal to agree 
to a US Congressional Committee request to hand over State 
Department documents on the subject of Cyprus, resulted in 
his being charged with contempt of Congress. However, for 
numerous reasons of internal security and foreign policy, 
the governments of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey have been 
equally reluctant to release any documents related to the 
1974 crisis.
(viii)
The author was able to partially overcome this 
methodological problem by interviews with key policy 
makers, diplomats, politicians and government officials, 
during a field trip to the United States, Greece and 
Cyprus (both sectors). The interviews were useful supple­
mentary material to the analysis of the written sources 
which were the cornerstone of research for this thesis.
Monitoring of primary documents such as US Cong- 
gressional Hearings, House of Commons Reports, UN debates 
and reports, was carried out. Analysis was also made of 
secondary material such as newspapers, academic articles 
and monographs from Greek and English original material, 
and Turkish sources in translation. In areas where it was 
not possible to fully document arguments, a more general 
perspective was given. There are still points which are 
not clear and which will remain contentious until the 
relevant information is put forward either by governments 
or the responsible decision makers.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters which in 
turn are split in two parts. The first part consists of 
chapters I to III, which analyze the Cyprus conflict from 
its pre-independence international setting to the suc­
cession of crises that preceded the 1974 crisis. The 
section provides a macro-historical perspective that 
critically examines the causes of the various crises, with 
particular emphasis being placed on analysing the role of
( ix)
the guarantor powers and the involvement of other foreign 
powers and organisations. These chapters are necessary 
background, to acquiring an understanding of the set of 
events that led to the July-August 1974 imbroglio.
The second part consists of chapters iv to vii and 
deals with the chain of international developments sparked 
off by the crisis. Chapter four will seek to explain 
the reasons for the failure of Kissinger crisis diplomacy. 
The next two chapters concentrate on analysing the profound 
effects 
of the 
to the 
Turkey. 
underta 
peacefu
the crisis had on the defence and foreign policies 
states involved, from the Greek withdrawal from NATO 
imposition of the American arms embargo against 
Finally chapter 7 will examine the actions 
ken by international bodies in their search for a 
1 settlement.
CHAPTER 1
THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Cyprus is situated in the Eastern Mediterranean, 500
miles from Greece and 40 miles from Turkey. Eighty percent
of its population are Greek Cypriot, and 18 percent Turkish
Cypriot. In 1 878 the island was ceded to Britain, in return
for a British undertaking of armed assistance in defence of
( 2 )the Ottoman Empire's Asiatic possessions against Russia.
However,the island did not formally come under British control 
until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923- The sovereignty of Cyprus, 
was relinquished by Ataturk to Britain under Article 20 of the 
Lausanne Treaty in which he ratified the annexation proclaimed
( 3 )by the British Foreign Secretary,Grey,on 5 November 1914*
In 1925 Cyprus was declared a British Crown colony.
The control of Cyprus reinforced the United Kingdom's
important trade routes to the Middle East and East of Aden.
However, Cyprus was not to be considered as vital strategic
terrain until after World War II. British control of Palestine,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, proved sufficient for strategic
purposes until after the second world war. ^
In the early 1950s the British Conservative government,
led by Sir Winston Churchill, concluded that a base in Cyprus
would strengthen Britain's posture in the Middle East after their
decampment from S u e z . T h i s  strengthened the Government's
opposition to the renewed calls for "Enosis" by the Greek
(6)Cypriot majority on the island.
The civil war and the subsequent post war reconstruction, 
had forced successive Greek governments from seriously
(g )
demanding from the British "Enosis" of Cyprus until 1954*
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According to Mayes, a key factor behind Greece's renewed
support for "Enosis" was her failure to achieve any positive
breakthrough to her irredentist claims over Northern Epirus and
( 9 )on the "rectification of the Greek-Bulgarian frontier".
The refusal of the British Government to comply with Greece's 
demands and to agree to Anglo-Greek talks over Cyprus, led 
the Conservative Papagos Government to place the Cyprus Question 
before the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 1954*^^ 
On 16 August, the Greek representative at the United Nations 
submitted the Cyprus item to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, "of the principle of equal rights and self determination 
of peoples to Cyprus".^  ^  In the explanatory memorandum signed 
by Papagos, the Greek Government emphasized that the over­
whelming majority of the Cypriot people desired "Enosis" with 
Greece, and referred, inter alia, to the plebiscite of 1950 
as one of the most recent proofs of this desire. The move 
to take the question before the UN also marked the internation­
alisation of the issue, and led once again to Turkey's direct
(12)involvement after an absence of nearly 30 years. However,
reflecting on this phase the former British Governor of Cyprus 
Sir Hugh Foot observed that, "the more the dispute became inter­
nationalised, and the more Athens and Ankara interfaced, the 
further would chances of a settlement disappear over the inter­
national horizon". ^*3)
At the UN however, the Greek delegation was confronted
by coordinated British and American obstructionist tactics
( 14 )aimed to block debate of the Greek submission on Cyprus.
During the General Assembly deliberations on Cyprus, the Turkish 
delegation stated its preference for the maintenance of the 
status quo in Cyprus as well as its strong political interest 
in the issue. During the UN debate,it also became apparent
to the Greek representatives that they had been over-optimistic 
about the number of votes that they could secure. The Greek 
delegation based its approach on the assumption that anti­
colonialist member countries would decide their stand on the 
basis of the principle of self determination rather than their 
political interest, and had under-estimated the effectiveness 
of behind the scenes lobbying and political pressures exerted 
by the British and American delegations.^^^
By 1955 the future status of Cyprus, well entrenched as 
a national political issue in Greece, Turkey and Britain, now 
received international focus in both NATO and UN forums. However, 
Whitehall and Ankara continuously blocked Greek attempts to 
increase the role of international organisations. In an attempt 
to torpedo the Greek move to bring the dispute before UNGA -
"a project which would cause considerable embarrassment to 
(l6)Britain" - the British Government invited both Greece and
Turkey to a tripartite discussion, hoping thus to foment trouble
(17)between them.
During the years 1955-1959 EOKA,led by Colonel George
Grivas, waged guerilla warfare and terrorism on Cyprus in pursuant
of "Enosis". The EOKA campaign further undermined Britain's
(l8)declining ability to impose its will in the Middle East.
The British withdrawal from Palestine in 1948 and Suez in 1954
increased the value of Cyprus: to Britain, ^ *9) ancj made it
reluctant to change the status quo of the island or discuss
(21)its rights of sovereignty over it. The reasons for the
British attitude lay in the international developments between 
1945-1954, such as the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute of 1951? the 
Suez dispute with Egypt which continued from 1945 on; the down­
fall of the monarchy in Egypt in July 1952, and the fear that
( 22 )the Soviet Union might penetrate the Middle East. After
3
withdrawal from Suez, the British established their new Middle 
East headquarters in Cyprus. The Suez withdrawal, however, 
was a setback to Britain's status as the dominant Great Power in 
the Near East region. Its domestic repurcussions were also 
dramatic. The Eden Cabinet consequently assured the "Suez 
rebels" that no similar withdrawal from Cyprus was contemplated.
In the aftermath of the Suez imbroglio,retention of British 
sovereignty over Cyprus became a top priority of the Eden 
Government.
In retrospect it can be argued that British strategic 
policy at the time attached too high a priority to the defence 
of the Middle East against the perceived Soviet threat, and 
neglected to take into consideration or assess adequately the 
internal political developments of the countries in the Middle 
East region. In a calculated move to reinforce Britain'sdeclining
status in the Middle East, Eden created the Baghdad Pact, which
( 2 3 )was initialed on 4 April, 1955* The pact was the end product
of a series of Western attempts over a number of years to devise
/ r\ a \
a Middle East Command, as part of the containment strategy,
and was based upon the US Secretary of State Dulles' conviction
that the Arab regimes would not commit themselves to military
alliance with the West, so that a Western controlled defence
organisation was a "future rather than an immediate possibility".
The Eisenhower Administration decided not to become a full
member of the Baghdad Pact and opted instead for "observer"
( 2 5 )status. Dulles was interested in preventing Soviet pene­
tration, and estimated that such an approach could only be 
successful if it managed to secure broad Arab sympathy and 
support. However,Eden's goal was to bolster Britain 1s presence 
and influence, regardless of the hostility shown against his 
Middle East policy by Arab Nationalists such as Nasser. The
4
widespread opposition by the local regimes in the end sealed 
the fate of Eden's policy. Washington1 s tacit support for Eden's 
policy in the region also failed to take into consideration 
the force of Arab nationalism, and in particular neglected 
the fact that Egypt was the dominant political force in the 
Arab world, and underestimated the possible threat to their 
strategic and economic interests in the area that Nasser's 
"Arab Nationalist" rhetoric could inflict.
The British Government was optimistic that the Baghdad 
Pact would help bolster the Iraqi regime of N iru-es-Said.
However in 1958 the overthrow of Nuri-es-Said by the Bathist 
revolution also spelt the end for the Baghdad Pact. A contributing 
factor behind Britain's refusal to relinquish sovereignty over 
Cyprus was the possible undermining impact such a move could 
have had on Nuri-es-Said's Baghdad regime.
The similarity of British and Turkish interests in the 
Baghdad Pact ^  indirectly strengthened Ankara's role in 
the? Cyprus dispute. The growing Angl o-Turkish relationship
( 27 )Led to Turkey becoming closely identified as an ally of Britain.
In the meantime the British Colonial Secretary, Mr Lennox-Boyd,
encouraged the Turkish version of self-determination (ie "Taksim"
( 7 8 )or partition). Turkish opposition to Greece's annexation
aims, revived the historic Greco-Turkish antagonism. In Turkey, 
Greece's campaign of self-determination for Cyprus was inter­
preted as a revival of the Greek irredentist ideology "Megali 
Idea" (The Great Idea); the concept to build a new "Byzantine 
Empire" with its capital at Constantinople (Istanbul). ^ ^
To counter the Greek Cypriot cause for "Enosis" spear­
headed by EOKA, the Turkish Government covertly persuaded the 
Turkish Cypriots to intensify their calls for "Taksim" (partition).
5.
In 1956 "Volkan" first and then TMT, were launched as the 
military arm of the "Cyprus is Turkish" Association. Turkish 
interests in the 1950's, however, towards Cyprus were primarily 
strategic. Turkish strategists viewed Cyprus as a vital strategic 
island located only fourtymiles from its coastline and pointing 
towards the strategic supply routes of Iskenderum and Alex- 
andreta. Turkey refrained from making any demands 
for the partition of Cyprus so long as Britain continued to 
exercise sovereignty over the island. However, after Greece 
began to claim self-determination for Cyprus at the United 
Nations, Turkey proclaimed her own interest on Cyprus.'^0)
The Suez debate in 1956 and the subsequent review of British 
strategic policy provided an opportunity for the eventual
II If /  ^  1 \solution of the 'Cyprus Question" in 1959» Following the
policy review the new MacMillan Government in late 1957 decided
that it no longer needed "Cyprus as a base" but rather it
( 12 )needed "bases in Cyprus".
Negotiations at the time over the future status of Singapore, 
and the EOKA campaign in Cyprus resulted in heated debates 
in the House of Commons over the future of UK bases abroad.
The Conservatives now asserted that the bases must be retained,
( 11 )if necessary even without the consent of the local population.
Setbacks to Britain in the Middle East such as Nasser's 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956, and Jordan's dismissal 
of Glubb Pasha, (the British military commander of its Arab 
Legion), added to the demise of British imperial power in the
/ Q J \
region. The contraction of British influence in the Middle
East resulted in the entrance of the United States into the area 
in a forceful way. On 5 January 1957? the announcement of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine - basically a new version 
of the Truman Doctrine - pledged economic aid and
the use of "armed force to assist any (nation in the Middle 
East) requesting assistance against armed agression from any
( T C )country controlled by international Communism'.' The doctrine
made it explicit that it was not only a deterrent in the Middle 
Fast region against the spread of Soviet influence but also 
against any sources of inter-Arab conflict. Some Arab
regimes believed that both Washington and Whitehall were over­
reacting to the so-called Soviet threat. The Arab critique 
led to a costing of relations between the two western powers 
and some Arab regimes. Since 1955 the Soviet Union had returned 
to playing an active role in the Middle East political arena.
In particular Moscow had skillfully exploited Arab divisions
(37)over' Iraq's alJiance with the west , and non-aligned
Nasser expressed hostility towards Iraq for placating Western 
( 7 8 )interests. Soviet interests in the Middle East were shaped
by certain factors which cannot be ignored. The Baghdad Pact 
had provoked the Soviet leadership and had revived their fears
( 3 9 )of encirclement. However, the fundamental reason for Soviet
interest in the Middle East is its geographic proximity. As 
McLaurin points out "although the West has been loth to accept 
this principle, it is a fact of geography that the Soviet Union 
is a Middle East power in a way the United States is not" ,
The Soviet leap over the Baghdad Pact encirclement, was considered 
by both British and American officials as an immediate threat 
against their global strategic interests. This subsequently 
resulted in a number of East/West Cold War incidents, which 
indirectly helped in securing the success of the London and 
Zurich meetings that led to the compromise solution of the 
Cyprus problem.
7
The "vacuum" theory ^  ^ ^ on which the implementation of 
the Eisenhower doctrine was justified proved to be an untimely 
policy that had failed to acknowledge or address itself to 
the rapidly changing political climate of Middle East politics.
Except for pro-Western states in the area such as Turkey, Lebanon, 
and Israel, the Eisenhower Doctrine received a hostile reception.
In particular, Nasser's Egypt and other strongly anti-Western 
Arab states accepted the Soviet line that the Eisenhower Doctrine was 
a Western and neo-colonial and pro-Israeli instrument directed 
against Nasser and Arab nationalism. The doctrine's underlying
weaknesses and limitations wereamajor setback for American foreign 
policymakers efforts to broaden Western influence in the Arab 
world. Indeed, the Doc,trine became the target for similar
attempts as the Baghdad Pact; the enmity of Arab Nationalist 
regimes, Soviet antagonism, and criticism from 
strongly anti-colonial non-aligned Readers such as Nehru.
The enticement of neutralist Arab regimes into the Western 
sphere was a major objective of the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Although like the Baghdad Pact it was nominally directed
/ i n \
against communism, its real aim was to contain the spread
F M • ( 48 )or Nassensm.
The succession of British policy followed by the failure 
of the Eisenhower Doctrine,led Washington into encouraging 
its NATO allies embroiled in the Cyprus question to find a 
solution, preferably between them. Washington was apprehensive 
that the dispute between its NATO allies over an island within 
close proximity to the volatile Middle East had to be resolved.
The Syrian Government's increased ties with the Kremlin, 
the overthrow of Nuri-Es-Said,and the Lebanese crisis of 1958 
had disturbed the Turkish Premier Menderes and all the other 
anti-Soviet and anti-Nasser leaders in the region. In particular,
8
the Turkish leader who was an ardent critic of Nasserism
admonished on the need to maintain the status quo and declared
all movements of revolution and change in the area as
Communist - and Soviet-inspired.^^
In 1957 Turkey planned to invade Syria which had developed
close relations with the Soviet Union and had adopted Nasserite
pol icies »particularly in her- foreign policy outlook, which
were radically different from her own. As Ambassador* Loy Henderson
reported at the time, Menderes was determined to eliminate
the: Syrian regime. ^  Likewise at the time of the coup against
( 52 )Nuri-es-Said, Menderes at one stage planned military inter-
(53)vention in Iraq. While in the 195$ Lebanon crisis, Turkey
supported the pro-Western Chamoun government against the 
rebel ling pro-Nasser forces.
The widening Middle Eastern crisis focussing around Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq , along with the Soviet military and 
technological breakthroughs in missiles and space travel, and 
the quasi-ultimatum of Khrushchev on Berlin, softened the three 
NATO allies in the Cyprus problem and made them more compliant 
in conducting talks for a compromise settlement. The American 
Secretary of State Dulles had more than a subtle impact in
/ r  / \
this change of emphasis. Washington now considered it
imperative to secure the cooperation of the British and Turkish 
governments in order to strengthen its position in the renewed 
Cold War political and strategic problems sparked off by the
/ £-7 \
so-called missile gap and the tension over Berlin.
The East-West casus belli over Berlin relegated the Cyprus 
problem and was an influential factor which hastened the Greek- 
Turkish rapprochement that set in motion the groundwork for a 
negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question.^59)
By the late 1950 s the Cyprus problem besides its 
elevation into a UN and NATO problem, also evolved into 
a Cold War issue. The Eisenhower administration and in
particular the Dulles brothers exerted substantial pressure 
on the MacMillan government as well , to resolve the problem 
before it turned into a repetition of another intramural NATO 
crisis as the Suez dispute had caused in 1 9 5 6 . ^ ^  The Cyprus 
problem had led to an atmosphere of mistrust between Greece 
and its NATO allies the UK and Turkey that posed a serious 
threat to the stability of the South Eastern flank of NATO.
Greek-Turkish enmity over the Cyprus problem had been the causal 
factor for the collapse of the Balkan Pact, the bridge between 
the Atlantic Alliance and Tito's Yugoslavia. Moreover, the 
"Cyprus Question" was creating problems for the West in the 
UN bloc vote mechanism. Finally,it was seen as creating an 
opening for the Soviet Union ,to enter the dispute by manipulating 
Greek-Turkish hostility which on a number of occasions resulted
• 4- K  4- p ( 6 2 )m  threats or war.
In February 1959 the Greek and Turkish Premiers concluded ' 
an agreement at Zurich, which was endorsed in London, to 
establish a Republic of Cyprus. These accords were viewed
by many Greek Cypriots as unconditional submissiveness by Karamanlis 
to Anglo-American pressure, which was more interested in NATO's 
cohesion than in addressing itself to the self-determination 
of the Greek Cypriots. Kyriakidis asserts that "the increasing 
importance of Turkey as a strategic factor to the United States 
and Great Britain, resulted in the corresponding weakening 
of Greece's position within the alliance which forced her to
( A \accept the Turkish position".
10
With the collapse of the pro-Western Iraqi regime on 14 July
1958, Washington prolicymakers feared that it could accelerate
Soviet inroads into the area,leading ultimately to a Soviet
controlled Middle East. To offset this threat, Dulles decided
that Turkey, its only powerful ally in the area, must be
strengthened by additional military and economic a i d . ^ ^
General Grivas maintained that it was not Turkey's strategic
significance but Ankara's determination and steadfastness in
pursuing a single goal - partition-and of threatening withdrawal
from NATO if it did not get half of Cyprus, that made British
(66)and American diplomats capitulate to Ankara's demands.
Grivas was also critical of Greece's foreign policy, for failing
to capitalise on Turkey's isolation from the Arab world.
The Greek capitulation meant that Greece would not put the
island before greater national interests.
The major weaknesses of the London-Zurich agreements was
that they represented a pre-determined compromise solution
drafted by Greek, Turkish and British experts and presented
to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders as a fait accompli.
The controversial accords were judged as being at best a set
of mediocre documents that did not signify a gain for any of the
three parties that conducted the deliberations. However, at
Zurich and London, the Turkish Cypriot minority which represented
1 8 % of the islands population was granted powers in excess
of its demographic share.
The Greek Cypriot majority had imposed upon it an unwieldy 
(68)constitution. The Cyprus constitution was drafted by
Greek and Turkish constitutional experts - who however, failed 
to consult Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders - contained in it 
provisions for separation at all levels between the two communities.making 
it virtually unworkable. The result was a form of quasi­
11
independence legitimised by an unworkable constitution which 
was, as events turned out, a perfect divissive instrument 
for the collapse of the new Republic,through the forced separation 
of the two communities leading to virtual partition. The 
constitution sharply limited the new island republic's sover­
eignty and independence. For example, the Treaty of Guarantee 
a pact between the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey gave 
the Guarantor powers the constitutional right to intervene.
Any developments in Cyprus interpreted
as detrimental to the interests of the three Guarantors could 
lead to collective or individual action directed toward "re­
establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty".
llii.-> provision enabled that each Guarantor could give 
its own interpretation and terms of "re-establishing the state 
of affairs". According to Kyriakidis,the effect of this 
provision is negative because it links British, Greek and 
Turkish interests to the const itut ional developments of the 
Republic of Cyprus.
Similarly, the Treaty of Alii anee , a defence treaty 
between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, made provisions for permanent
(71)stationing of Greek and Turkish troops on Cyprus. The
presence of Greek and Turkish armed forces on Cyprus reflects,
moreover, the unwillingness of Greece and Turkey to allow the
development of a Cypriot political consciousness.
Furthermore, the constitution institionalised and gave
over to forced separation and tension at a time when inter-
communal cooperation was widely needed. The disproportionate
power allocated to the Turkish minority coupled with the rigid
and complex system of checks and balances practically guaranteed
(72)eventual governmental paralysis.
12
Under the I960 accords the President had to be Greek 
and the Vice president Turkish, and respectively elected by
(73)their communities for a five year term.
However, according to Kyriakidis "it was the executive 
right of final veto, which also extended to matters stemming 
from decisions of the House of Representatives, that hampered 
most the process of government". For* example, under articles 
4 8 (d) and 49(d) the President and Vice President were granted 
(he power to veto any decisions of the Council of Ministers 
on any foreign affairs, defence or security issue. The veto 
power was also extended to cover any decisions passed by the
( A ^House of Representatives. Most decisions of the House
(75)under the constitution required only a simple majority.
However, in certain key areas of legislation, the two communities
are accorded separat e communal majority votes. The use of the
legislative veto however, in particular by the Turkish Cypriot
Vice President, resulted in a constitutional crisis which
culminated with the breakdown of the fragile government in
(77)December 1 9 6 3 »
The difference of interpretation given by both sides on 
the legality of key provisions of the constitution had adverse 
results. On the one-hand there was no attempt made by the 
Greek Cypriot leadership to preserve and uphold the Constitution, 
which they strongly believed did not represent an accurate 
picture of the Cypriot population. On the other hand, the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership looked upon the Constitution as 
the only means to protect their minority interests. The end 
result of this inter-communal rivalry permeated all spheres 
of government, and each new incident became an obstacle to 
compromise, and fostered instead an intricate system of legal 
crises, which set the two communities into perpetual constit- 
uti ona1 factional ism.
13
Adams and Cottrell write: "when one examines the problem 
in greater depth, it is clear that these agreements, which 
were attempts to satisfy the conflicting demands of all parties 
to the negotiations, have not provided a flexible enough frame­
work to meeting changing conditions. The historic roots of 
earlier unrest could not and did not disappear with the ratif­
ication of the agreements, the achievement of independence 
for the island, or the subsequent efforts of the Cypriot govern- 
ment".(78)
PARALYSIS, BRINKMANSHIP AND POWER POLITICS: CYPRUS 1960-1965
Cyprus re-emerged as a centre of conflict and international
tension with the outbreak of inter-communal violence in late
December 1 9 6 3 . After a pause of only three years, communal
violence re-surfaced on the island, and threatened to engulf
the patrons of the respective communities, Greece and Turkey,
to the brink of war.
As outlined above, after August I960 it became apparent
that the limited form of independence granted to Cyprus had
not managed to solve the long drawn dispute of the two communities,
and in some cases independence exacerbated further old protracted
differences. In November 1963 the legal authority "crisis"
between the two communities prompted Makarios to put forward
a number of constitutional amendments as a gesture aimed at
(79)breaking the stalemate. His thirteen points were submitted
to the respective guarantor powers and to the Turkish Cypriot
Vice President Dr Kiiciik.^^ On 16 December the Irionu Cabinet
rejected outright Makarios' proposed uni1atera1 amendments and
repeatedly stressed the in-alienability of the I960 constit- 
(8 2 )ution. Hughes maintains, that "Makarios was wrong to push
through his constitutional reforms, however necessary, without 
considering Turkish Cypriot sensibilities. Similarly the
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Turkish Cypriot leadership was wrong to force him to this by 
subordinating every political issue to their sectional interests. 
Their grievances, however, were culpably encouraged by the 
Ankara Government in order to project internal dissatisfaction 
on to a foreign situation. "
Certain developments which had taken place in world politics 
since I960, also indirectly elevated Cyprus's importance within 
world affairs, especially among the Super powers, who now 
perceived Cyprus as a vital area in their strategic rivalry 
in the critically important Eastern Mediterranean and Middle 
East regions. "For the West in general, the unique location 
of Cyprus vis-a-vis Europe, the USSR, the Levant and Africa
(84)made it a topic of renewed salience in international relations." 
Unlike the 1950's when Cyprus was primarily a colonial problem 
kept strictly within the confines of the West, by 1963 Cyprus 
was a fully fledged member of the United Nations, the Common­
wealth and the World community, and had ceased being an exclusive 
Western interest. On the contrary, Cyprus's implementation 
of an active; non-aligned foreign policy^ meant that any adverse 
development that threatened its sovereignty and territorial
integrity would most probably invite some sort of Soviet
( o r \involvement. Radical political change and shifting
alliance of certain Middle East regimes, such as Iraq and Syria 
had undergone, now elevated Cyprus's strategic value in the 
East/West rivalry in the region. Indeed, Egypt's tilt in the 
early 1960s towards a radical line, the emergence of Ben Bella's 
Algeria, the creation of OPEC, along with the Soviet buildup
/ o z: \
in the Mediterranean alarmed Western strategists. It was
within this tense and fluid international setting that the 
December 1963 crisis unexpectedly erupted.
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As armed clashes between the two communities rapidly 
spread across Cyprus, at the request of the Cyprus Government 
a limited peacekeeping operation was launched by British troops 
(stationed at the British sovereign bases of Akrotiri and 
Dhekelia). However, this move failed to restore civil order. 
Moreover, Ankara's warning that it would carry out a unilateral 
intervention by invading the island and the unsuccessful 
request for help by the Makarios Government to the UN Security 
Council on 28 December 1963? widened the escalation of the
(87)crisis into a major international dispute.
Following the inconclusiveness of the British diplomatic
( 8 8efforts at mediation , on 25 January 1 9 6 4 , the British Foreign 
Secretary advised the Johnson Administration that his country 
intended to seek a broader peacekeeping f o r c e ^ ^  through NATO.^^ 
Furthermore, he underscored that if there was no other’ Western 
solution forthcoming, he was ready to transfer the Cyprus issue 
to the UN. With the memory of the British troops counter­
insurgency emergency operations against EOKA still fresh, uni­
lateral British intervention seriously threatened to revive 
anti-colonial and anti-British feelings among the Greek Cypriot 
population.
(91)President Johnson accepted the British proposal and
from February 1964,the United States assumed the initiative.
Washington's overt involvement, however, also precipitated strong
(9 2 )involvement by Khrushchev.
On 28 January 19 6 4, President Johnson^^ sent General 
Lemnitzer,the NATO commander in Europe, as his special envoy 
to Athens and Ankara. The supreme Commander's trip stalled
the threatened invasion, and laid the groundwork for the machinery
( 9 S )formulation of a "NATO plan" for Cyprus. The move was
a turning point in that it signified formal involvement of
16
American diplomacy. Washington was anxious to prevent Soviet 
entangelment in the dispute in particular via the avenue of 
Security Council vetoes. However, the NATO plan was not 
introduced, primarily because of Makarios1 rejection. The 
Archbishop stated that while he accepted the plan in principle, 
he preferred the introduction of the proposed multinational 
force to come under the direct authority of the United Nations 
Security Council.
Renewed efforts were made to amending the NATO proposal 
(drafted by the US and the UK) more acceptable to Makarios, 
following his rejection of the initial proposal. On 9 February 
1964, US Under-Secretary of State George Ball and his British 
colleague, Mr Sandys, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, 
made major changes on their original p l a n . ^ ^  The proposals 
now incorporated that the Guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey 
and the UK, would not exercise their rights of unilateral inter­
vention under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee for a three- 
month period while talks for negotiated settlement were being 
conducted under the chairmanship of an acceptable mediator. 
Despite the acceptance of the plan by Athens and Ankara and 
the severe pressure placed on Makarios by the American envoy 
George Ball, during his talks with the Archbishop on 12 February, 
Makarios in the end in an intransigent mood, refused both 
the NATO peacerkeepi ng force or the alternative of continuation
(97)of the British peacekeeping force. According to Linda
Miller "the plan did not fail because of Makarios1s unwillingness 
to accept an international peacekeeping force. Rather, it 
was clear that the Cypriot President's rejection did not derive 
from the military deficiencies of these proposalsj^^ but from 
his conviction that the United Nations would serve as the most
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reliable mechanism for realisation of his internal political 
( go)goals". His Beatitude believed that approval of the NATO
plan threatened to identify him too closely with the Atlantic 
Alliance and could have placed under jeopardy the support that 
he had secured for his position from the Soviet bloc and the non- 
aligned states.^^^ Confident that the Eastern bloc countries 
and members of the non-aligned movement would continue their 
support, Makarios decided to take the dispute to the UN Security 
Council. 1^*) On 15 February, both Britain and Cyprus respectively 
presented the issue to the Security Council. After exhaustive 
debates, delaying tactics and reservations over the formation 
of another UN peacekeeping force by some members, on 4 March 
the Security Council passed unanimously resolution 186 recommending 
the creation of UNFICYP - the UN force in Cyprus, and the appoint­
ment of a mediator "for the purpose of promoting a peaceful 
solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting 
Cyprus, bearing in mind the well being of the people of Cyprus 
as a whole and the preservation of international peace and 
security". The adoption of resolution 186 marked a diplomatic 
setback for the Inoriu Government which believed that only NATO 
mediation could secure a just settlement. ^
The return of the Cyprus conflict to the United Nations 
forum after a lapse of five years failed to break the impasse.
To a degree, the restrictive terms of reference imposed on 
UNFICYP,by the UN Security Council plus the problem of securing 
adequate funds for the force, limited the scope of peacekeeping 
operations over Cyprus. Moreover, although resolution 186 
was adopted on 4 March 1964? the first contingents of UNFICYP 
did not reach Cyprus until 27 March. The delay increased the 
risk of renewed inter-communal c l a s h e s . I t  can be argued
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that had it not been for the interim peacekeeping of the 
British troops ,prior to the arrival of UNFICYP? the clashes 
might have escalated beyond control which would have probably 
led to a Greek-Turkish War.
Linda Miller has written that in Cyprus the role of the 
UN was strictly confined to containing the conflict and preventing 
external intervention and in particular Greek or Turkish govern­
ment involvement while working towards a negotiated settlement.
In the case of UNFICYP,the UN wanted to avoid confronting problems 
similar to those it had experienced in the Congo.
The separation of the peacekeeping functions of UNFICYP from 
those of the mediator highlighted the desire of the Security 
Council to ensure ,that it introduced a form of UN participation^^^ 
that "would place the burden for resolving the issues on the 
parties themselves rather than upon the Organisation",
On 2 June 1 9 6 4 , the crisis entered a new critical phase 
with the decision of the Turkish Security Council on 1 June^ 
to invade Cyprus, the object being to create a strategic beach­
head and then force upon the Greek Cypriot side to accept 
partition of the two c o m m u n i t i e s . D u r i n g  the escalation 
of the crisis?American officials observed that both Greece and Turkey 
now viewed the Cyprus issue?as an integral part of their 
respective national interests and placed it ahead of their 
commitment to NATO.
In their efforts to avert a Greek-Turkish War President 
Johnson and his staff were faced with a serious policy problem. 
Whether it could be possible to balance the act of preserving 
the sovereignty of Cyprus without threatening the respective 
interests of the United States, NATO, Greece and Turkey? If 
the Johnson administration decided to support Makarios' case
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for majority rule by the Greek Cypriots, it placed at risk 
its longstanding bilateral relationship with Turkey. On the 
otherhand, if it opposed the Archbishop, it threatened to 
damage its close ties with Greece. Alternatively if it 
refrained completely it would have antagonised both the Greek 
and Turkish Governments, and creating an opportunity for Soviet 
involvement into what was considered clearly as a Western dispute.
The potential of a Greek-Turkish War over Cyprus presented 
similar problems for NATO as it had done in the period 1955- 
1958. The crisis threatened to weaken NATO's South-Eastern 
flank. Senior State Department officials such as Assistant 
Secretary of State Ball, now viewed the crisis and the islands 
continuation as a sovereign non-aligned state, as posing a serious 
threat to American interests in the Eastern Mediterranean because: 
"it threatened to lead to a Turkish intervention and thus a 
Greek-Turkish War; it threatened Greece and Turkey's ties to the United 
States; it had strengthened the position of AKEL and the USSR 
on Cyprus; and finally it had created a serious problem
to the UN; and it had undermined NATO".^**^
Following the failure of the successive Anglo-American 
diplomatic efforts, President Johnson in the end was forced 
to personally intervene and mediate during the summer of 1 9 6 4 , 
in order to prevent the dispute from escalating into a Greek- 
Turkish War.
On 5 June, Johnson warned the Turkish Prime Minister 
Ismet Inonii, that his country might not be the recipient of 
NATO support in the event of a Soviet attack, if her invasion 
of Cyprus were carried out. However, the seasoned Turkish
leader viewed Johnson's ultimatum as an unwarranted intervention 
in his governments' affairs and led to an immediate deterioration 
of Ankara's relations with the Johnson Administration. Despite
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the high political cost, Johnson's ultimatum succeeded in 
detering the Turkish military from implementing their planned
(114)invasion.
In a concerted effort to end the stalemate, the US extended 
invitations to the Greek and Turkish leaders to visit Washington 
to discuss the Cyprus problem. In June 1964 Johnson met in 
Washington, separately, the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers' 
Papandreou and Inonu.
Following the Washington talks, the Johnson Administration 
applied pressure upon U-Thant (the UN Secretary-General) to 
sponsor a new "Cyprus" mediation effort to be conducted by 
former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson. American 
policymakers insisted upon the Acheson proposal despite the 
fact that a UN mediator,Sakari Tuomioja of Finland had already 
been nominated. Diplomatic observers assessed the American 
directive as a calculated move by the US to remove the problem 
out of the UN forum and bring it back under Western mediation 
circles. ^ Washington's attempts to dictate to U-Thant
on how the dispute should be handled was a radical departure 
from its previous support for UN mediation.^ While
voting publicly for the Security Council resolutions,the US 
Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, stated "the United States 
has no position as to the form or the shape of a final settle­
ment of the Cyprus problem. The leaders of the two communities 
must work out their differences t o g e t h e r ^ ^ ^  Moreover, 
when in March 1964 the UN Security Council had passed the 
resolution recommending the reaction of UNFICYP, President 
Johnson had declared that "the United States Government will 
give full support to the efforts of the United Nations mediator
... „(119)in this direction".
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U-Thant's firmness in rejecting the Acheson proposal forced 
Washington to accept a modified role for Acheson as outlined 
by the Secretary-General. U-Thant agreed to Acheson playing a 
secondary role in the scheduled Geneva talks.
Discussions between Greek and Turkish Government represent­
atives began in G e n e v a ^ ^  on 4 July 1 9 6 4, under the chairmanship 
of the UN mediator, Tuomioja.^^^ It should be noted that, 
neither President Makariosnor the Turkish-Cypriot leader Dr 
Kuckuk were invited to participate. The results of American
behind the scenes mediation efforts at Geneva were expressed
(12 2)in the "Acheson plan". This plan contained, inter alia,
the following key points: "first, enosis of Cyprus with Greece,
in return for a thirty to fifty-year lease of a military base
to the Turks. The Turks would have sovereignty over the base,
whose size was approximately equal to one fifth of the island.
Second, the cantonisation of the island, creating two parallel
governmental structures, one for each of the two ethnic groups.
(121)Third, a joint military command for Greece and Turkey".
Acheson's plan also included provisions for the creation of 
a permanent Turkish military base on Cyprus and the annexation 
to Turkey of the small Greek island Castellorizo. Both the 
Papandreou^ and Makarios^^^ Governments rejected Acheson1 s
plan and claimed that it was another form of "double enosis"
.... (126) or partition.
The Arrchbishop started to fear that the
delegates to the Geneva talks under Anglo-American pressure
might produce terms for a negotiated settlement that were
contrary to the interests of the Greek Cypriots. To increase
his leverage Makarios renewed his contacts with the Soviet Union
(127)and increased his Government's contacts with Nasser's regime.
His Beatitude1s foreign policy re-orientations received a cool
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reception from both Greece and the US ? who believed that
Makarios 1 s new policy line enhanced Soviet efforts to undermine
NATO's south-eastern flank through infiltration.^12^  In
particular, they were concerned that the Kremlin might exact
a price in return for its material and moral support of the
(129)Makarios position, thus increasing the possibility of another
Cuban scenario in the Eastern Mediterranian.
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, at the time commented,
"we feel that the four countries primarily concerned should 
try to settle this amongst themselves, and not have a situation 
festering which gives an open invitation to outsiders to inter­
fere and try to fish in troubled waters" ,
The Papandreou Government questioned Makarios1s increased
(13 2)contacts with Moscow and underlined that if for tactical
foreign policy reasons Makarios accepted the support of the
Soviet Union and of AKEL (the Pro-Moscow Communist party of
Cyprus) at home, they were skeptical, whether he could retain
his independence of them indefinitely. In June 1 9 6 4 , Papandreou
infiltrated Greek army units to Cyprus, and on 19 June appointed
General Grivas ,commander of the Greek forces in Cyprus (which
included not less than 20,000 infiltrated Greek military
(13 3)personnel). Besides the re-inforcement strengthening
the defences of Cyprus against a Turkish invasion, and fore­
stalling the introduction of Soviet military aid, the new forces, 
and the introduction of General Grivas ,were also intended to 
introduce a new Conservative countervailing influence in Cyprus 
to that of Makarios.
Soviet-Makarios cooperation was partly facilitated by 
Makarios's apprehensions over Acheson's plans, and his policy 
to accept Soviet diplomatic and military help as a deterrent 
against Ankara's planned invasion. His Beatitude was restless that
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Papandreou might agree to accept an Acheson plan which did 
not include total enosis. Acheson's pro-Turkish tilt in Geneva 
reinforced Makarios'.s suspicions.
In August 1964 inter-communal clashes erupted when once 
again, Turkish planes bombarded Cypriot villages, but this 
time the Turkish planes bombed Greek Cypriot positions in order 
to help improve the strategic defences of the Turkish Cypriots by 
using the bombings to deter the Greek Cypriots from launching 
any new of f ensivesl At this point, the Soviet Union abandoned its
previous declared support for Makarios and suddenly adopted a more 
cautious line. Khrushchev now urged Makarios that although 
he sympathised with him he believed a cease-fire would be an 
"important contribution" to peace. For some observers the 
Soviet "about face" was similar to their Cuban missile crisis 
turn-around in 1962. Adams and Cottrell have written that 
"Khrushchev in classical Leninist fashion was "buying time" 
in anticipation of a high level Kremlin reassessment of the 
issue."(137)
Differences between Turkey and the United States such 
as the Johnson ultimatum to Inonu over Cyprus, presented the Soviet Unioi 
with an opportunity to upgrade the status of Turkish-Soviet 
relations. According to Campbell, "Moscow's shift of tack 
amounted, in effect, to the abandonment of a policy which had 
treated Turkey as totally committed to the US in the cold war, 
and as an advance US base to be threatened on occasion with 
nuclear annihilation, in favour of a policy which acknowledged 
Turkey's right to choose its own course and offered some
(1 3 8 )alternatives to one-sided dependence on the West." Following
the Johnson ultimatum and the collapse of the Acheson mediation 
efforts, the Turkish Government considered a review of its foreign 
policy,and to change the direction that focussed on a gradual
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reduction of its military and political obligations towards 
(119)the West.v '
Rapprochement with the Soviet Union was seen by some 
analysts as a move to secure support from Moscow for 
Turkey's Cyprus position. Hotham is of the opinion however, 
that "the true nature of the operation was rather the reverse: 
that the Cyprus issue was used by the Turks as a means to obtain 
a more independent position within NATO, thereby facilitating 
the approach towards the Soviet Union".^^0) Turkey's brink­
manship over Cyprus had isolated her in the World Community.
During 1964-65 Turkey's standing with non-aligned states 
was at an all time low. Particularly since Makarios, in October 
1 9 6 4 ? had managed to secure complete support for his position 
during the movement's meeting in Cairo. The Archbishop
offensive paid off when on 18 December 1965? the UN General 
Assembly passed a resolution which inter alia noted UNGA's, 
recognition of the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus.
The rapprochement with the Soviet Union was Turkey's greatest 
political trump-card, to counter the broad diplomatic support 
for Makarios' position. However, contrary to previously outlined 
arguments, Ullman and Dekmejian^^^ believe three factors 
seemed to have encouraged the Inonii government to turn towards 
Moscow. "The desire to gain the support of the communist block 
in the United Nations, after it became evident that no Cyprus 
solution agreeable to Turkey would be forthcoming on the basis 
of support from NATO; a second involved Inonii ' s belief that 
by such a rapprochement he could deny Makarios the privilege 
of threatening to call upon Soviet help if pressed by Ankara",..- 
and that such a shift would force Washington into pressuring 
the Greek Government to accept a negotiated settlement that 
incorporated or accommodated in part Ankara's demands!'^
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Although the rapprochement with Moscow was fully endorsed 
by most Turkish leaders^ Ankara was faced with a dilemma
in its attempt to re-direct its foreign policy priorities.
All the political leaders, except the leader of the Workers'
Party (Pro-Moscow), believed in retaining Turkey's relations 
with the US and NATO as the cornerstone of her foreign policy. 
However, at the same time the same leaders wanted to water
down Turkey's high profile with NATO in order to increase her
i • 1 •i (146) manoeuvrability.
The government eventually compromised by deciding to retain 
its close ties with the West, while simultaneously pursuing 
an independent position on some issues. ^ Besides the "Cyprus"
motivé some scholars maintain that Turkish-Soviet rapprochement 
could partly be attributed to the emergence at this period 
of "detente" and to the more direct motive of Ankara seeking 
economic aid from the Soviet Union to make up for the declining 
amount of American and European assistance.
Turkey's Soviet move paid off when in 19^ >5^  ^ 49) Turkey
extracted support from Moscow for its position for an "Independent
federated Cyprus". ^0) Following the Turkish foreign minister's
visit to Moscow in November 1 9 6 5 , and the return visit by a
Soviet delegation in January 1 9 6 5 , the Soviet Union stated
that besides the independence and territorial integrity of
Cyprus, "the legal rights of the two national communities",
should also be guaranteed, a radical shift from its previously
fi^ ni support for Makarios. However, despite the shift
the Soviet leadership was cautious in its policy
over Cyprus and refrained from any overt interference in the 
dispute.
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CHAPTER II
INTERNATIONAL TENSION AND THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 1965-69
In the period of 1966-1974 a succession 
of events occurred which induced the Ankara leadership 
to implement a hawkish approach against Greece over its 
Cyprus policy.
The object of Chapters II and III is 
threefold. First, to examine the pattern and dynamics 
of the Cyprus conflict. Secondly, to analyse the 
succession of crises during this period, their causes 
and consequences. It will be suggested that to a large 
degree the causes of the 197 4 crisis are to be found in 
the developments in the period 1966-74, in which overt 
and covert intervention were dominant, and the stability 
of Cyprus depended ultimately on walking the political 
tightrope between domestic and external factors. The 
delicate balance was indeed a difficult exercise for 
Makarios to maintain, particularly because it depended 
upon the constantly changing manoeuvres of the regimes 
in Athens and Ankara.
Rift between Athens and Nicosia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - T- - - - - - - - - - - -
The deterioration in relations between 
Athens and Makarios, which became most acute during the 
rule of the military in Greece, had its origins in the 
Greek Government crisis of July 1965. The dispute then 
between Greek Premier Papandreou and the Greek High 
Command over Cyprus had contributed largely to his 
ousting, which in turn helped sow the seeds for the 1967 
coup d'etat.^-
The minority Conservative Cabinets that
succeeded Papandreou (after the dismissal of his
Government by King Constantine in July 1965) until the
military coup of 21 April 1967, favoured the Acheson
proposals and applied heavy pressure on Makarios to
accept it. The minority Prime Minister,
Mr Stephanopoulos, who succeeded Papandreou supported
the Acheson plan. He disliked Makarios from the days
when he was a member of Papagos' Cabinet in the mid
1950's and believed that solution of the Cyprus question
2could only be achieved through Greek-Turkish talks. He 
placed Greece's relationship with NATO above everything 
else, and was also an advocate of close Greco-Turkish 
co-operation. Makarios rejected the contents of the 
NATO and Acheson plans, and- the Greek position towards3them. The widening rift between Athens and Nicosia was 
also placing under pressure, Greece's relations with 
Washington.
4With NATO insistence, secret talks 
between the Greek and the Turkish Governments were held 
from June to December 1966.^ Greek-Turkish talks over 
Cyprus had been a policy priority of the Johnson 
Administration but former Premier Papandreou had been 
reluctant to initiate such a dialogue. The Makarios 
Government had been apprehensive of bilateral talks. As 
Mr Georghadjis its Minister of the Interior, stated in 
July 1966, it explicitly "... reserved the right to
creject any solution reached". The Greek and Turkish 
Foreign Ministers held discussions on a number of 
occasions to examine the basis of a possible settlement; 
but little progress had been made because of the 
diametrically conflicting objectives of the two sides, 
and the neutral position adhered to by Makarios. Turkey 
reiterated her position that neither community in Cyprus 
dominate the other, that the balance of forces in the 
Aegean between them should remain in equilibrium as 
stipulated by the Treaty of Lausanne, and that any
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proposed changes to the agreements in force, should be 
concluded only after all the interested sides had been 
consulted.
A major turning point in the protracted 
Greek-Turkish talks was the protocol that the Greek and 
Turkish Foreign Ministers, Toumbas and Caglayangil,gsigned in Paris on 17 December 1966. It provided inter
alia for "Enosis". At this meeting Greece agreed to
grant to Turkey "Dhekelia" (one of the two British
9Sovereign Bases in Cyprus). As a further concession,
Toumbas offered the "Karagatch triangle", a strategic
area in the Evros River of interest to Turkey.  ^ The
remainder of Cyprus would have been demilitarised.^^
This would have dramatically altered the local balance
in favour of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The Greek
concessions were viewed more conciliatory than those
outlined in the Acheson plan. The magnitude of
concessions acceded by Toumbas, was also symptomatic of
the disjointed foreign policy followed by the minority
Governments, which were undermined by the continuing
12unstable domestic developments. This protocol was
never ratified as the Stephanopoulos Government was
dissolved shortly after, for reasons other than the
13Cyprus problem.
While the minority Greek Government
continued its talks with Ankara over Cyprus its
relations with Makarios deteriorated. His Beautitude
was critical of the talks and warned both Athens and
Ankara that no agreement that they reached would be
14honoured by his Government.
In contrast to Makarios' ability to 
politically manoeuvre independently from Athens, the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership was almost totally dependent 
upon Ankara. The threat of a Turkish invasion of Cyprus 
was the key factor which could underwrite the security
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of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. The Turkish minority 
was almost exclusively dependent, for military, economic 
and diplomatic support on Turkey.^ Makarios'
neutralist foreign policy and in particular his 
opposition to NATO sponsored solutions, enhanced his 
popularity in Greece especially among the Centre and 
Left political camps. Therefore, any attempt by the 
minority Athens regime to side-step Makarios would have 
been difficult and politically damaging, more so, since 
elections were scheduled to be held in May 1967.
The avenue by which the Athens government 
could apply pressure on Makarios was through the Greek 
National Guard in Cyprus, commanded by General Grivas, 
who was responsible directly to the Greek General staff. 
His Beautitude however, exploited the Greek Government's 
weak position in order to regain control of the National 
Guard from Grivas. Makarios underlined that to counter 
Ankara's accusations that Cyprus was under de facto 
Greek occupation by clandestine Greek forces, it had to 
be clearly demonstrated that the National Guard was 
under Cypriot control. He proposed to replace Grivas by 
General Gennimatas (the former chief of the Greek 
General Staff whom former Premier Papandreou had wanted 
to remove in 1965.) His demand was also based on his 
assessment that the former EOKA leader was preparing 
either to assassinate him or stage a coup d'etat.^
However, Grivas opposed Makarios' moves 
to secure control of the National Guard. After
Makarios' abortive attempt to remove Grivas or undermine 
his position, the Makarios Government insidiously tried 
to erode the National Guard's strength, or 
counterbalance it by strengthening and building other 
armed bodies under their direct control. While
appropriations for the National Guard were reduced, on 
24 February 1966, Makarios decided to increase the size 
of the police force, ^  and concluded an arms deal for
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1,000 rifles, 1,000 sub-machine guns, 20 mortars, and 20 
armoured cars to be imported from Czechoslovakia, to 
strengthen its capability.
With the disclosure of the secret arms
deal in December 1966, relations between Athens and
Nicosia plummeted further and led to a heated
intra-Greek dispute. The first consignment of the Czech
weapons were delivered but, a second consignment
including tanks and armoured cars was not honoured by
the Prague government in December, following a strong 
18diplomatic protest by Turkey. The UN
Secretary-General made no demur when he learnt of their 
19purpose, but the reactions of Athens towards Makarios
. 2 0  were quite hostile.
With the collapse of the Stephanopoulos
Government in December 1966 the Turkish Premier Demirel
called off the dialogue and declared that his Government
was not prepared to conduct talks with an interim
government expected to hold office only until the
21elections scheduled for May 1967 . In February 1967, 
the caretaker administration convened a Crown Council 
meeting and promised Makarios, who was present, that 
Greece would not conduct any further negotiations, 
except on a basis acceptable to Nicosia.
Action and Reaction:____ The Greek Military Regime and
Cyprus
On 21 April 1967, a coup d'etat staged by
a group of Greek officers ousted the civilian caretaker
22government. The coup was viewed as an unwelcome
development by the majority of Greek Cypriot leaders, 
who were now also sceptical about the prospect of 
"Enosis", as a military Government in Athens was 
considered to have few attractions. Fears were also 
held that a parallel coup might be attempted to oust
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Makarios. In light of the Greek coup and of possible
machinations in Cyprus orchestrated by the new regime,
the Soviet Union which had refrained from total
commitment to either the Greek or Turkish Cypriots was
now supporting the extension of UNFICYP1s presence on
Cyprus (in contrast to its stance in the June 1967
23Arab-Israeli war). With Soviet support, the Security 
Council unanimously voted on 19 June, to extend the 
mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months.
"Essentially the Colonels were narrow in
vision, parochial in analysis, devout, pure, pious
nationalists without interest in compromise or the
capacity to understand the art of the possible. Enosis
was sacred; any alternative was treason. The great
obstacle to enosis - Turkey - could easily be ignored or
manoeuvred into concessions; the • real culprit
Archbishop Makarios - had to be pilloried", concludes 
24Bell. A large segment of Greek officers were of the 
opinion that; Makarios preferred to remain President of 
Cyprus than proclaim enosis, that he espoused a radical 
foreign policy, and that he was a fellow-traveller.
Isolated internationally, the Athens 
military saw resolution of the Cyprus problem as a means 
to bolster their diplomatic image. The Colonels were 
under pressure from the Johnson White House and NATO to 
resolve the Cyprus issue through bilateral talks with 
the Demirel Government. As Xydis has written, "at the 
time there was a general revulsion in Western Europe 
against the establishment of the first military regime 
in this area since the war. The revulsion was strong 
enough to force the governments of Western Europe into 
demonstrations of immediate disapproval, which were 
expressed in diplomatic démarches or public 
statements."  ^^
-32-
During a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting 
held after the June war, the Greek and Turkish Ministers 
under pressure from their colleagues to resolve their 
outstanding differences agreed to revive their dormant 
talks over "Cyprus". The Demirel Cabinet believed that 
the Greek coup had created the right conditions for a 
resumption of the talks. Moreover, Turkish officials 
assessed that the military was likely to remain in power 
for quite a few years and that its foreign policy was 
not likely to be influenced or shaped by public opinion 
like its civilian predecessors.
The policy of the new Athens regime on 
how to resolve the Cyprus problem agitated the Makarios 
Government. In July 1967, however, Athens was
determined to initiate new moves to break the stalemate
27 . . .in Cyprus. In a statement issued in Athens in July
the military, demanded the dismissal of Cabinet
Ministers in the Makarios Government, who "on the eve of
decisive developments, lay down groundless conditions
and subversive prerequisites which would make 'Enosis'
impossible". The statement called on these persons -
"who, 'unhappily' included some who hold the highest
posts in the State and influence the leadership of the
Cypriot people to make room for those who trusted the
national Greek Government and the Cypriot leadership and f
had the realistic spirit needed for a final solution
that will be both profitable to the nation and generally
2 8acceptable". The Greek warning was in reply to a
statement made during a House of Representatives debate
by Mr Clerides in which he inter alia stated "that he
was opposed to any plan for "Enosis" that would provide
29for a Turkish military base in Cyprus."
The Greek military Government believed 
that the major obstacle to an "Enosis" compromise 
settlement, was the Archbishop's refusal to any 
territorial concessions or the offering of military
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3 0bases to Turkey. The possibility of the Athens Junta
agreeing to a negotiated solution which rejected or
failed to incorporate Makarios' objections, forced his
Beautitude into patching up his differences with Athens.
The achievements of Ankara's diplomatic offensive, as
shown with the visit to Paris of President Sunay and his
talks with De Gaulle, and the continued diplomatic
isolation of Greece, were factors that Makarios took
into consideration in deciding to adopt closer relations
towards Athens and Western Europe.^ Although from the
outset Makarios was aware of the real intentions of the
military concerning Cyprus, and while other members of
his Cabinet were publicly critical of Greek policy, he
32remained silent. Makarios was hopeful that with time, 
he might be able to out-manoeuvre Athens over its Cyprus 
policy.
On 4 July, Makarios advised Athens that
he would not accept any "bargain" made between Greece
and Turkey on the future of Cyprus. ^  However, in his
dealings with the Athens military, Makarios adopted a
cautious approach. His Beautitude was acutely aware
that, firstly, the military were not sympathetic to
Greek Cypriot aspirations. Secondly, the Israeli
victory in the June war over the Arabs and in particular
Egypt, had eroded the Arabs position and was also a
3 4drawback for Makarios' foreign policy, which closely
identified with Nasser's policies in the region.
Finally, the talk of an Athens-inspired coup in Cyprus
had forced Makarios to evolve towards a policy of
appeasement.^ Commentators on the Cyprus problem
believed that, the Athens demand for the removal of
Mr Clerides, might be the prelude to the removal of
Makarios himself. Makarios managed to regain some lost
ground vis a vis Athens by managing to secure once again
the support of Moscow which was opposed to the newly
3 7installed anti-communist and pro-NATO Athens regime.
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Following meetings between the Greek and
Turkish Foreign Ministers in Bonn and Luxembourg during
July 1967, Greece and Turkey renewed their talks over 
3 8Cyprus. During a three day visit to Cyprus, Junta
strongman Colonel Papadopoulos, pledged that "Greece
would strive for enosis by peaceful methods, and in
3 9co-operation with President Makarios". However, the
policy of Athens was contrary to this statement, and was
highlighted by the fact that the Greek-Turkish talks
were being held on a platform which stipulated "Enosis"
in return for a Turkish base on the island, or a Turkish
4 0presence in a NATO base. The military's position
clashed with Makarios1 tactical position which, excluded
outright a Turkish base or anything which espoused
41Turkish Cypriot autonomy. Anti-Communism and hence
closer relations with Turkey - a NATO ally and the 
strengthening of the eastern flank of NATO were placed 
on a higher priority by the Greek regime than relations 
with Nicosia. Within this policy platform a non-aligned 
and neutralist Makarios in Cyprus was considered an 
anathema^.
Athens persisted in its opening towards
Turkey, despite the explicit warnings by the Turkish
Foreign Minister that "Turkey will never accept a
4 3solution to the problem of Cyprus based on 'enosis'". 
Caglayangil's strong statement appeared to vindicate the 
view held by Greek Cypriot political leaders that, no 
negotiated settlement could be reached because of the 
fundamental differences of the Greek and Turkish 
positions and that no meaningful breakthrough would 
materialize from the consultations.
Greek-Turkish Summit Talks over the Cyprus Question
On 9-10 September 1967, a Greek-Turkish 
conference held at Kesan and Alexandroupolis at the 
suggestion of Demirel, ended in a major diplomatic
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setback for the Athens military. In seeking the new
diplomatic talks with Ankara, Athens underestimated the
complexities of the Cyprus problem and announced
prematurely in an optimistic tone that a final solution
45was in the offing. However, the talks proved
inconclusive.
The Greek side was hopeful that if an
accord could be reached with Ankara, Makarios might be
persuaded to accept it. The Turkish Premier, however,
repeatedly referred to the London agreement of 1959,
which categorically excluded "Enosis", and also demanded
the withdrawal of all the excess Greek troops from
Cyprus before any other matter was discussed. Athens
had certainly miscalculated by expecting to extract
concessions from the Turkish side which came to the
meeting in a political position far stronger than their
own. In view of the diplomatic isolation of the
4 6military, Ankara rejected the Greek proposals and used
the venue instead to enhance its position on other
47outstanding differences.
While the Greeks proposed "Enosis", the
Turks referred to the London-Zurich agreements, and in
48the end the talks terminated , achieving only a vague
communique on co-operation and future
49rapprochement. The conference was convened without
sufficient background preparatory work by both sides and
50without consulting either the Greek or Turkish
Cypriot leaders.
Even if Athens had succeeded in 
extracting a plan from Ankara - including a Turkish 
military base on the island - it would have been 
difficult for them to succeed in getting the Greek 
Cypriot leadership to approve or agree to any 
pre-determined deal. without the Archbishop's consent
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Athens ran the risk of agitating Makarios to publicly 
renounce "Enosis" which he had fought for so many years.
Makarios declared the summit talks a
"failure", ^  and said that "a solution should not be
52dependent on the dialogue". Similarly commenting on 
the same talks, the former United Nations mediator in 
Cyprus, Mr Galo Plaza, stressed that "The Cyprus problem 
cannot be solved by Greece and Turkey alone 
conferences between Greece and Turkey would reach no 
conclusion, particularly if Cypriot representatives were 
not included".^
Upon his return to Turkey, Demirel noted
the extent to which the talks had been a failure from
the Greek point of view and made a similar appraisal to 
54Plaza's. He reiterated that he had rejected the Greek 
side's proposal for "Enosis", and that he had insisted 
on the validity of the Zurich agreement.
The November 1967 Cyprus Crisis and American Shuttlecock 
Diplonyacy; The Vance ftissidn
In November 1967, an outbreak of 
inter-communal hostility in Cyprus, escalated into a 
serious crisis that once again threatened to engulf 
Greece and Turkey into a possible war.
The crisis began when Greek Cypriot
55police (CYPOL) enforced their right of patrol through
two villages, Ayios Theodorous (mixed population) and
Kophinou (all Turkish). ^  On 14 November, two CYPOL
units patrolled the area without any incident. However,
UNFICYP High Command advised the Cyprus government that
the patrol had made its point, and that the additional
CYPOL patrol led by Grivas on the same day was not 
57needed. This was contrary to the established norm of 
periodic patrols and underscored to the Makarios
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Government the dangers in its approach to sustain the
5 8pressure against the Turkish Cypriot enclave. On 15
November, a CYPOL patrol was stopped at Kophinou and
attacked. This incident led to a full scale attack by
the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Police Tactical
59Reserve Forces. By launching the offensive, the Greek
6 0Cypriot forces had disregarded UNFICYP's instructions.
The attack was also contrary to the Security Council's
advice "to refrain from any action or threat of action
likely to worsen the situation in Cyprus, or endanger
international peace". ^  Prior to the November incident,
the capture and later the release of the Turkish Cypriot
leader Denktash by Greek Cypriots and violations of
Greek air space by Turkish air force planes on 2 and 4
November, had created an atmosphere of tension both in
6 2Cyprus and between Greece and Turkey. The
Kophinou/Ayios Theodorous offensive led by Grivas had
taken place with the covert approval of the Athens
military - which had been briefed earlier on the likely
ramifications of such an operation. Since Grivas was
responsible to the Greek High Command, it was up to the
6 3Greek military to change the instructions to Grivas.
Turkey warned Greece and Makarios of the
ultimate sanction of an invasion of Cyprus. The
National Guard's attack on Turkish Cypriot enclaves, in
November, strengthened the hand of "Turkish" hawks who
were demanding a military invasion. On the 15th,
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil, requested UNFICYP
64to intervene and negotiate a cease-fire. In the
meantime throughout Turkey there were demonstrations in 
support of a Turkish invasion. On 16 and 17 November 
the Turkish National Assembly and Senate confirmed upon
the Demirel Cabinet the power to use the Turkish armed
65 6 6forces to invade Cyprus. Demirel declared that his
government would "do everything possible and necessary
6 7to stop Greek aggression in Cyprus." Despite the
Turkish ultimatum, CYPOL on the 17th sent a patrol into
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the hostile area. However, within 24 hours, UNFICYP had
managed to negotiate a cease-fire and the Greek National
6 8Guard troops had withdrawn from the villages. Demirel
took advantage of Greece's international isolation and
decided that he would use the incident to extract
concessions that would strengthen the Turkish Cypriot's
security and Turkey's wider interests. In a note to the
69Greek Government he demanded:
(1) "Removal of the Greek soldiers on the Island 
in violation of the Treaty Alliance;
(2) Removal of General Grivas;
(3) Disbandment of the entire National Guard;
(4) Disengagement in the area where the fighting 
took place;
(5) Authorization for Turkish Cypriots to form 
their own local governments and police forces 
in their enclaves;
(6) Compensation to Turkish Cypriots for losses 
resulting from the attacks; and
(7) Enlargement of the United Nations'
Peacekeeping force to preclude a repetition of
70the attacks."
The Greek Military's Reaction to the Turkish Ultimatum
Threatened by aerial bombardment plus an 
impending invasion of Cyprus and the risk of a clash on 
the Greek-Turkish border, Athens stalled for time. A 
diplomatic avenue was needed to be found^ in order to 
minimise the damage to its already shaky credibility. 
Athens accepted Demirel's first demand that General
-39-
72Grivas be recalled to Greece and in a symbolic move to
. . . 73offset Ankara's threat appointed Mr Pipinelis, a
74career diplomat, as Foreign Minister on 20 November. 
Diplomatic observers however, saw the appointment of Mr 
Pipinelis as a ploy by Athens to gain time.
The military proposed bilateral talks with
Turkey, however, Demirel accused Athens of delaying
7 5tactics and rejected the offer. Mr Tuley, the Turkish
7 6Ambassador in Athens, said that "before Ankara could
consider the Greek suggestion, Greece should reply to
the set of demands submitted by the Turkish
77government".
These demands were viewed by Athens more as an
attempt by Ankara to discredit the regime than to
improve the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority.
The demand -that Greek forces in Cyprus be reduced to the
treaty level was rejected by Athens in its reply to the
7 8Turkish note on 22 November. The Greek government's
refusal to accept the Turkish preconditions for a
settlement heightened the tension between them. Mr
Pipinelis said "that Greece was determined to accept no
settlement of the Cyprus dispute which would be
incompatible with the national interest and Greek 
79dignity".
Dismissing the Greek reply as unsatisfactory,
Demirel threatened that an invasion of Cyprus was
imminent and that it would be launched the next day.
Ankara was now seeking a radical tilt in the balance of
8 0forces towards the Turkish Cypriot side. Such a move 
it argued was the only means to prevent another outburst 
of intercommunal violence. As the Turkish
representative stated to the UN Security Council: 
"...The Turkish government firmly believes that the only 
element which threatens the peace on the island, which 
poses the greatest danger to the security of life of the
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Turkish community, and the most direct impediment to the
effective functioning of UNFICYP in Cyprus, emerges the
the presence of the Illegal Greek Army of occupation
which has been brought to the island
81surreptitiously ...".
Although Athens was ready to negotiate with
Ankara, the thought of agreeing, to concede major
concessions in order to appease the Turkish Government
8 2placed the Greek military in an unenviable position.
Turkey's Strategic and Diplomatic Advantage
Ankara's carefully timed and orchestrated
combination of military and diplomatic threat placed it
in a vantage position whereby it could demand
concessions from Athens, which under different
conditions would have probably led to war. In
particular, the Turkish side was favoured by the
diplomatic isolation of Greece, which in turn weakened
its posture towards Ankara by; Washington's involvement
8 3in Vietnam and by the erosion of support for Makarios
84by the Post-Khruschev Soviet leadership . It has also 
been noted that most world attention at the time was 
focussed on the United Kingdom's Sterling crisis, and 
that it was probable that the Demirel Cabinet estimatedQ Cthat Turkey could over-react, and get away with it.
Devoid of any diplomatic support and with its 
armed forces in a state of military unpreparedness, war 
seemed an unlikely option for Greece and placed Turkey 
into a forceful position to threaten war. A clash at 
this point in time in all probability, would have led to 
the demise of the military, which eventually occurred 7 
years later. If Turkey had invaded Cyprus, Greece would 
undoubtedly have been compelled to intervene to defend 
the Greek Cypriots. Yet its ability to intervene
effectively was limited both by distance and by the
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disorganised state of the Greek armed forces, stemming
in part from a purge of experienced battle seasoned
officers as a result of the "ASPIDA" affair, and the
8 6April coup. The partial arms embargo imposed by the 
Johnson Administration, after the coup of 21 April,
added to the level of unpreparedness of Greece's armed
, 87forces.
As the crisis escalated, it became apparent
that the Greek armed forces were at a disadvantage. The
situation also highlighted the "value in a crisis of
local military superiority, and a will to use it out of
8 8proportion to the political issues at stake." During
the crisis Demirel was looking for a way to secure the
interests of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. However,
his policy dilemma at the time was how to formulate an
approach that would accomplish this without exposing the
Turkish Cypriots to unnecessary risk. As Harris
declares: "Precedent favoured [Turkey] making a
convincing show of its determination to exercise its
treaty rights to invade if necessary in order to compel
89a return to the status quo ante". An integral part of
such a policy rested upon Demirel's skill to agree to an
invasion. It was around this issue that Turkey
exercised maximum strategic leverage over Greece.
"Turkish military strategy planned to establish a
beach-head, or occupy a port, in Cyprus. Meanwhile, the
Turkish army in Thrace would await possible aggression
from the Greeks. The overwhelming opinion was that the
First Hellenic Army would not budge. In that case, the
9 0military actions would be limited to Cyprus". In the 
event of a Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus, Turkey's Air 
superiority and its close proximity to Cyprus, would, 
from the commencement of hostilities have placed it in a 
strategically superior position (as shown in August 
1964). It was not possible for the Greek air force to 
provide adequate air cover over Cyprus, as the island 
was out of range from most Greek bases and any attempt
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to reinforce Cyprus with additional troops would in all
probability have led to Ankara countering the move by
91invading Cyprus. Reinforcement of the Greek ground
troops by air support would have also been extremely
dangerous, and there was a chance that the
troop-carrying aircraft would have been shot down before
92they even reached Cypriot airspace. Ahmed states that
"the decision not to intervene militarily was probably a
wise one, for its outcome could have been partition of
the island by Turkey and Greece. Strategically, this
was never seen as being in the interest of Turkey, for
'double enosis' would have permitted a Greek military
presence only forty miles from the coast of southern
Turkey, and could have proved most dangerous in a future
armed conflict. It was in Turkey's interest therefore
to maintain an independent Cyprus, provided that the
security and rights of the Turkish minority were
9 3guaranteed."
Besides the local strategic superiority, the 
Turkish government correctly deduced that the 
international developments also placed it in a strong 
diplomatic position. Turkey skillfully used its newly 
acquired diplomatic flexibility to manoeuvre which 
resulted from the partial lifting of the Soviet threat
from the North, thus strengthening its bargaining
. . 94position over Cyprus. Although Moscow's rapprochement
with Ankara came during and after the Cypriot crisis,
wider considerations prompted the Kremlin to revise its
policy towards Turkey. Good relations with Turkey were
crucial for the Soviets to freely manoeuvre in the
Mediterranean, as the deployment of Soviet ships in the
95Mediterranean required a guarantee of unrestricted
9 6passage through the Dardanelles. As Zoppo points out,
"the operational capability of the Soviet Mediterranean
9 7fleet is curtailed by Turkish control of the Straits 
and . . . neither modern technology nor friendly Arab 
ports can completely eliminate the constraint Turkish
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control of the Straits places on the operations of the
98Soviet fleet west of Bosporus".
In 1967, the Soviet Union refrained from
criticisms of Ankara when it threatened to invade
Cyprus. The silence was interpreted by Turkish
diplomats as signalling a pro-Turkish tilt by Moscow.
This was confirmed on 23 November, when the Soviet
Government released a statement stressing that: "The
present events in Cyprus cannot be considered in
isolation from the policy of the reactionary circles of
Greece, which, with the support of outside forces, have
for quite some time been drawing up plans envisaging a
solution of the Cyprus problem by military methods, and
the liquidation of the independence and territorial
integrity of the Cypriot state through so called 
99'enosis'.
The Soviet leadership had opposed Turkish 
policy on Cyprus until 1965. Since that period, while 
"neutral" on the dispute, it outlined support for the 
Turkish position in several areas of its policy over the 
Cyprus problem culminating with its public support for 
Turkey in November 1967. ^  The rift between President 
Johnson and the Inônü Government in 1964 had played a 
part in the Turkish rapprochement with Moscow. Soviet 
relations with Turkey eventually expanded in 1966-67. 
In September 1967, the Turkish Premier went to the 
Soviet Union on an official visit. In the joint
communiqué issued at the end of the trip, the two sides 
noted, "the grave danger created by attempts to 
aggravate the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
and deprive the Cypriot state of independence".^ ^
The policy followed by recent regimes in 
Ankara had been to continue its close ties with the West 
and in particular with the United States, while at the 
same time conducting normal diplomatic relations with
-44-
Mo scow. The perception held by Turkish officials and in
particular the Turkish military was that the Soviet
Union was waiting in the wings to take advantage of any
power vacuum. This led Turkish policymakers to
administer a cautious foreign policy viz-a-viz the
Soviet Union, which was counterbalanced by a firm
102commitment to NATO. Overall, its opening towards
Moscow improved its manoeuvrability. Despite this move 
Ankara's strategic dependence on the United States and 
NATO was still vital.
Crisis Diplomacy "Concert" - The Vance Mission
On 22 November, in a move to prevent a
Greek-Turkish war the Johnson Administration, in concert
with the Wilson Government and Canada proposed a
10 3settlement formula. The Canadian Prime Minister,
Lester Pearson, was chosen to make the proposal. The
trilateral plan was presented to the Greek Foreign
Minister on 22 November by their respective Ambassadors 
104in Athens. The plan called for:
(1) the number of Greek and Turkish troops 
stationed in Cyprus to be reduced to the 
levels specified in the Treaty of Alliance 
accords;
(2) the size of UNFICYP to be increased;
(3) members of the Turkish Cypriot community who 
suffered injuries or damages in the incidents 
to be compensated, and the security of the 
Turkish Cypriot minority to be guaranteed; and
(4) the Demirel Government to guarantee that 
Turkey would not intervene militarily on the 
island.
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The proposal which had the full diplomatic support of
the three co-sponsors, was primarily a move to stall for
time in order to help diffuse the latest Cyprus crisis.
The peace plan contained some concessions for all the
interested parties. The conflicting replies to
Pearson's formula indicated that detailed negotiations
would need to follow before any agreement that
accommodated their respective interests could be
r e a c h e d . H o w e v e r ,  the atmosphere was so tense that
it was not even possible to extract an agreement for
representatives from Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey to come
to the negotiating table "(No such meeting had taken
107place in the last four years.") Moreover, the
British Government with extensive first-hand experience 
in dealing with past Turkish-Greek animosity, was in 
this instance not in favour of placing the Cyprus 
problem before the Security Council. The premise being 
that such a move would have exacerbated the respective 
intransigent positions.
Demirel held the diplomatic trumpcard and
played it effectively with aggressive diplomacy backed
10 9by the threat of war, he reiterated his demands.
The Athens regime, after evaluating the stringent 
Turkish demands was now more receptive and agreed to 
meet with Turkish representatives. It rejected the 
Turkish ultimatum "no discussion without withdrawal" and 
counter argued "no withdrawal without discussion".
In this climate of obstinance outside mediation seemed 
necessary.
On 22 November, President Johnson appointed 
former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, as his 
special envoy to mediate in the dispute. On the same 
day, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed José 
Rolz-Bennet (of Guatemala) as his special 
representative. On 24 November, Athens and Ankara
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accepted a third mediator, Manlio Brosio, the 
Secretary-General of NATO.
As the crisis escalated it became evident that 
the impending invasion would be called off only as part 
of a total package which achieved both a reduction or 
withdrawal of the clandestine Greek troops in Cyprus and 
a strengthening of UNFICYP. The above package was not 
inherently unacceptable to either Athens or Ankara. To 
the Demirel Cabinet it offered the prospect of a Greek 
withdrawal and an improvement in security arrangements 
for the Turkish Cypriot minority. Similarly, to the 
Athens Junta it provided an opportunity to withdraw from 
a totally unfavourable p o s i t i o n . T h e  reasons why the 
Greek military did not find the withdrawal unacceptable 
is partly linked to the internal politics of Greece. In 
September 1967 the military had heard reports that King 
Constantine was planning a counter coup to overthrow the 
Junta with the help of "certain monarchist officers" in 
the armed forces. The Junta feared that a royalist 
counter-coup might be launched from within the Greek 
forces in Cyprus, possibly assisted by the 
"pro-Royalist" Makarios. (The Greek Pentagon had not 
placed, by November 1967, enough officers loyal to the 
Athens regime in key posts on the island.) Hence, the 
withdrawal of the Greek forces stood to eliminate the 
threat of a coup from Cyprus.
United States Foreign Policy and the 1967 Cyprus Crisis
From the outset Cyrus Vance was confronted
with a policy dilemma in his task of averting a war
between America's two NATO allies. He was placed in an
uneasy position between them and was forced to play the
"honest broker". Vance was aware that any move that
favoured either Greece or Turkey, simultaneously ran
112the risk of alienating the other.
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In Washington, in November 1967, State
Department policymakers knew that President Johnson
could not follow the same tactics he had used in 1964 to
avert a Greek-Turkish war. It seems clear even without
knowing Vance's actual instructions, that in 1967 the
Johnson administration was not prepared to sanction the
Turkish invasion by employing military force, and
that the Athens military was probably so informed. War
between two NATO allies was unacceptable for the Johnson
administration in November 1967, as it had been in 1964,
but US officials held fears that a Turkish invasion of
Cyprus could lead to forceful counter-measures on the
part of Greece. To avert this "worst case" scenario,
Washington's only viable option was to press via
diplomatic means, for a peaceful resolution, although
State Department officials were conscious that
advocating such a solution could threaten US-Turkish
114relations once again. Since its 1964 diplomatic
intervention against Inonii, the United States had not 
been prepared to further undermine its relations with 
Turkey over the Cyprus p r o b l e m . W i t h o u t  overt US 
intervention, and short of war, the only option 
available to the Athens military, was to accede to the 
Turkish ultimatum.
Vance's diplomatic effort was facilitated by 
the gradual emergence of an international consensus 
which, in this instance, also included the Soviet Union. 
On 22 and 24 November, the UN Secretary-General, U 
Thant, issued appeals to the President of Cyprus and the 
Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey: "I appeal to the 
three states most directly involved - Cyprus, Greece and 
Turkey - in the strongest possible terms, to exercise 
utmost restraint, particularly at this critical 
juncture, to avoid all acts of force or the threats of 
recourse to force .
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On 24 November, the Turkish President, General
Sunay, sent letters to world leaders declaring that
Turkey had "decided to solve the Cyprus problem once and 
117for all", after having tried all diplomatic means in 
118vain. Sunay asserted that the London and Zurich
agreements on Cyprus had been violated and that
President Makarios's administration had annihilated the
Cyprus Constitution. In the meantime, following an
examination of the Cyprus developments, the UN Security
Council adopted, on 2 5 November, without a formal vote a
"consensus" which endorsed the UN Secretary-General's
appeal for calm, and his subsequent recommendation that
all external forces be withdrawn from Cyprus, except for
119those of UNFICYP. The Security Council consensus
seemed to remove the threat of imminent war. In the 
management of the crisis the United Nations body 
supplemented the mediation efforts of Vance mostly 
through its existence as an acceptable forum. This 
provided both sides with the proper diplomatic venue and 
through impartial guarantees and peacekeeping, over an 
extended period of time through UNFICYP.
The decision by Moscow not to take an active 
interest in the November crisis indirectly assisted the 
US envoy's mediation efforts. Had the Soviet regime
decided to intervene in an overt way, as it did in 1964, 
Vance's ability to manoeuvre in the dispute would have 
been limited.
Analysts within the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) monitoring the crisis
noted the possibility that the United States and the
Soviet Union could be locked into a confrontation over 
121
Cyprus. Even if a Greek-Turkish conflict did not
lead to direct involvement by the United States or the 
Soviet Union, it would have been a major strategic 
setback for the United States if war broke out between 
two of its client states. Besides their NATO
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membership, both had concluded bilateral defence
agreements with the United States and together had 
received more than 4.5 billion dollars in American arms 
since 1946.122
The Link between the Sjoviet Union’s Middle East ,Policy 
and Its 1967 "Cyprus" Posture
Moscow's decision not to intervene in November 
1967, contrasted sharply with the active role the Soviet 
Union played, in the neighbouring June 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war and its involvement during the 1964 Cyprus crisis. 
Western diplomats, at first, feared that the Soviet 
Union might play an active part in the latest Cyprus 
crisis and, thereby, underscore its presence in the 
Mediterranean. However, contrary to its assessments, 
Moscow decided to maintain an almost unprecedented air 
of detachment throughout the critical phase of the 
crisis. A number of developments could have been 
instrumental to the Kremlin's benign stance.
The Kremlin policy-makers responsible for
Soviet policy on the Cyprus problem were continuously
aware that the Cyprus dispute fell within the Western
sphere of influence and any strong Soviet involvement
would have affected Moscow's wider foreign policy
relations with the US. The Kremlin was apprehensive
throughout the 1967 crisis to avoid any "backfire" 
123
effect that could have turned the dispute into a
major East-West issue. Such a scenario would have
probably had negative results for the Soviets in that it
would have resulted in a closing of the ranks by NATO,
12 4including the two adversaries Greece and Turkey.
The Soviet Union observed during the 1967
Cyprus crisis, as it did in the June 1967 Middle East
War, the necessity of maintaining a buffer between local
12 5conflicts and a potentially global conflict. As
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Adams and Cottrell state, "where the issues are complex, 
Moscow prefers to act not with tactical consistency but 
according to opportunity, thereby reinforcing
fundamental and strategic objectives. Given the
diversity of the political entities involved in the 
Cyprus problem and the Kremlin's special and often 
changing relations with each of them, the Soviet leaders 
wish, at all costs, to retain their flexibility. In 
their view, maintaining a strong position of influence 
over the affairs of one troubled island, and 
consistently supporting its indigenous communist party, 
is not worth the sacrifice of concomitant advantage 
elsewhere.
A Critical Analysis of Cyprus Vance's Mediation Tactics
The Presidential envoy, tried to save as much
face for both the Greek and Turkish sides by 
127shuttling continuously between Athens and Ankara and
gradually obtaining agreement on the major issues of
contention. Vance's modus operandi was to first
forestall a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and then attempt
12 8
to extract a detailed agreement. He held talks
12 9alternately with Greek and Turkish officials. On 24
November, the US envoy advised the Athens military that
rather than appear to be responding to Ankara's threats,
Greece could consider a proposal to be channelled via
the office of the UN Secretary-General on agreed terms
and would project the view that Greece would be
130
responding to U-Thant's recommendations rather than 
to Demirel's ultimatum. While offering the U-Thant 
option in Athens, in Ankara Vance tried to ensure that 
the Turkish Government did not increase its set of 
demands.
Throughout his "Cyprus" mediation Vance worked 
closely with both the NATO Secretary-General and 
U-Thant's special representative. Gradually, he managed
- 5 1 -
to get Greece and Turkey to draft a plan. The turning
point occurred on 24 November, when the Athens military
agreed to withdraw its excess troops stationed in Cyprus
but only if some means could be found to ensure that
their decision did convey the view that they had
succumbed to Ankara's pressure. Vance, having obtained
Greece's agreement to his formula, presented it to
Ankara for acceptance. In reply, Demirel's government
131put forward a set of rigid counter-proposals. A
combination of factors, headed by the Parliamentary 
Opposition's reaction, led to the Turkish Premier taking 
a tougher stance. He feared that the Greek side would 
evade the terms of a settlement if it dragged out.
An unforeseen setback in the de-escalation of
the dispute developed as the Turkish Government
132re-examined the agreements extracted by Vance.
Demirel's Cabinet was primarily examining closer the
objections to Vance's proposals stipulated by some of
133the minor opposition parties. The Turkish Premier
was trying to shield his political flank before he 
conveyed to the US envoy that the proposals were 
acceptable. The Turkish Government having also
mobilised an invasion force in 1964, was aware that if 
that force disembarked without going anywhere it would 
have been under pressure, to show impressive results in 
order to placate domestic public opinion for once again, 
rejecting the military option of war over Cyprus.
Following days of drafting countless peace
formulae, the prospects of averting war and peacefully
resolving the crisis seemed a real possibility. At one
phase the talks were only narrowly averted from
13 4
collapsing. However, a last minute switch in outlook
by the interested parties, enabled the Presidential 
envoy to successfully conclude the talks. Vance's
diplomatic efforts were facilitated in part by the 
active participation of Brosio and Rolz-Bennet, both of
-52-
whom as envoys paid separate visits to Ankara and
13 5Athens. On 27 November, an inconclusive agreement
was reached after Athens military accepted the Demirel 
proposals that Vance brought back from Ankara. Despite 
Athens concurrence, the agreement could not be ratified 
until it had also been approved by President Makarios.
For the first six days of his nine day
mediation the US envoy focussed his attention
exclusively on Athens and Ankara and totally bypassed
the Cyprus Government. Vance's strategy was to extract
an agreement from Greece and Turkey on an acceptable
settlement, and then to provide Makarios with the option
of either accepting the terms of settlement, or to be
projected as the side torpedoing the agreement and
13 6prolonging the crisis. The reason for this was
summed up by a senior diplomat, "It was not Vance's 
mission to get an agreement that would work - that, in 
view of the problems among the three countries, would 
have been impossible. His job was simply to get an 
agreement that would avert the immediate threat of war". 
By ignoring the Greek Cypriots' objections, Vance was 
able to secure an agreement between Ankara and Athens 
which permitted the Turkish leaders to begin political, 
if not yet military, demobilisation without stopping to 
demand what Makarios would do. It has been argued that 
had Vance tried from the outset to include Cyprus into 
the agreement the talks would have collapsed or made 
insignificant progress that Ankara would in all 
probability have carried out the invasion.
Makarios was acutely aware of the
insignificant role his government played in the
mediation efforts spearheaded by Vance, Brozio and
Tafall to bring Athens and Ankara together. President
Makarios, at the height of the crisis stated that,
"Whether the war that threatens our island will be
137avoided or not does not depend on us".
-53-
The Makarios-Vance Talks-:_____American Mediation Versus
Byzantine Statecraft
Makarios, on 27 November, conveyed to the UN 
special envoy Rolz-Bennet that he would agree to the
removal of all Greek and Turkish contingents from the
13 8
island with a view to eventual demilitarisation.
During Vance's first meeting with Makarios* on 29
November, the US mediator assumed rather prematurely
that His Beautitude would fully endorse the proposed
Turkish-Greek agreement which he had drafted. Makarios
saw the talks as an opportunity to extract substantial
concessions from Vance who had deliberately excluded him
139in the earlier phase of the negotiations.
On 3 0 November, Greece and Turkey agreed to 
the terms of Vance's formula. The move signified that 
the crisis had been deferred, and it was only the 
formality of the Secretary-General to issue the 
agreement under UN auspices and in turn being ratified 
by the parties. Last minute reservations by Makarios, 
however, threatened to torpedo the Vance settlement and 
forced the US envoy to return to Cyprus to avert the 
collapse of the agreement. In the meantime the UN 
Secretary-General who was scheduled to announce the 
terms of the agreement on 1 December 1967 was forced to 
postpone the announcement until an agreement was 
extracted from Makarios as well.
Makarios had added to the Turkish demand 
calling for disbandment of the entire National Guard and 
the demand for total demilitarisation of Cyprus and thus
linking the removal of both the Greek and Turkish army
14 0contingents as specified under the London Agreement.
The Demirel government strongly objected to Makarios' 
proposal. However, His Beautitude was determined to 
resist a reduction in the National Guard or to accept an 
increase in UNFICYP members except only if it was part
-54-
of a wider settlement that contained UN guarantees of
Cypriot independence. Following a new round of
141Vance/Makarios talks, U-Thant issued a third appeal.
In an attempt to force Makarios to abandon his 
intransigent position to the Vance formula, the Greek
and Turkish Governments publicly stated that they both
142
agreed with the terms despite Makarios' opposition.
In the meantime, U-Thant appealed to the governments of
Greece and Turkey, "... to carry out an expeditious
withdrawal of those of their forces in excess of their
respective contingents in Cyprus ... with regard to any
further role that it might be considered desirable for
UNFICYP to undertake, I gather that this could involve,
subject to the necessary action by the Security Council,
enlarging the mandate of the force so as to give it
143broader functions".
-55-
Greece and Turkey responded favourably to the 
appeal, and stated that they were "ready to carry it out 
expeditiously". The Greek Cypriot's reply was, however, 
interim and qualified. Representatives of Greece and 
Turkey signed an agreement, on 3 December, to reduce the 
number of the armed forces each had stationed in Cyprus.
The Greek-Turkish pact called for:
a. the removal from Cyprus, within 4 5 days, of 
all Greek and Turkish troops not authorized 
under the 1960 Cyprus accord?
b. the dismantling, within 45 days, of all Greek 
and Turkish war preparations that had 
precipitated the crisis;
c. the disarming of all local military forces on 
Cyprus, particularly the Greek Cypriot 
National Guard; and
d. the expansion of the 4, 500-man UN force to
prevent further communal clashes between Greek
144and Turkish Cypriots.
In his talks with Vance, Makarios once again
outlined his objections to the internal security
arrangements for Cyprus agreed by Greece and Turkey. On
4 December, Makarios repeated his proposals, emphasising
his positive response to U-Thant's peace plea. Inter
alia he stated, "my government considers that effective
guarantees against any military intervention in the
affairs of Cyprus is a demanding necessity for peace,
145and should be insured through the Security Council". 
Makarios' proposal that any change in UNFICYP's status 
should be examined in terms of eventual
demilitarisation, and considered by the UN Security
146 .Council, was opposed by the United States, Britain
and other UN Security Council members on the grounds
that such a meeting would only polarize further
Greek/Turkish antagonism in the UN and lead to a barrage
of charges by both camps.
Greece and Turkey approved the UN
147Secretary-General's recommendation to expand UNFICYP, 
but Makarios insisted that he would consider a larger 
role for UNFICYP, only if the Cyprus Government could 
exercise some degree of control over it.
Makarios attacked Turkey's demand to
re-arrange the balance of forces on Cyprus using an
expanded UNFICYP, a demand which in the final analysis
did not stand much chance of being approved by the
Security Council, as a veto on the question of expanding
UNFICYP was expected from the Soviet Union and possibly 
148
France . In the end Makarios' adamant posture paid
off. In the final agreement, there was no reference to
149the Turkish demand for the disbandment of the Greek
Cypriot National Guard while the reference to possible
150expansion of UNFICYP was heavily qualified.
-56-
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The November Crisis in Retrospect
The November crisis affected many diverse
relationships. The crisis represented a defeat for the
Greek military regime. Its retreat from the Cyprus
arena meant that Athens' leverage vis-a-vis Makarios was
at least temporarily reduced. By submitting to
Demirel's demands for a withdrawal of the illegal Greek
forces on Cyprus, the Athens military forfeited the hold
that it had over Makarios on the "Enosis" issue.
This was especially the case given that it had been
forced to curb its own "Enosis" aspirations. Indeed by
"capitulating", the Colonels' regime revealed its
internal weaknesses and also produced a wave of
anti-Greek Government feeling in Cyprus, where Greek
152Cypriot political leaders recalled the pledges of
the Athens military to resolve the Cyprus problem.
Following the withdrawal of the clandestine Greek
troops, Makarios abandoned "Enosis" and became firmly
153committed to a policy of national independence.
The November 1967 crisis drastically altered
the situation on Cyprus, and illustrated Makarios'
political acumen and strength in standing up to the
Turkish threat of invasion, while skillfully avoiding
some of the consequences of the Athens and Ankara 
154
agreement. He ignored the Greek example, and refused
to capitulate to Vance's pressure without first 
extracting substantial concessions.
In the case of Turkey, the crisis was a well 
orchestrated diplomatic success for Demirel though it 
failed to make any breakthrough on the inter-communal
issue. However, in terms of domestic Turkish politics,
• . 155the crisis was a political setback. In particular,
"Demirel was criticised by all the opposition parties
for having missed the opportunity to intervene and
settle the Cyprus crisis once and for a l l . " ^ ^  Ahmed
writes that "Turkish public opinion was convinced that,
in calling off the invasion of Cyprus, the politicians
157had once again bowed to US pressure."
The 1967 crisis was a successful exercise in 
crisis management through co-ordinated mediation. It 
also illustrated that if a super power did not 
relinquish its responsibility for conflict resolution, 
and was in a position to exert pressure over both sides 
to a conflict, it could indeed play an effective 
mediatory role. There was also widespread agreement 
that the Vance mission helped remove the legacy of 
distrust of the United States that was left in Ankara 
following President Johnson's ultimatum to Inonii in 
1964. The fact that Turkey was not isolated in the 1967 
crisis was probably the central factor in the 
normalisation of Turkish-American relations.
Finally, the crisis was a successful exercise
in effective co-operation between the State Department,
NATO, and the UN representatives. In retrospect, the
1967 crisis also showed that the de-escalation of the
crisis under UN auspices was the only alternative to
war, or to radical territorial changes imposed by 
1 5 8
force. The fact that in 1967, there were no
protracted intercommunal clashes as had taken place in 
1963 and 1964, could be partly attributed to the
-58-
effective presence of UNFICYP.
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" W h e r e  t h e y  m a k e  a d e s e r t  t h e y  call 
it p e a c e ."
T a c i t u s  C .55 - C .117
" P e a c e  is in t h e  g r a v e : /  T h e  g r a v e  
h i d e s  all t h i n g s  b e a u t i f u l  a n d  g o o d : /  
I a m  a G o d  a n d  c a n n o t  f i n d  it t h e r e . "
P r o m e t h e u s  U n b o u n d  I. 632
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CHAPTER III
SUBVERSION AND INTERVENTION 
1969 - 1974
With the de-escalation of the November 1967 crisis, a new 
era of peace seemed to dawn upon the political arena of Cyprus.
As a gesture of reconciliation in March 1968, President Makarios 
announced several measures aimed at re-uniting the two c o m m u n i t i e s / ^  
After preliminary talks in Beirut from 2-5 June, formal inter­
communal negotiations began on 24 June in Nicosia under the auspices
of Senor Bibiano Osorio-Tafall, the UN Secretary-General1s personal
( 2 )
representative in Cyprus. Between 1968 and 1971 negotiations 
deteriorated,diminishing the prospects for a solution. The in­
crease of clandestine activity in the form of the formation of 
extremists Greek Cypriot organisations, such as the "National Front” 
and "EOKA-B", largely at the instigation of the Papadopoulos 
regime, polarised political activity on the island. During the 
period 1969 to 1974 there were numerous subversive actions such 
as the 1970 assassination attempt on His Beatitude, which his 
administration believed originated from Athens, resulted in a 
deterioration of relations between the two regimes. Makarios’s. 
decision to challenge the Greek government's attempts to undermine 
the sovereignty of Cyprus, which included the threat of force­
ful intervention, polarised the two sides leading inevitably to 
the July 1974 confrontation.
Subversion - The Formation of the National Front
The emergence in April 1969 of the pro-enosis extremist 
organisation, the National Front, threatened not only the future 
of the inter-communal talks, but also the survival of the Makarios
pursuit of Enosis and the elimination of Communism, the National
EOKA and dedicated to the
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Front became the vanguard for "enosist" extremists. In May
1969 it demanded that the Makarios government be overthrown
(5)
and be replaced by a more militant pro-enosis government. The
Front also focussed its attention on the inconclusive inter-
communal talks by questioning the relevance of the talks. The
increase of violent political actions by the organisation led
the Cyprus government to introduce emergency measures including
the banning of the National Front Movement in August 1969.
Prior to this, Makarios had asked the group to dissolve itself.
On 22 August, he stated: "I warmly appeal to all members of
illegal organisations and groups to realise the great national
harm they are causing to their country and to dissolve themselves.
If their illegal activity continues the immediate consequences
will be civil strife and a complete collapse of our internal 
(6 ) 
front".
//
On 17 February 1970, the Soviet Union claimed that the
"Athens Colonels", with United States and NATO support, were
planning a coup to oust Makarios, annex Cyprus to Greece and
"( 7 )
incorporate it into the NATO defence system. The statement
was evaluated by western diplomats as an exercise in disinform-
(8 )
ation aimed at f o m e n t i n g  anti-NATO feeling in Turkey. However,
on 8 March 1970, an abortive assissination attempt against
His Beatitude as part of a plan code-named "Hermes" brought to
(9)
the forefront the schism between Athens and Nicosia. Relations,
at a low level since the 1967 crisis, deteriorated further in
1969, when Papadopoulos had demanded that Makarios dismiss his
Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Georkajis, because of his
alleged involvement in an assassination attempt against the Greek 
(1 0 )
dictator. In order to reduce the pressure from Greece, Makarios
( 1 1 )
requested Georkajis to resign.
(4)
As a symbolic gesture of reconciliation, in 17 January 1970,
in a joint communique with Makarios, Papadopoulos repudiated the
( 1 2 )
activities of the National Front. However the move failed
to mend the strained relationship. A speech on 12 February 1970,
by General Yerakinis, the retired Greek officer who commanded
the Cyprus National Guard, titled "Enosis Even By Force", fuelled
fears among Greek-Cypriot leaders that the National Front had
close links with dissident officers in the National Guard
(13)
who in turn were receiving instructions from Athens. The Ankara 
government was also alarmed by the contents of the speech and 
lodged a formal complaint with the Greek government. To avoid 
a crisis the Junta was forced to severely reprimand the General.
The developments of March 1970 drew considerable internation­
al interest. The Soviet Union made approaches to the governments 
of Britain, Greece and Turkey, and reaffirmed her stand on non­
intervention. The Turkish foreign minister Caglayangil expressed 
his country's partisan outlook when he stated:
"Turkey would not hesitate to intervene, if an 
attempt were made to overthrow the present regime 
in Cyprus and to impose a unilateral solution.
The United States reaction was rather more ambivalent. Fifteen
days before 8 March 1970, the American ambassador in Nicosia,
(15)
David Popper, had warned Makarios of the assissination attempt.
The warning, Hitchcns explains, was given for one of the follow­
ing reasons: "Popper may have been part of the soft-line 
American faction, he may have been hedging a diplomatic bet in
case the assissination misfired, or he may have been feeding
(16)
disinformation about the date." The accuracy of 
Popper’s informationandthe suspicion that Eric Neff, CIA stat­
ion chief in Cyprus, had been in cluse ccr.idct with the plotters
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prior to the incident led to a deterioration in Cypriot-American relations 
Shortly after Makarios declared Neff Persona non grataf * ^
Despite the link between Athens and the terrorist pressures,
Makarios in 1970 decided to back away from a confrontation with 
the Colonels. Instead he followed a policy of moderation aimed 
at ro-bui1 cling the strained relationship. For example, despite 
the fact that evidence in the possession of Greek Cypriot author­
ities showed the involvement of.Greek officers, Makarios denounced 
the "Hermes" plan as a forgery and publicly denied that the 
Creek regime was behind the plot to overthrow him.
The Athens-Nicosia divisions in intra-Greek relations had to a 
degree distracted the Makarios government from the crucial inter- 
communal t a l k i e  ^  Moreover, the calls for "enosis" by the extremist 
group also hardened the position of the Turkish Cypriots. From 29 August 
to 9 December 1968 the two sides had exchanged proposals on the 
judiciary, the police, the legislature and local government. The 
negotiators in March 1969 had even established subcommittees to 
study technicalities. However by May 1969 the talks reached a stalemate 
over differences on the future standard of local government. In a move to 
break the impasse both sides agreed to shelve the discussion of this 
item and proceed with talks into other areas such as the judiciary 
where chances of progress appeared more likely. With the escalation 
of Greek-Cypriot tensions Denktash concluded that the time was 
not right to agree to a settlement. Patrick asserts: "There 
may perhaps have been an additional motive in such a ’holdout’ 
strategy’ the Makarios regime could have conceivably offered 
additional concessions to resolve the prolonged inter-communal 
dispute so that it could concentrate its resources on the conflict
O 9 )
within its own communtiy . However Makarios consolidated his
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position and did not make any additional concessions.
On 2 December 1970 U Thant stated that the talks were far 
from satisfactory and deplored the fact that the situation re­
mained strained and that there had been no significant advance.1(2 0 ) 
In March 1971 Rauf Denktash commented that "the talks which lie 
ahead cannot be immunized; questions of principle or cardinal
issues are still far apart, and the chances of bridging them in
(2 1 )
the near future seem rather dim' .
The Impact of the 1971 Turkish Coup
In 1970 and 1971 Turkey was faced with a wave of student
violence and terrorism, and Premier Demirel was failing in his
( 2 2 )
efforts to contain it. Military chiefs warned against what
they termed the 'idleness of Parliament' and the incompetence
(23)
of the governing Justice Party in dealing with the problems.
On 12 March 1971 the military commanders intervened, forcing
Demirel to resign. His ousting came after the armed forces
submitted a memorandum to President Sunay informing him that
if "strong and respected government" were not promptly formed
(24)
to stop the anarchy the armed forces would seize power.
A coalition cabinet of an 'above party' character was
(25)
formed with Professor Nihat Erim as Prime Minister. Under the
new arrangement Parliament remained in session, with the army
(26)
directing from the background. One explanation for the demi-
coup d ’etat was that the military did not wish formally to
seize power fearing that such an act would have led to Turkey’s
isolation abroad as had occurred with Greece after the 1967 coup.
The F.rim government's decision to make the Cyprus problem
the main element in its relations with Greece was to have serious
(27)
implications in intrn-Greek affairs. The new Turkish Foreign
Minister, Olcay, believed that it was not possible to isolate 
Turkey's relations with Greece from the Cyprus issue." Their 
geographical proximity and contractual bonds constituted a nat­
ural milieu for the development of co-operation between Turkey and
Greece. A durable solution to the Cyprus problem, however, was
(28)
a precondition to this development to relations."
The Lisbon NATO Summit
With the consolidation of Erim's regime, an Athens-Ankara 
dialogue began to develop in the spring and summer of 1971. In 
May the Turkish Ambassador in Athens, liter Turkmen, conveyed 
to the Greek Premier the following message:
"...relations between states cannot be run in accordance 
with the mentality of Archbishop Makarios, who is basically 
a nineteenth century priest wishing to run a chauvinistic 
state. We have an excellent opportunity. On Cyprus two 
communities live side by side in a de facto federation.
Turkey and Greece have so many points of common interest 
and have so much Reason to be friends and allies that it 
would be a great pity to ignore these simply to please 
Makarios.
Papadopoulos informed Erim that he held similar views and 
stipulated that Greece and Turkey should improve their relations 
without awaiting a solution to the Cyprus question. However,
Erim informed Athens that "so long as there remained a Cyprus 
issue Turkish-Greek relations could not possibly be improved."
The Turkish premier held a strict interpretation of
t-lic London and Zurich accords and their binding legality until
p  1 ) -
revised by accepted procedures. On 2 April 1971, Erim had stated 
"Turkey is determined as ever to use every means at its disposal
to defend its security and that of its kinsmen in the event of
a new act of aggression against the rights occurring to the
(J2)
Turkish Cypriot community under the Cyprus agreement. On 30 May
1971 Papadopoulos voiced that friendship and alliance between
Greece and Turkey was more important than the Cyprus question.
Then later lie underlined that the Cyprus question "should be solved
within the framework of negotiations between Athens and Ankara; and
that he was prepared to impose his will on Nicosia, if necessary by 
(33) 
force".
Erim, considered a Cyprus expert, had been the Turkish
representative during the "Acheson" mediation in 1964 and had also 
served as a Turkish expert on the commission for Cyprus during the 
transition period before independence. His coming to power contributed 
to .he marked increase in Turkish Cypriot intransingence.(34)
Wider political and strategic considerations centred around
the Athens-Ankara rapproachement. It was viewed that an improvement in
relations with Ankara would enhance the Colonel's position vis a vis the
Nixon Administration, and help project the image that Greece was a staunch 
member of NATO, which on last analysis would have helped underwrite 
its claims for larger military and economic assistance from the
(35)
US. On the other hand Ankara presupposed that by improving its 
relations with Greece, it could influence the Colonels’ policy
(36)
over the Cyprus issue. The exponent of this policy was Turkmen.
He believed that the Cyprus question must be solved through the 
Greek government. The whole problem, he argued, was to get the 
government in Athens to act.
During the NATO summit in Lisbon, American Defence Secretary
• >
Laird talked about the need "for settling the remain­
ing dispute between Greece and Turkey, as this was necessitated
„  ( 3 7 )by the interests of reinforcing NATO1s southern flank". The 
Lisbon meeting cemented the Grec.o-Turkish rapproachement with the
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two countries using the forum for secret bilateral talks. Both
agreed to make every effort towards speeding up the inter-communal
(38)
talks in Cyprus with a view to a successful conclusion.
Athens's reluctance to brief the Cyprus government adequately
(39)
over the Lisbon talks led Makarios to suspect that a deal might
have been readied in the secret talks between Palamas and Olcay
for a Greek-Turkish joint action to expediate a Cyprus settlement
(40)
over his head. In order to improve his leverage, Makarios 
visited r'nc Soviet Union in June 1971.
Makarios' Moscow Trip
The Archbishop’s visit was seon by Athens as a gesture of 
defiance, and accentuated Greek anxieties about the growing in­
fluence in Cyprus of AKEL, the consistently pro-Moscow communist
party of Cyprus. Makarios insisted on going to the Soviet Union
(41)
despite Pnpadopoulos’s advice to the contrary.
In w, Makarios told the Soviet leaders that he would
oppose any attempt at a decision leading to a political or geo­
graphical division of Cyprus, and that he would not agree to a 
limitation of its independence and sovereignty. At the end 
of the visit the Soviet Union stated its support for the indepen­
dence and absolute sovereignty of Cyprus, and the peaceful sol­
ution of the Cyprus question without outside intervention on the
(42)
bn = is of the UK Charter principle and resolutions. Makarios
noted Lhc-t: "Expression r>; Soviet opposition to intervention,
the use of force, or threat of the use of force had always played 
« (4 3) 
a deterrent role."
Pnpnioannou, the leader of AKEL,praised the "unselfish support
and assistance" pledged by the Kremlin to Makarios as "clear warning
i ( 4 ^ )
to all those planning intervention or aggression against Cyprus".''
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Rift Between Athens and Nicosia
Interpreting Makarios's trip to Moscow as evidence that 
His Beatitude was pro-communist, the Papadopoulos regime con­
cluded that it was now imperative that Makarios must adhere to 
the dictates of Athens or be rem.oved from power.
On 11 June 1971 the Athens government presented Makarios 
with a formula which it believed would end the inter-communal 
stalemate. The contents proposed giving the Turkish Cypriots 
a large degree of autonomy and appointing to the Makarios Cabinet, 
a Turkish Cypriot minis ter responsible for Turkish Cypriot local 
athorities. Makarios rejected the formula because he held 
reservations that it was part of a secret Greek-Turkish agreement 
(concluded at the Lisbon meeting) to impose a NATO solution.
His outright rejection frustrated the Athens government. On 18 
June, Papadopoulos warned Makarios to accept his guidelines and 
concluded, that if he refused the Greek government would be
(45)
forced to take bitter measures. He should either settle his
differences with the Turkish Cypriot community or face the con-
(46)
sequences alone. Makarios replied to the Greek leader that the
ultimatum was creating unacceptable developments in intra-Greek
(47)
relations. His determination not to succumb to the dictates
(48)
of the Athens government led to a freeze in their relations.
On 6 July 1971 the President declared that to save Cyprus
he would accept aid from any direction, of any kind, and to any
(4 9 )
extent. Although there was no evidence that the Soviet Union 
had promised any military assistance to Makarios during his visit 
to Moscow, he skilfully promoted such a possibility through a 
series of statements. He also renewed his assertion that there 
was adequate proof to confirm the claims that an outside settle­
ment in the NATO framework, which would more generally serve
the interests of the West, was imminent. Makarios forewarned
that: "...a settlement against the will of Cypriot Hellenism
would turn Cyprus into a source of great discord...and the
(51)
Western world would not gain from this".
Inter-Communal Talks Stalemate, The Formation of EOKA B and 
Intervention•by the UN Secretary-General
His Beatitude stated on 10 August 1971 that the inter-
t
communal talks had reached deadlock, adding:
"We shall continue however, our efforts with patience 
and tolerance for a peaceful and democratic solution, 
although outside threats against the independence and
territorial integrity of our country are becoming more
(52) 
frequent . 1
The talks had reached an impasse because both sides had 
hardened their positions on "local government"^*^ The Turkish
Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, had recommended that the administrative, 
and judicial powers that pertained to local government be written 
in the Constitution. The Greek Cypriot side had accepted 
that the above pr_ovi si on should be inc luded in
the Constitution, however it was at variance with the alternative 
proposal by Denktash that " there should be a central local 
Government Authority either for the Greeks or for the Turks".
Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiater rejected the proposal and 
replied to his counterpart that "Your proposal regarding the creation of 
separate Greek and Turkish Central local Government authorities, 
apart from other ills w i l l....... make the administrative
system completely unworkable and put into slow motion the devel-
(54)
opment of the country..." Denktash feared that without such local 
authorities, Turkish Cypriots would not he able to achieve t.he communal 
and local autonomy
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(50)
feared that such a development complicated his attempts to control 
the organisation. During the EOKA struggle of 1955-59, Grivas had 
shown on many occasions that he was prepared to play his own 
game irrespective of the wishes of any government in Athens or 
elsewhere. His claim that, in order to secure enosis, he would 
contenance a NATO or even purely Turkish base in Cyprus as at 
least a notional guarantee for the Turkish minority amplified 
Makarios’s suspicions that Athens and Ankara had already agreed 
in principle on "double enosis" - partition of the island along
( £ O \
broadly demographic lines.'
The turbulence in intra-Greek affairs helped torpedo the last- 
meeting of the inter-communal talks. At the end of 1971 the 
Greek regime' sconflicting policy in Cyprus had become apparent. The 
Papadopoulos regime publicly stated its support for the continuation 
of the US sponsored intercommunal talks and at the same time directed 
covert activities to overthrow the Archbishop.
In a move to revive the inter-communal talks U Thant, in an 
aide-memoire on 18 October 1971, suggested to the governments of 
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey that Mr Ozorio Tafall (his special 
representative in Cyprus) should in the exercise of the Secretary- 
General’s Good Offices take part in the talks between the repre­
sentatives of the two communities. He also proposed that the 
Greek and Turkish governments should each make available a constit­
utional expert to attend the talks in an advisory capacity^^)
U Thant had dratted the formula after consultations with Greek 
and Turkish officials in New York. On 28 November Xanthopoulos- 
Palamas (the Deputy Greek Foreign Minister) announced that Greece 
and Turkey had signified their agreement to the formula. Greek- 
Turkish Cypriot disagreement over the qualifications of Senor Osorio 
and the "technical" consultants created a number of problems tor
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both sides. Denktash insisted that Taffall's
terms of reference should not go beyond observer status. He feared 
that an increased role by the UN would probably undermine the guarantor 
status of Turkey. Conversely while Makarios accepted an increased
role for the UN special representative, he wanted the Athens and
(65)
Ankara appointees to have only peripheral functions. After a 
period of hesitation over the principle of direct involvement of
Greece and Turkey in a settlement, the Cyprus government sub-
(66 )
scribed to the agreement. On 2 December the UN Secretary-
General warned that the situation in Cyprus had deteriorated, and
that tensions between the two communities had escalated to a
(67)
critical level.
(6A)
The 1972 Czech Arms Crisis
On 21 January 1972 the Makarios government covertly imported
ten thousand cases of light arms and ammunition from Czechoslovakia.
'The order was first placed in 1971 after communal incidents in the
Chattos areas where the Turks controlled a small enclave and Greek
Cypriots sought the protection of the National Guarcl.  ^ However,
the Greek army officers refused to provide protection on the
grounds that their terms of reference were concerned with defence
and not with local policing, thus reflecting the Greek governments
measures to avoid any confrontation with Turkey that would have
(69)
jeopardized its rapproachment with Ankara. It is also plausible
that the division in intra-Greek relations partly contributed to 
the immobility of the Greek officers. Despite differences with 
Athens, the Nicosia government had informed the Greek Commander 
of the National Guard about the Czech arms order. The Athens 
government assumed that once the Nicosia-Athens differences were 
resolved the weapons would be handed over to the National Guard.
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However, as relations deterioraled further, Makarios decided to use
the Czech arms to rcinforce his seven hundred strong Police Tactical
(70)
Reserve (PTR). This had been his principle objective in purchas­
ing the arms. With rumours of a possible coup by Grivas or the
Athens government, the strengthening of the PTR was evaluated as a
(71)
necessary counter measure.
Following Makarios’s refusal to transfer the arms to the
National Guard, the Papadopoulos government used the incident as
a pretext and decided on a showdown with Nicosia. On 11 February,
f 7?'
Panagiotacos handed Makarios a communique. It called for the
immediate s m  rciulc r of all imported arms to UNFICYP , for the 
Cyprus Cabinet to be drastically reshuffled to include pro-
Athens elements, and Athens to be respectfully regarded as the
(73)
"centre of Hellenism". A number of factors underlined the
Colonels' move. They feared that the weapons might be used against 
opponents of Makarios such as "EOKA B" or the Turkish community. 
Failure to confront Makarios would have strengthened his position
and independence from Athens, and exacerbated his intransigence
against Papadopoulos' s terms to make more concessions to the
(74)
Turkish Cypriots. Makarios believed that acceptance of such
demands would have led to partition, and degraded the Cyprus
(75)
government into a puppet administration. The extremist faction
of the ruling "Revolutionary Council" of the Athens Junta led 
by the s t r y  anti-M::• rios Brigadier loan.nides were extreme! y 
provoked by t!.*j Czech an- which implied a flirtation with the 
Communists by Makarios (whom they considered pro-communist)
They pressured Papadopoulos to intervene to "bring the communist 
influence under control in Cyprus and cut it down to size".
The arrs crisis was quickly ovc7 shadowed by the more
stringent demands of the Greek government for the right to 
dictate the composition of the Cabinet of Cyprus. Athens's crude
'
diplomatic tactics and heavy-handed approach stiffened Makarios' 
opposition. .On 18 February Panagiotacos stated: "I think the 
time has come when the rulers in Cyprus must understand that 
Athens is actually the National centre and that taking initiatives 
which could perpetuate the internal anomaly and have unpleasant 
international c o n s e q u e n c e s w i t h o u t  the knowledge of Greece, will 
not be tolerated in the future”. He also asserted that Greece 
would exercise its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee for
r 78)
unilateral intervention, "if national interest dictated it .
Panagiotacos public statement signalled that the Athens military
Government was re-asserting its rights of intervention in case of a
threat to the status quo in Cyprus. However, whether the treaty 
gave the Greek Government the right to intervene in the internal
affairs of the island to the point of determining what form or shape 
the Government of Cyprus should have was rather suspect. But 
in giving covert assistance to the subversive groups which sought to 
destroy Cyprus' independence, the Athens regime was contravining 
both the treaty of guarantee and the Cyprus constitution it was pledged to 
uphold,as one of the three guarantor powers. While not capitulating to the 
Greek demand, Makarios wanted a diplomatic arrangement that would defuse 
the crisis. However, a period would have to elapse before hecould 
compromise-with Athens and not lose face.
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The Nixon Administration and the 1972 Crisis
A coup to remove Makarios had been expected by the Cyprus
(79)
government on 12 February. This coup was called off as a result
of the effective security measures which had been taken in time
by Makarios and as a result of diplomatic pressure from the Nixon
administration. United States officials feared that any hostilities
on the island might jeopardize the position of the Turkish minority,
(80)
raising the risk of a major^crisis between Greece and Turkey.
In the view of the American government Athens had acted too
harshly when it dispatched the Panagiotacos memorandum to
Makarios. Immediately an intensive diplomatic offensive was 
launched by the United States to limit the damaging impact of this move 
Popper informed President Nixon who in turn cabled instruc-. 
tions to Ambassador Tasca in Athens, to seek a meeting with
(81)
Papadopoulos and to warn him against any violence in Cyprus.
Tasca later testified in 1975 that "in 1972 I made a very strong
statement about not getting involved. That stopped the whole
(82)
business at that point".
Numerous explanations can be put forward for the American 
move which was undertaken even though Washington had no great 
admiration for Makarios, because of his co-operation with 
the pro-Moscow AKEL and his non-aligned policy which
often clashed with American interests. Indeed in 1969 President
Nixon had ordered that all US foreign aid to Cyprus be cut
off after Makarios refused to co-operate in restricting Cypriot
(83)
shipping to North Vietnam. Cyprus was also one of the seven * >
countries that had reneged at the UN on th^ir committments on 25 October
1971 or the China issue which caused the US to lose the diplomatic
_ W )
campaign to keep Taiwan in the UN.
In 1972 US policy makers decided that, in terms of the whole stability
of the crucial Eastern Meditterranionregion US interest stood to suffer if the
military regime forced its showdown with His Beatitude. The Nixon adnari^tration
ation already under attack because of its benign approach towards the Athens
military did not want to attract additional criticism, especially at a
time when it was close to concluding its negotiations for new naval bases in
Greece. It is plausible to argue,that the homeporting negotiations inspired
(85)
the Papadopoulos regime to seek the overthrow of Makarios. Assuming a passive
American reaction the coup night have succeeded. However the timing 
was poor and the coup attempt backfired. With Nixon's historic 
Peking trip scheduled for 20 February the State Department probably '
did not want to face another Cyprus crisis. At the time the US feared that the 
Kremlin would exploit anv international incident to minimise the impact of
Nixon's trip. On the otherhand after Peking, Nixon was preparing 
for the Moscow Summit and SALT I in May 1972. Hence the need to forestall 
a crisis which could have drawn in the Soviet Union.
Finally, the strong objection to a coup in Cyprus staged or directed 
by the Colonels regime that was voiced by Congressional opponents 
of the Junta and by a large cross section of the internationial 
community, signalled to American policy makers in the 
State Department of the high risk of the proposed coup, who in turn 
decided that it was in the Nixon Administration's interest at the time, 
to direct the Papadopoulos regime to abandon the proposed coup.
7 7
The Soviet Union and the February 1972 Cyprus Crisis
During the 1972 Cyprus crisis, the Soviet Union linked the
Cyprus crisis with the planned establishment of US bases for the
Sixth Fleet in Greece. On 15 February the Soviet ambassadors
in Athens and Washington madecritical representations to the governments
(87)
Greece and the USconcerning the proposed ins ta'lat ions . The Soviet 
Government conveyed to the Papadopoulos regime that
"the establishment of such bases would be a dangerous step, 
fraught with serious complications in the Balkans and the Mediter­
ranean area. In the meantime it also warned Washington 
"that implementation of the above intentions would be
a step towards aggravating the tension in Europe and contrary
(88)
to the tendencies which emerged there lately".
The Soviet Ambassador in Athens underscored to the 
Greek Foreign Minister not to overthrow Makarios while the Soviet 
Ambassador in Ankara, Grubyakov, stressed to the Secretary-General 
of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Eralp, on 17 February that 
"Moscow would not remain indifferent to any moves to end
„(89)
the independence of Cyprus and to impose a solution by force.
He also said that Greece and the US had agreed between themselves 
to overthrow Makarios, proclaim "double Enosis" in Cyprus, and turn 
the island into a NATO base.
Egyptian President An war Sadat also rallied to the support 
of Makarios. On 16 February he stated: "The United States has 
stepped up provocative intrigues in the Mediterranean area, secured 
the turning of the Greek port of Piraeus into a base of its Sixth 
Fleet, and is now weaving a plot against the government of 
President Makarios in Cyprus with the aim of turning the island into
•- u m (90)its base .
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The Role of Turkey and the United Kingdom
During the 1972 crisis, Turkey sided with the Greek r e g i m e / ^ '
On 15 February the Turkish Foreign Ministry agreed with the Greek
proposal that the arms consignment should be placed under the
(92)
control of the UN force in Cyprus. The United Kingdom also agreed
that the recently imported arms should be surrendered to UNFICYP.
On 16 February, the Heath government categorically stated that
Mthe latest developments in Cyprus were the concern of Greece
(93)
and Cyprus and did not directly concern Britain'. Diplomatically 
it was a tactical error on behalf of the Foreign Office. Britain 
was one of the three guarantor powers. The government by abdicat­
ing its treaty responsibilities was also undermining its own pos­
ition in Cyprus. Indeed most diplomatic observers doubted its subsequent 
statement that "if things develop in such a way that endanger the inde­
pendence of the island, Britain will have no alternative but to 
intervene". British influence had been diminishing in Cyprus since 
1964, and its latest posture was a further indication of this devolution.
On 21 February Turkish Foreign Minister, Bayulkan, attacked 
Makarios over the Czech arms, and warned thaf'the arms might
(94)
spread the outbreak of clashes to the Turkish Cypriot community."
The Turkish threats in 1972 lacked the decisive impact of their 
1964 and 1967 ultimatums. The different nature of the 1972 
crisis (primarily an intramural Greek-Cypriot crisis and not an 
inter-communal confrontation) were partly responsible for Turkey’s 
weak reaction. Moreover the instability which plagued the crumbling 
Erim government to a large degree refrained the Cyprus "Hawks” 
in Ankara from seeking greater involvement in the 1972 dispute.
In a d d i t i o n  a t the time the Turkish military were eager to consolidate their 
position in NATO and did not particularly desire a crisis.
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The Bishops Ultimatum
On 2 March, the Bishop of Kitium (Larnaca) Kyrenia and Paphos,
called upon Archbishop Makarios to resign as President of the
Republic, on the grounds that his exercise of temporal and political
power conflicted with his religious duties and was in breach of Canon
(97)
Law. The move had been instigated by the Colonels government. -
After His Beatitude rejected the ecclesiastical ultimaturh^lihe Athens
regime finally accepted the'Makarios formula of playing down the
crisis and resuming negotiations as soon as the situation had settled
down. Makarios notified Athens that he was prepared to surrender
(99)
the Czech arms.
The United Nations as a Forum for Face-Saving Diplomacy
On 14 February, the UN Secretary-General addressed a message to
President Makarios through Senor Osorio-Tafall, expressing his con-
( 100)
cern and offering United Nation's assistance. Subsequent efforts
by Tafall and the UNFICYP commander helped in bringing the 1972
developments under control. The United Nations presence in Cyprus
permitted both Greece and Cyprus to use it as an avenue to gradually
edge back from confrontation without losing face.
On 10 March 1972 after protracted negotiations between Senor
Tafall and Kyprianou an agreement was reached for the Czech arms
to be stored under the supervision of UNFICYP. Dr Waldheim
expressed the hope that the agreement would "result in a reduction
of tension in the island and that all concerned will not find it
impossible to resume the search for a solution of the underlying
( 101)
problems of Cyprus".
On 14 March Makarios informed the Greek regime that he had 
placed the Czech arms under UN control. His decision to surrender 
the Czech arms consignment restored some equilibrium between
(95)
81
Athens and Nicosia.
Following the UN arms agreement, Papadopoulos retracted 
most of his demands and indicated that he would be satisfied 
with a minor Cabinet reshuffle to eliminate one or two Ministers 
who reputedly opposed his military governm^nl:. Makarios
agreed to reconstruct his Cabinet in due course. In return 
Athens tacitly agreed to let Makarios continue to keep the reins 
of power, at least temporarily. The Archbishop was anxious to avoid 
another confrontation. There was however no reason at all for 
Makarios to assume f the C o l o n e l  Kr>d shelved their plans 
to overthrow him. The Archbishop quickiv rt*\ iseA that out­
manoeuvring the military regime would not be sufficient to 
guarantee his survival.
The 1972 crisis had eclipsed the inter-communal negotiations.
On May 1972 all the parties agreed to resume the talks on a new 
(103)
basis. The inaugural meeting was presided over by the UN
Secretary-General, in June 1972. The resumption of the talks,
partly restored some political equilibrium. In June 1972 Waldheim
reported: "the situation on the island is anything but encouraging...
the mutual suspicion led to a political instability and an atmosphere
(104)
of tension and recrimination which is extremely dangerous".
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The schism was highlighted with the naval mutiny carried out
by a group of officers in the summer of 1973. On the other
hand to counter the increasing opposition to his regime by
Western leaders (particularly by a group of influential US
Congressmen led by Representative Benjamin Rosenthal)
Papadopoulos was preoccupied with initiating moves toward what
he called guided d e m o c r a c y . i n  the meantime, a 
deterioration in relations between the Athens military regime
and General G r i v a s , f o r c e d  Papadopoulos to cancel
"Operation Apollo". The plan envisaged the overthrow of
(108)
Makarios, by Greek officers stationed in Cyprus.
However, in Cyprus throughout this period EOKA-B stepped up 
its terrorist attacks against the Makarios administration.
To counter the threat by EOKA-B His Beatitude reinforced 
his security forces. The demise of Papadopoulos followed by the 
death of Grivas in January 1974 plus the leadership crisis in 
Ankara, forstalled at least temporarily, any new moves against 
Makarios. However, the formation of a co-alition 
government in Turkey,between the moderate Ecevit (Republican 
Peoples Party) and the Islamic fundamentalist Erbakan (National 
Salvation Party) who held ultra nationalist v i e w s , a n d  
the emergence in Athens of the Anti-Makarios Ioannides, were 
ominous signals for His Beatitude. He once again became
(83 )
very apprehensive, that new attempts would be made to 
challenge his sovereignty by either the Ioannides regime 
or the new Ecevit-Erbakan co-alition. Makarios also feared 
the possibility of secret collusion between Athens and 
Ankara over Cyprus.
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CHAPTER IV
THE B R E A K D O W N  OF K I S S I N G E R  D I P L O M A C Y  : C Y P R U S  1974 
The October War and Reassessment of the Strategic Significance of
Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean
In the early 70s, the relaxation of tension in Europe caused
"the focal point of instability in East-West relations to shift in
large measure from N A T O’s central front to its southern flank, the 
• (1)
Mediterranean". Nasser’s ability to lift the Arab-Israeli conflict 
from the local to the international level after the 1967 confront­
ation, followed by the war of attrition and the dangerous phase of
"no war no peace", further amplified the strategic importance cf the
( 2 )
Eastern Mediterranean. The extensive deployment of Soviet naval
(3)
power after the Six-Day War in 1967, and the dramatic upsurge in 
the volume of arms transfers by both super powers to their respective
(4)
clients, made the area a major threat to international security.
In no area beyond European territory proper has the strategic mil­
itary balance between the United States and the USSR been as import­
ant a factor in international affairs as it has been in the Medi-
<5) „
terranean.
The Soviet buildup alarmed Western strategists, who had looked
upon the Mediterranean as an exclusive Western possession. The
threat by the Maltese Prime Minister Mr Mintoff to expel British
forces from Malta raised suspicions in NATO circles that Cyprus
(6 )
might follow the Maltese example. The Jordanian crisis of 1970
and the number of Soviet ships in the region underscored che
increase in Soviet naval power which was now countering the permanent
(7)
US presence, in the Mediterranean.
The growing Soviet influence in the area reaffirmed American 
commitment to Israel. If the pre 1967 defined Israeli territory 
was threatened the US would probably intervene, increasing the risk of a 
superpower confrontation. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the
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Soviet U n i o n  deployed about 90 ships off the coast of Syria and Israel. 
Viewing the Mediterranean basin including the Middle East as a single
strategic entity in terms of the strategic power balance, Greece, Cyprus
and Turkey were now key vantage points not only in terms of NATO-Warsaw
Pact confrontation, but also in terms of super-power rivalry in the Middle
East region. "Cyprus provided a focal point for domination of the
eastern littoral from Turkey to Egypt and the access to Syria,
(9)it
Lebanon, and Israel, and through these countries to Jordan." Cyprus 
makes acontribution to US strategic interests via the British bases of 
Akrotiri and Khekelia fromwnere US planes conduct surveillance operations
( i o )  •
in <"he eastern Mediterranean. During the October War American 
U-2 planes operating from the British sovereign bases were used to 
monitor the war. The US electronic monitoring facilities at 
Yerolakos, Nea Milia and Karavas were also used. Finally, the 
American over-the-horizon (0TH) radar at Mt Olympus was used to 
monitor many of the nuclear testing areas in Soviet Central Asia
an
of interest to American intelligence.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war introducec new variables to the super power
strategic rivalry with the implementation by both Moscow & Washington of 'ocean
( 1 2 )
strategy' as a mutual lever of deterrence* Although the US 6th fleet
had a superiority in the Mediterranean the build up of the third Soviet 
^Eskadra' in the Eastern Mediterranean was seen as an immediate threat 
for US naval forces that did not haVe adequate air cover. Moreover the 
high ambient noise levels in the Mediterranean sea made sonar 
conditions extremely difficult to monitor thus creating a problem 
for anti-submarine operations, making effective air cover a necessary 
prerequisite. US officials noted that if the Soviet fleet secured land base< 
air cover in the eastern Mediterranean, to support its operations, it 
would pose as a very formidable strategic force. In the aftermath
v
of thr Middle East nuclear
(8)
alert, American naval strategists stressed that for effective US 
deterrence in the region it was advisable that the US secure its 
land based air support for the Sixth Fleet, and that at the same time it 
should seek to curtail Soviet access to sea and land based support.
The size of the Soviet fleet deployed in the Mediterranean has 
ossillated depending accordingly on the ability of Moscow to secure 
those facilities to reinforce its operations in countries in the 
region such a-s Egypt and Syria.
In both Greece and Turkey the US had a series of air and naval 
bases which were intended strictly for the support of the Sixth Fleet 
and US military and economic assistance to both Ankara and Athens 
was partly in the form of a quid pro quo for the use of such bases.
In relation to Cyprus, American foreign policy interests were as follows: 
Firstly to oversee that the Cyprus 'problem' did not lead to another 
confrontation between its two allies Greece and Turkey. Secondly, to prevent
Moscow from meddling in the dispute either by overtly supporting 
Makarios or through the pro-Moscow Cypriot Communist party (AKEL). Thirdly
with increasing soviet influence in the region, the US was equally
interested in maintaining its presence in the British bases on the island
(14)
and its own electronic surveillance facilities in Cyprus.
With the 1973 Octoberwar the level of rivalry between the super powers 
changed in the Middle East, a sphere where detente had not been 
tested so f a r . During the crisis Kissinger "stressed the deter­
mination of the US 'to go to the brink' over the question of a 
direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East I'^^^Moreover, the Yom 
Kippur war .^showed the erosion of Israeli strategic superiority 
over its Arab adversaries . * Washington , however, rea f f i rmed i t s commitment
to Israel, and despite the oil embargo, - the US President ordered a .massive
(18)
militaryre-6upply effort. The October War had created insecurity
in Israel for the first time since 1948, and American policy in
the region in the aftermath of the war was concentrated on strengthening
87
American influence not only in Israel but throughout the entire
(19)
region.
The American realisation of the precariousness of the Arab- 
Israeli situation and the deterioration of the Western position in 
Italy led the United States to attach greater importance to the 
Greek Bases and territory. The revived US emphasis was more in
relation to its interests in the Middle East, and not necessarily
( 2 0 )
as part of NATO strategy. In bolstering the Colonels' regime the
United States ventured m  a pclicy which was far from secure. If 
the Colonels lost power,the United States, because of its close 
association \-:i x h them, ri.-’-c" suffering a serious political Cetback 
and even ran the risk of being deprived of Greek naval facilities.
'In July 1972 President Nixon had stated that without aid to Greece 
the United States had no viable policy to save Israel. " Washington's 
plan, however, to wrap a popular issue - Israel - around an unpopular
one - Greece - backfired with the development of the 1974 Cyprus
( 2 1 )
crisis."
The Nixon administration's position was that "political differences
aside, the United States and Greece had mutual security interests
( 2 2 )
that could not be lightly dismissed". Despite r i s i n g  opposition
of the Colonels' regime by a large group of Congressmen in the spring
of 197a, the White House continued"to accord pre-eminence to military
(23)
and strategic considtratior.s over political and moral values."
The Arab-Israeii conflict, rather than NATO security, influenced 
the -Late Department to continue to show preference for the Greek 
Colonels in 1974. Although the Greek government remained neutral 
during the October War in the Middle East, it was fully co-operative 
in allowing access to American communications facilities in Greece 
and to other facilities such as Athenai Airbast and Souda Bay Airfield.
There were r.c restrictions placed on the nsoves\e.r.t of the vessels of
it in t h e  A t h e n s  a r e a  of onlKi
the Sixth Fleet I h o m e  p o r t e d  in
logistic facilities for the re^supplv of the Sixth Fleet. Washington 
-policy makers concluded that this security relationship was an im­
portant ingredient in the strength of the political-military posture
/ n / \
of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean during the crisis.
The Greek military regime was aware that by declaring- its strong
military commitment towards NATO and its bilateral military co-operation with
the US strengthened the Nixon administration'sposition tc confront its critics
The collapse of the Papadopoulos regime and its replacement by
the loannides Junta in November 1973 had far reaching implications
(25)
for the Cyprus conflict. With the death of Genera] Grivas in 
January 1974 the leadership of EOKA B eventually came, Liter removal.
of the new moderate EOKA B leader, Major George Karousos, under tht
(2f\\
direction of the Greek Intelligence Service, (KYP).
In the spring of 1974 there was much talk of an impending
coup d'etat in Cyprus to be organised by EOKA B and KYP. The
Cyprus government alleged that there was considerable involvement
on the part of the US government in support of Greek efforts to
(27)
unseat Makarios. In March 1974, the Cypriot Ambassador to Washington,
Nicos Dimitriou, warned State Department officials of the possibility
(28)
of an attempted coup d'etat. In light of the periodic rumours of coup
plots and conspiracies that circulated about Cyprus, US officials rejected 
Dimitrious advice.
On the contrary, Kissinger instructed the US Ambassador in Athens,
(29).
Tasca, to avoid making representation to the loannides regime Although
the-regime was showing signs of disintegration, the Nixon ad:-: ni strat ion 
continued to endorse it, especially within NATO forums. In May 1974, 
General Goodpaster (Saceur) praised Greece for maintenance of her 
forces at an excellent level of training and at a high degree of 
readines i?°> At the same time, a conflicting draft report to the 
North Atlantic Assembly declared:
"The effect upon the (Greek) armed forces of almost seven 
years of dictatorship, accompanied bv periodic upheavals
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. \
and a succession of savage purges, has been severely to
distort their command structure and to create an atmosphere
of suspicion and antagonism among factions of the officer
corps with different political views and sharply divided 
„ (31)
loyalties.
"On 20 June 1974, Peter Koromllas., a Greek-born CIA agent, who
was; Ioannidis’s confidant and adviser, reported to CIA headquarters
(32)
that a coup in Cyprus was imminent’.' - At the direction of Kissinger 
and Sisco, Ambassador Tasca was instructed on 29 June to warn the
Greek r eg ire that the ’Jnited States disapproved of any move against
(33 »
Makarios.
The Breakdown of Kissinger Crisis Diplomacy: Cyprus 1974
The first in a series of State Department miscalculations
began with the failure of Ambassador Tasca to pass on the Kissinger-
(34)
Sisco cable. Since this mode of contact fell through, the State 
Department failed to warn the Athens government formally. It could 
have done this by calling in the Greek Ambassador to Washington, 
dispatching a special emissary to Athens, or releasing a White 
House statement which could have had the same effect on the Greek 
Junta.
In early July, a flood of leaks to the press by the Cyprus
government drew attention to the probability of a coup. On 5 July
a blueprint of the proposed coup appeared in the Cypriot paper
*Apogevmatir.i ' . The next day, the same paper, published President
(35)
Makarios’s letter to General Ghizikis, the Greek President. The 
text clearly outlined an Athens-orchestrated conspiracy, claiming 
that the Greek officers with the Cyprus National Guard were working 
with EOKA B terrorists to bring about Makarios's downfall. The 
tass resignations on 8 July of Mr Tetenes (Greek Foreign Minister), 
Mr Tjounis (Director-General, Political Affairs, Greek Foreign
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Ministry) and Mr Vlahos (Secretary-General, Greek Foreign Ministry)
(36)
were further indicators of the forthcoming coup. Nevertheless,
despite all the ominous signs, the Nixon administration remained
firm in its support for the Greek Junta, and avoided making an
executive decision which could have averted the coup. Instead,
American-Greek liaison was kept at ambassadorial level, which under
Kissinger was not a channel that always reflected the official view.
Furthermore, bureaucratic ineptitude, primarily through a
breadkown in communications, erased whatever possibility existed
of the lower echelons of the State Department hierarchy forcing the
(37)
Athens government to cancel its Cyprus venture.
On 15 July Makarios was deposed in a coup staged by the National
(38)
Guard and EOKA B and was replaced by Nicos Sampson.
A whole range of motives could be discerned behind the Junta’s 
miscalculated Cyprus putsch. The crisis may have been stoked up 
originally by the Athens regime largely for internal reasons, in 
order to restore their deteriorating position in the armed forces and 
in the country as a whol |39) Since the removal of Papadopoulos in November 
1V 73 the mi 1 itary had been divided into 5 factions. The royalist officers 
wanted the return of the exiled King, officers with democratic leanings were in
f c vcur 0 f a return to civilian rule under the leadership-of exPrime Minis ter KararBnLi> 
the Quaddafist faction wanted the Ioannides mil itarv to adopt a more radical
line. Although anti-communist, the Quaddafist group espoused a socialist
ideology, was anti-western, and argued that Greece should withdraw from
NATO and pursue a non-aligned foreign policy.
The Ioannidis clique declared thatfor "purification" reasons the 
military needed to remain in power for a few more years and then 
allow a return to civilian ru'f- Finally another group 
favoured the return to power oi the departed dictator Papadopoulos.
Success in Cyprus would probably have restored Ioannides
r\r*af i r’»rr n n c i  t" 1 n n  A I f  lirvi i K i f  f  or» r-. i ir o J  -i ^ "
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split the Greek army officers, the majority were united when it
(AO)
cane to action on. Cyprus. By achieving a de facto form of Enosis, 
the Junta would have managed to satisfy the ultra-nationalist demands 
of some of the army factions which were also critical of the regime’s 
handling of the Aegean crisis with Turkey over continental shelf 
rights. The Athens government apparently believed they could pull 
off the annexation of Cyprus without having to fight a real war.
The moment seemed favourable, for Turkey was still convalescing 
from a 30 month interval of semi-military rule, its new coalition 
government had not settled,and Ecevit's decision to litt the ban on opium,
poppy cultivation had not pleased Washington ^  . The Greek leader­
ship may also have been hoping that they would be able to trade con­
cessions on the Aegean seabed issue for Turkish acceptance of enosis.
In June 1974 the Athens government threatened war with Turkey over
(42)
the Aegean issue. A Summit between the Greek and Turkish Prime 
Ministers, during NATO's annual executive meeting in Brussels, on
26 June, broke down completely because of the Greek refusal to negct-
(43) . .
iate, or to make counter-proposals. It was indicative 0f
junta's incompetence that it could have assumed that Turkey would 
not react decisively to a defiant move on Cyprus.
United States Tilt Phase I
State Department experts contended that unless Kissinger denounced
the appointment of Sampson, his elevation mijrht be interpreted :.y
the Turks to signify a virtual takeover of Cvprus by the Greek Jur.ta,
( 4 0
and could prompt Turkey to invade the island. Kissinger rebuffed
their counsel, partly because he perceived that Makarios had lost
power physically and was unlikely to be restored by the UN (which
x (45)
is what the Soviet Union was advocating), ar.d in the fir:- l
( 4 0
few days, did nothing to minimise the effects of the coup. On 
17 July the State Department ignored the possibility that the coup
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was of Athens's making. Instead itreferred to the coup as an internal
situation, stating:
"In our view, there has not been outside intervention."
Contrary to the American position, the Soviet Union moved speed-
(48)
ily to denounce the coup; so did the British. The UK went on record
with a demand to the Greek government that it replace the 600 or so
officers assigned to the Greek National Guard, most of whom had evident-
(49)
ly participated in the coup. In addition British Foreign Secretary, 
Callaghan, tried to persuade Kissinger to exercise America’s more 
powerful influence in Athens, and to recognise the dangers in’ counten­
ancing a regime in Cyprus as unstable and unsavoury as the puppet
(50)
government of Sampson.
Ignoring Callaghan’s advice and the advice of State Department 
officials to restore Makarios to power, Kissinger defended the Greek 
regime. The Secretary’s decision was consistent with US policy 
largely dictated by the Pentagon but acquiesced by the State 
Department, viz. to defend the Greek Junta and to take timely steps 
to prop it up whenever it seemed to be in trouble. The rationale 
for this was the American need of air and naval bases in Greece for 
the defence of the eastern Mediterranean. The increasing instability 
in Italy, the Portuguese crisis and the open Soviet support for 
Cunhal now meant that anything that reduced American and NATO strength 
in the Mediterranean was interpreted simply as an adverse shift in 
the balance of power'.'
The weak American response, which deliberately did net endorse 
Makarios, gave Ioannidis reason to believe that the US approved of 
•
him and had even suggested that he was not to blame for the Cyprus
situation. The United States stance in the United Nations further
(r 2 )
enhanced his position" During 16 and 17 July the Security
Council adjourned without passing a resolution condemning the coup.
(53)
stated the obvious fact: that the Cyprus National Guard was ordered
(54)
into rebellion by its Greek officers. The American delegation used 
delaying tactics on the pretext that more facts were needed before 
it could approve UN action. The United Kingdom neglecting its obli­
gation as a guarantor power, also failed to put forward a positive 
resolution while there was still time. Instead, apparently under
American influence, the British delegation omitted to take any
(55)
initiative at all until it was too late.
British Foreign Office officials emphasised to their American
counterparts that "it is difficult to put pressure to the Greeks
(56)
unless you take a position for the restoration of Makarios".
However, in the United States, when the Washington Special Action
Group met, on 16 and 17 July, it opposed the withdrawal of Greek
troops on the grounds that their removal could cause a power vacuum in 
(57)
Cyprus. 'United States misjudgements and early indifference 
deprived Washington of credibility or leverage in both Athens and 
Ankara as the crisis escalated.
On 17 July Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit proposed to Callaghan 
"that Sampson be removed, Cyprus be given a new federal system, the 
Greek soldiers be sent home, and negotiations to start such a system
begin immediately. Ecevit also proposed that T u r k e y  and the UK
(58)
intervene jointly to restore the status quo antd'. The British 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, declined to use force, hoping that 
the crisis could be resolved diplomatically. Without American 
support the British strategy of international action was doomed to 
failure.
After the United States had created the impression that it
was tilting toward a de-facto recognition of the Sampson regime,
Kissinger sent Sisco to Athens and Ankara, but apparently without
(59)
a mandate to put pressure on either government. On 15 July the
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White House had stated that the United States was deliberately hand­
ling the crisis ’low key* because it felt confident that its diplomacy 
would succeed.
When Sisco reached Athens, the Junta had virtually disintregrated
and the American Under-Secretary of State squandered precious time
(60)
searching for someone of authority in Atnens. Eventually the Greeks 
agreed to replace rather than pull out the officers in Cyprus. The 
Turks, however, had no intention of becoming entangled in protracted 
negotiations that would permit the regime on Cyprus to consolidate 
its hold on the island and become a fait accompli. Ecevit reasoned 
that the further delay would only create the impression of Turkish 
weakness in Greek eyes. He rejected the Greek proposal, and while 
Sisco was bargaining with him that Turkey should postpone its invasion
»I
for .48 hours, Ecevit ordered it to proceed. On 20 July a seaborne
assault, backed by air support was followed by paratroop landings
in the area of the Turkish-Cypriot village of Geunyeli, creating a
.. (61)
wedge between Kyrenia and Nicosia.
Turkey resorted to force even though not all possible avenues
o
to a solution had been exhausted. Kissinger’s eleven separate phone
calls to Ecevit had also failed to postpone the invasion. During
the debacle Kissinger-rejected a suggestion by Tasca to use the
(62)
Sixth Fleet to block the invasion. Tasca later was critical of 
both Sisco’s shuttle diplomacy and Kissinger’s activities during the 
critical phases of the conflict. He strongly condemned both Sisco 
and Kissinger for not informing him about what they were actually 
achieving., Tasca stated in his testimony:
"I was not informed on the results of the telephone con­
versations or on what was going on between the United
(63)
States and the British.”
The former Ambassador placed the blame on the Secretary’s modus
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operand!.
The Turkish Council of Ministers had, prior to Ecevit's 20 July
decision, unanimously voted that Ankara should intervene militarily
(64)
if diplomatic efforts and contacts failed. The weakness of the
Greek government was a key factor in the Turkish decision to send
its forces to Cyprus. Ankara skilfully exploited both this advantage
(65)
and the lack of an effective or co-ordinated Greek response. In
earlier crises Turkey adopted the strategy of open coercive diplomacy
by bombing the island of Cyprus. In 1974 it abandoned its previous
tactics and concentrated on ambiguous signals diplomacy. The'new
posture managed to isolate and diffuse the Ioannides regime from
any form of action which could have cemented its Cyprus positon.
The underlying motives behind the shift in Turkish tactics were the
following: Turkey needed time to win the consent of the majority
of international opinion and institutuions to its projected invasion.
Furthermore, it was known that the mismanagement of the Cyprus coup
(66 )
had widened the rift within the ruling Greek Junta, and the coup
(67)
had triggered off civil war among the Greek Cypriots. The longer 
the civil war continued, the lower would be the resistance which the 
Greek National Guard could put up against the invading Turkish 
forces. Prior to the coup, senior Greek officers in Cyprus had 
advised Ioannides to postpone it because Greek military strength in 
Cyprus at the time was inadequate to defend the island against a 
Turkish invasion. Following the coup, the Ioannides regime failed 
once more to direct its policy measures close to the tangible 
reality of reinforcing its forces on the island.
*
The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 also owed more than a 
little to the classic reflex: recourse to foreign adventurism to 
ease internal stress. After a l l ,"Ecevit’s action to announce price 
increases on a wide range of products had proved very unpopular in
^  y 1. 1  1
Turkey(68) • Moreover , the enactment of the  ^^ '^c a ^ a m
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the spring of 1974, created another domestic crisis, threatening 
the fragile Ecevit-Erbaken coalicion / Furthermore, Erbakan's 
National Salvation party's radical hawkish policy over Cyprus, 
plus the fact that since the 1950s the Cyprus question had been a 
national issue in Turkey, meant that at least for reasons of domestic 
political expediency, a Turkish invasion was very much on the cards. 
Foreign policy factors were also important in Ankara's decision.
If Turkey exploited the Cyprus crisis successfully it could have 
used it to gain concessions from the Greeks over the Aegean issue.
In 1974, Turkey was to prove far less constrained by Washington 
than it had been in previous crises. The full-scale invasion con­
stituted a calculated reaction to the coup against Makarios. The 
new decree by the Ecevit administration on 1 July 1974 authorising
a resumption of poppy cultivation had caused a deterioration in
(71)
US-Turkish'relations. This friction enabled Turkey to feel less
constrained towards Washington, giving it mere room for independent
action in its gamesmanship over Cyprus. On a more general note the new
Nixon doctrine of remaining uninvolved in local disputes may have given
Ankara the idea that the US would not play as decisive a role in the
(72)
Cyprus question as it had in the past.
The Security Council on 20 July in its Resolution 353 (1974)
called upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and
territorial integrity of Cyprus, demanded an immediate end to foreign
military intervention, and called upon the three guarantors to enter
(73)
into negotiations without delay. Ignoring Resolution 353, T u r k e y
(74)
continued its offensive until a ceasefire was reached on 23 July.
In the meantime the military regime in Athens collapsed when the
chiefs of staff rejected Ioannidis’s orders to mobilise the Greek
(75)
forces into action against the Turks. On 24 July Greece returned
to civilian rule with ex-Premier Karamanlis heading the ntw government.
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An important factor in the Chiefs’ decision to turn over power was 
the reluctance of the United States after 20 July to support their 
disintregrating military government, and US pressure to ensure 
that a Greek-Turkish conflict was avoided at all costs. This lends 
support to the critics’ case that if US pressure had been applied 
on Athens from the beginning of the crisis, it would have been suc­
cessful in removing Sampson and diffusing the crisis before the 
Turkish invasion took place.
American Tilt Phase II
Following the guidelines of resolution 253, on 22 J u l y  Callaghan 
obtained Greek and Turkish agreement for talks between the guarantor 
States in Geneva. As regards the negotiations, the Cypriot delegation 
at the UN, backed by the Soviet Union, objected to having three out­
side countries meeting together and deciding what should happen to 
Cyprus without the participation of the legitimate Cypriot g o v e r n m e n t ^ ^  
The three power conference began on 25 July, attended by the foreign 
ministers of Britain, Greece, and Turkey. On 30 July it reached an 
interim agreement which provided that (i) the ceasefire line should 
-be that held by Turkish forces at the time of the agreement; (ii) the 
three guarantor Powers reserved their rights and obligations as 
formulated by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; (iii) the talks would 
reconvene on 8 August when representatives of Greek and Turkish
(77')
Cypriots would join the guarantors in considering the wider issues.
American shortcomings in policy making and policy execution 
continued, even after the signing on 30 July of the interim ceasefire 
agreement by the guarantor powers. While State Department officials 
insisted that US policy had not tilted towards Turkey, the US did 
remain publicly silent when the Turkish invasion force expanded its 
Cyprus bridgehead in violation of the cecsefire agreement. On 
30 July, Kakarios warned that unless the US attitude to the invasion
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was made more clear and more decisive there would be a possibility
of serious disturbances in that sensitive area, and also within
NATO. Just after the first stage of the Geneva talks, Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, Hartman, told the Karamanlis
government that the US opposed an early complete withdrawal of the
Turkish invasion forces from Cyprus, because such action would lead 
(78)
to anarchy. Hartman omitted the possibility that a temporary
increase of UNFICYP could have prevented this from happening. The
State Department continued to tilt its policy towards Turkey after
8 August when the Geneva talks resumed. However, on 13 August, the
talks collapsed and on the 14th Turkish forces resumed fighting,
finally occupying 40% of the islan<!l?^
The United States reacted to the series of Turkish ceasefire
violations by emphasising only restraint rather than condemning
the continuation by the invasion forces of ’the peace operation*,
as the Ankara government liked to call it. The US also failed to
apply pressure on Turkey to revert to the status quo ante. Instead
Washington recommended that Makarios not return to Cyprus, as his
(80)
return might exacerbate the situation on the island. In these
• r/
circumstances of the Turkish presence, as Karnow underlined, even-
handed appeals for restraint, such as the US issued, amounted to the
„(81)
encouragement of Turkish adventurism.
During the first phase of the Geneva talks, KLssinger managed to persuade 
the Turkish Prime Minister to postpone the deadline for the Turkish ultimatum.On 
13 August, the US Secretary of State intervened and requested Ecevit to expand the 
Turkish ultimatum by 36 hours. However, this time the Turkish leader refused to 
accomodate Kissinger' s approach and instructedhis negotiators to walk out of the 
t a l k ^ lb) The British Foreign Minister said that the negotiations had 
broken down because of Turkey's arbitrary and unreasonable refusal to 
allow a delay so that all parties could consider its plan for a 
federated governmen^?2  ^ In calling for a Security Council meeting
Callaghan warned the Turks that there could be no military solution
that would stick. In an all concieved move o f  b o t h  b a d  timing and policy.
on 13 August at a critical stage of the Geneva talks,the USissued a state
ment which stated inter alia "that Washington supported a greater
' (83
degree of autonomy and protection 'for the Turkish Cypriot community’.
It immediately became apparent from the timing of the release and the emphasis
on Turkish grievances, that Washington was supportingthe Ecevit Governnent 
position-in Geneva. TheTurkish leadershipintepreted the statement as a 
signal that the US would not oppose a second Turkish military offensive in Cypru 
Makarios believed that"the US was fooled by the Turks, or perhaps 
was deceived when Turkey said it would be a limited operation - a 
police action - to restore constitutional order in two days. Per-
„ (84)
haps they understood only later what Turkey's real plans were.
Ankara claimed that the reason for the second military drive was
diplomatic. It needed to strengthen its military position on the ground in 
order it improve its bargaining level when the Greek side refused to negot­
iate under threat, Turkey implemented phase two, on P retext that they
were simply adhering to the thesis' that they could not win at the
: (85)
conference table what they had not won on the battlefield." More
likely, it is possible that the T u r k i s h  high command, apprehensive that
their flanks of its forces in Cyprus would be exposed if they remained in the
volatile Kvrenia-Nicosia wedge, decided to advance. As George points
out," military leaders have a strong advocate's role in determining
policies, and once a diplomatic crisis erupts into warfare, their
bargaining position within the policy making arena becomes even
s t r o n g e r ( 8 6 )  » With the absence of any bold initiative on the part
of the US to avert the coup, or the Turkish landing, Ankara correctly
estimated that Washington would not intervene to stop this second
advance.
Only after Greece ' 6 withdrawal from the military wing of NATO 
on 14 Aufcust did the US:condemn Turkey's renewed assault. Ki66inger
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reasoned lhat there was no easy and permanent way of reconciling I
the competing interests of Greece and Turkey and once he had lost I
Turkey, and with the collapse ot the Ioannides Junta, he decided to
tilt for the time being with the stronger pa-rty, namely Turkey. In termj 
of Kissinger's real politik the US c o u l d’not remain an impartial 
observer over Cyprus and risk seeing its two-allies drift into total 
war. However, in 1974 Turkey was more important to US strategic interest.
than Greece.
In Western geo-strategic thinking Greece does not have the same 
importance as Turkey. It is Turkey which directly borders on the 
Soviet Union, is an important link in the chain of direct encircle­
ment of the Soviet Union and was geo-strategically and organisationally 
the link between the NATO and CENTO powers. What is more, Turkey con­
trols the Dardanelles and holds a grip on the Kurdish ethnic group 
which lies astride the most direct route between the Soviet Union 
and the Middle East. Moreover, Turkey's neighbours, Iraq and Syria, 
were already too firmly pro-Soviet for Washington to want to risk 
angering"Ankara into adopting a similar attitude in the Middle East.
This resolve was all the more important in the context of Kissinger’s 
post-1973 diplomacy in the Middle East where US prestige was visibly 
committed to the solution of the Arab-Israeli problem unilaterally 
with the long-term objective of drastically reducing, if not com-
/c 7 \
pleteiv expelling, Soviet influence from this strategic region;
A Criticue of Kissincer’s "Cyprus Diplomacy"
---------------------------4 . ----- ^  ___ JL_____ . - a  ............ ■■
Kissinger rejected accusations by Athens that the US had tilted
in favour of Turkey because it regarded its military bases there as
more important than those in Greece. He said the situation on Cyprus
"tilted not because of American policy but because of the actions
of the previous Greek government which destroyed the balance of
( 88 )
forces as it had existed on the island".
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Kissenger further argued that during the 1974 crisis the US decided 
that under the circumstances quiet diplomacy would be the most 
effective course, and he refused to accept that America was partly 
responsible for the outcome of events. In response to criticism, he 
argued that a threat to cut off military aid to Turkey would have been 
ineffective as far as stopping the Turkish a.ivance in Cyprus was 
concerned. Referring to the American Interest in Turkey's 
strategic position bordering the Soviet Union, Kissinger stated that 
cutting off aid would have had the most drastic consequences for the
u «. 1 1 - (89>Western alliance.
In order not to contain the further internationalisation of the 
Cyprus issue the US had chosen to support Britain as the prime med­
iator. Although Britain had a legal right and a moral obligation to 
find a solution to this dispute, it lacked in 1974 the influence 
needed to restrain the Turkish invasion. As Callaghan pointed out, 
circumstances had so changed that the importance of Cyprus to Britain 
was no longer the same as in 1960 when the Treaty of Guarantee was 
signed. ^ ^ C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of policy also played their part in British 
non-intervention. The British Foreign Secretary suggested that 
because the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was a dead letter it was not 
politically expedient to seek to uphold it. As the former colonial 
power, Britain was also sensitive to charges of intervention. Finally,
Prime Minister Karolc Wilson stated that with ’Ulster’, or.e moral
(91)
commitment was enough for Britain. In comparison with the 196«^  and 
1967 American mediation efforts, the 1974 decision reflected either 
• >
a re-evaluation of American policy or a tactical error on the part 
of the US.
Watergate, World Order and Cyprus
Kissinger's attention was mostly focussed on the world 1 s^major powers
sria 1 1 scates on tne otner hand were jnere pawns in nis grand globa 1 strategy ana
were expendable. In his handling of the issue, Kissinger demonstrated
that he was more concerned with stability, in the region than pursing a s o l u t i o n
Kissinger'*s goal was spcure e stable international order and that objective
(92)
transcended all others. He- argued that was the necessary pre-condition for pea 
and for continued US leadership in world af fairs . Kissinger be iieVea that"Peace 
was derived from a certain balance of power and what diplomacy was supposed
to sustain was not peace per se but this balance and that the structure
on which peace and this balance were to rest was to be made up of
11
three pillars: (a) partnership with friendly nations, (b) strength
against potential aggressors, (c) willingness to negotiate with former
i- (94)
adversaries. Seen from this viewpoint, Kissinger's 'tilt
diplomacy' over Cyprus was in line with his goal of pursuing a world
order favourable to the US. The tilt towards the Greek colonels and
later towards Turkey, was in sequence with Kissinger's objective of
preserving American strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Kissinger was a strong advocate of the view that "a strong conventional posture
backed by a strong nuclear capability offered the best hope for deterring the
spectrum of alternative strategies open to a revolutionary power such as the 
" (95)
Soviet Union. Kissinger emphasised that deterrence of aggression 
remained an essential component of Western policy, new order or not, 
and that the foundation of deterrence must be built upon a strong con­
ventional force.
From a totally different perspective, it has been widely asserted 
that Kissinger was too immersed in the developments around the Water­
gate crisis, and in the dispute between the Executive and Congress,
(96)
to be able to give Cyprus his full attention^ On a closer examination 
the evidence points to the contrary. When President Nixon began his
102
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slow retreat under the pressure of his Watergate prosecutors the momentum
of American foreign policy had been increasingly sustained by Kissinger 
(97)
alone. Kissinger was in a tactically secure position with almost 
total authority. As both Secretary of State and National Security 
Council Adviser to the President, he could protect diplomacy from
%
the damaging effects of Watergate.
As Ball points out, "if Kissinger*s initiatives during the
Watergate period went well, he took credit for the success of the
Middle East negotiations; if they went badly as in Cyprus, he blamed
/90)
his failure on the breakdown of executive authority". Moreover 
there was no reason for Kissinger to believe that he would not remain 
Secretary of State under President Gerald Ford (who had already said 
he would retain him).
The Soviet Union's Reaction
Throughout the 1974*crisis, the Kremlin leadership accussed the 
Greek military regime, and "NATO circles" as being respon­
sible for the coup of 15 July.^ Although Moscow called for a return 
to the status quo ante that existed be fore'July, their immediate reaction 
to the Turkish invasion was one of silent compliance(^®®
It has been reported that the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean 
was unde*r instructions to steer clear from Cyprus for the duration of the hostilit­
ies. It was onlyafter t h e c o 11apse of the AthensJunta, on 24 July and the 
negotiation of a ceasefire on Cyprus that Moscow distanced itself from the 
Turkish policy.
The Soviet Union was apprehensive that following the
ceasefire on 22 July'moves would be initiated to sett le the dispute within
( 1 o r i *
NATO as an intramural issue. On 29 July the UN Security Council
rejected the text of a Soviet draft resolution which recommended sending
( 102)
a UN Special Commission to Cyprus. At the end of July
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M o s c o w  protested against Turkey's logistical reinforcement of her forces 
on Cyprjjs .From the Soviet point of view the main danger lay in a pos­
sible division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece - both NATO powers.
Following the second Turkish offensive in August, 
which was followed with Greece's withdrawal from the military 
wing of NATO, the Soviet Union began to tilt towards the Greek side; .
Overall however Moscow limited its involvement to submitting to the UNSecurity
(103)
Council on 18 August a new plan that called for the convening of an
international conference to examine the problem. The Soviet proposal was 
immediately supported by the Greek Foreign Minister . Makarios also 
stated his support for the Soviet plan^l^ ^However the Archbishop 
had many doubts whether this proposal could be implemented. He 
believed that it would come up against Turkey's refusal, and that 
if Turkey refused to attend such a conference there were not many 
chances of its taking place. On the other hand, the Soviet leaders 
stressed repeatedly that the Soviet policy of ’good neighbourliness' 
towards Turkey would continue uninterrupted, and would be unaffected 
by the events in Cyprus.
CHAPTER V
THE NATO INTRAMURAL DILEMMA
The Debasement of N A T O’s Political, Mediatory and Consultative 
Machinery
In previous Cyprus crises, NATO had played constructive med­
iatory roles between its inter-alliance adversaries, Greece and 
Turkey, over their Cyprus dispute!^ In 1974, however, in a radical 
departure from established policy, its crisis management machinery 
proved quite ineffective. The end result was a deterioration in 
the solidarity and cohesiveness of the organisation. On 14 August,
1974, the Greek government decided to withdraw from the military
( 2 )
structure of NATO.
The intramural crisis was probably seminal for the collapse 
of America's (and NATO's) Mediterranean policy, after nearly three 
decades of undisputed supremacy. Karamanlis's 'Gaullist' withdrawal, 
the renewed arms race between Greece and Turkey, and the subsequent 
ambivalent nature of NATO's position on the southern flank threatened 
the stability of the region. To a degree, these developments can 
be regarded as direct by-products of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. .In 
analysing the immobility of NATO on the one hand, and the post- 
crisis implications on the other, one is confronted with a wide range 
of conflicting determinants and viewpoints. That the Greek withdrawal 
inflicted a blow to the stability of the region is widely accepted.
In order to provide a linkage analysis between NATO and the Cyprus 
issue this chapter will trace the whole sequence of developments of 
the NATO crisis, European Detente, the October War and the crisis 
In the Trans-Atlantic relation^the policy contradictions within 
NATO over Greece and Turkey, the Greek withdrawal and the subsequent 
deliberations over Greek re-entry to NATO under special conditions.
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Trans-Atlantic Crisis, European Detente and NATO Disunity
In 1965, Kissinger wrote that "the atmosphere of detente
(3)
removes the previous urgency for Allied cohesion". At the time he 
also suggested that"common defence against a military threat would 
soon lose its force as a political bond. Negotiations with the Eastern 
Bloc would prove corrosive unless they went hand in hand with the
creation of common political purposes and the institutions to embody
,;(A) - (5)
them. Although Kissinger identified the problems of the alliance,
he nevertheless viewed the role of the US as primus inter pares within
A (6)
NATO. Later, as a practitioner of American foreign policy, he drafted 
and implemented aTrans-Atlantic policy, which was inherently contra­
dictory. In theory, the Nixon government continued to stress that the 
relationship was at the level of equal partnership?^ In practice, 
however, the administration under Kissinger applied a policy of secret 
global diplomacy, which put the stabilisation of relations between 
the superpowers ahead of Trans-Atlantic affairs. By failing to adequately 
consult the major NATO powers over US policies to the region the 
Washington administration undermined the solidarity and cohesiveness of 
NATO, and gave the European Governments the impression that they rated 
low on the list of US priorities.
Kissinger's failure to give his European allies advance inform­
ation of his China breakthrough or the SALT I talks increased European 
anxieties about superpower summitry. Over SALT, West European leaders 
feared that Washington and Moscow would discuss and agree upon the 
critical issues affecting European security and only thereafter inform
/ o \
their respective allies. The talks were strictly bilateral, just 
as were the nuclear proliferation treaty(NPT) negotiations. "In 1969, 
Nixon had assured his NATO allies that, in any talks between the US 
and Soviet Union, the allies would be fully consulted both before and
107
during such talks, and their interests taken into account.w During 
the SALT I negotiations, however, US - NATO consultations with few
exceptions did not go beyond mere information, and came after, rather
(9)
than before, negotiating rounds. The transient consultations between 
the US and the Atlantic Community reinforced the latter's fears about 
the credibility of the US strategic guarantee, simultaneously increas­
ing friction with the alliance. Colley points out that SALT I
raised a number of questions in European minds, both political and 
(1 0)
military. Newhouse, however, has concluded that European governments 
were reluctant themselves to tinker with their political security 
edifice and recognised that the web of East-West negotiations would in 
time dislodge some of its foundations.^^
Following the signing of SALT I, a new set of factors threatened 
the Transatlantic dialogue. Different perspectives over the future
role of FBS (Forward Based Systems) and clash of interest over MBFR
(12) (13)
(Mutual Balance Force Reductions) widened the rift between them.
Western Europe’s response to SALT was on the whole greeted favourably
(14)
(9)
in spite of some doubts about it.
a
In 1973, the military and political relationship were indirectly
challenged and transformed by events in the non-military (especially
*(15)
the economic) dimensions of the Trans-Atlantic relationship. Growing
disharmony over trade and financial issues openly threatened the already
( 16 )
fragile relationship. On 3 May, 1973, Nixon in a critical appraisal 
of Trans-Atlantic affairs censured Western Europe for discriminating 
against the US on financial^^and trade issues, while at the same time 
they maintained a fastidious position on NATO security. Nixon argued 
that the Europeans wanted to "preserve American protection in defence and 
an undiminished American political commitment . • « . » * o this
raised a fundamental question: can the principle of Atlantic unity 
in defence and security be reconciled with the European Community’s 
increasingly regional economic policies?*^
In search of a rapproachement in Trans-Atlantic affairs, Kissinger 
drafted a "New Atlantic Charter". He cautiously argued that, "If we 
permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neg­
lect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved and
(19)
we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement."
Kissinger's new policy, however, failed to reconciled the two 
camps, a'nd charter received a hostile reaction in most of the 
European c a p i t a l s ^ ^ T h e  put standing Tran s--At lan t ic differences ove rlapped with 
the developments in the Middle East to plunge the relationship into 
the public domain. The October War and the diverging A m e r i c a n  ^ nd 
European differences over it, illustrated the magnitude of the American 
and European positions on issues-such as International Security, energy 
and world finance, and exposed the myth that prevailed 
about European unity.
The Yom Kippur War reflected differences between the European
perceptions of its regional interests with American understanding of
(21 )
its global interests. Washington considered that the maintenance
of the Middle East military balance was as much in Europe's interests
as its-own <22k e  US view was that the "NATO" countries should have
supported i ^ 3) The Europeans, however, felt that they had been little
more than pawns in an American adventure with much greater hazards
for it than for the US. Indicative of this was former NATO Secretary-
General , Brozio' ssummation of European uneasiness over America's
Decom 3 nuclear alert during the crisis, and its failure to consult
ii (24)
NATO, constituting the most clamorous episode.
In 1973, the NATO countries had become more Independent of US 
tutelage. One commentator summed up the emerging relationships thus:
"They did not want an extension of the old British-American 'special
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relationship' - i.e. a degrading of European governments to the status 
of advisers to Washington, able to advance their own interests only by
disturbed at its NATO allies indifference towards the problems of Eurooean
(26)
security. NATO Secretary-General Luns had noted that "as East-West
receded, so economic, monetary and other difficulties appeared increas-
In the aftermath of the .1973 Middle East crisis, a new set of problems
emerged, which surpassed, in order of magnitude, most of the or her
transatlantic differences. The crisis, as Hassner observed, "created a
double feeling of identity and of impotence among West Europeans: the
(28)
feeling that their interests were more different from those of the
United States than before but, conversely, that they were more dependent
(29)
than before on American power".
The October crisis, and the subsequent energy crisis,
exposed not only the underlying nature of Trans -Atlantic policy differ­
ences, but also the fragmentation °f iitra European interests with respect 
to political, economic, and traJc issues. One instance
of the Europeans task of cohesion was the inability of tKt» Nine to 
agree publicly on any plan to share oil supplies after the Netherlands,
(along with the US) was faced with a total oil embargo, on 17 October,
(31)
from OAPEC countries. The embargo underscored . the insecurity of 
Western Europe in the energy field.
Despite official announcements stressing the necessity for increased
co-operation between Western countries in coming to terms with the
(33)
escalating energy crisis, diverging tendencies emerged. Realising
their dependence on OAPEC oil, the EEC countries temporarily set aside
(3A) - -
their differences and made a pro-Arab declaration on 6 November and
influencing US policy The United States had also become
relations seemed to be improving and the dangers of confrontation
"(27)
ingly to trouble relations between the Allies.
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in return, received an undertaking that deliveries would be resumed.
In making the move the EEC offic-ially refused to follow the strategy
(35)
of a strongly defensive stand advocated by the US.
In 1974, new complications between America and the EEC countries 
and an intra-EEC split broke out at the energy conference in Washington
( 11t 13 February 1974) .  The Nixon administration emphasised to the
(36)
West European foreign ministers participating in the conference
(37)
that there could be no unilateral EEC solution to the energy crisis 
that could succeed, especially without the full participation of the 
US. It suggested that without their involvement, the world would be 
caught up in a vicious circle which would inevitably lead to a break-
(3-T)down of the world economic order.
During the conference proceedings, Kissinger lobbied to have the 
bilateral negotiations approach scratched, and proposed, instead, a 
general energy conference of all countries under the auspices of the UN - 
without previous consultations between the consumer groups. The French 
representative, Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, rejected outright 
Kissinger’s energy formula. The Secretary of State, however, with assist­
ance from the German delegation, managed to isolate the remainder of the
(31)
EEC countries from the intransigent French posture. Shortly after 
the Washington conference, the eight dropped the American plan, and return­
ed to the French-sponsored bilateral approach.
On 15 Mar.cn 1974 Nixon warned that " .....the Europeans cannot
have it both ways. They cannot have United States participation and 
co-operation on the security front, and then proceed to have confrontation 
and even hostility, on the economic and political front.
Ill
And until the Europeans are willing to sit down and co-operate on the
economic and political front, as well as on the security front, no
meetings of Heads of Government should be scheduled11^ ^
Nixon’s criticism heightened the fears already held 
by the EEC, that the US was P e k i n g  a renewal of its sphere of
influence in Western Europe. The deteriorating situation illustrated 
that Western 'Europe had at least on a temporary basis moved perceptibly
out of the ambit of American hegemony. It was faced, however, with a
(41)
policy choice between the aim of seeking its political autonomy 
from the US, and the security solidarity stemming from NATO, restricted 
* (42) its room for manoeuvre.
A number of key NATO officials had assumed, at the time, that 
the October crisis, and the threat of a US - Soviet confrontation to 
which it gave rise, would have been sufficient to have dampened dif­
ferences between America, NATO and Europe. As Secretary-General Luns
(43)
has written this did not happen. In 1974, the resonance of the
crisis also affected NATO. In analysing the failure of 
the Western powers (especially the United States) to manage the 
1974 Cyprus crisis and the subsequent intramural dispute, the dis­
integrative atmosphere that prevailed in the West on the eve of the crisis 
was one of the factors that thwarted Western mediation efforts. From 
the outset, differences developed over political and strategic priorities
in managing the conflict. The clash of policy in the early phase began
(44)
as an Anglo-American disagreement. However, as the dispute escalated, 
dissension over Cyprus also spread within the ranks of NATO and the EEC. 
Despite the fact that the crisis threatened the collapse of the 
• >
alliance's southern flank, both NATO and the EEC were content to play
only a secondary role, leaving the job of mediation to the US and Britain
(45)
hands. In a radical departure from past precedents of intervention,
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the Secretary-General of NATO only sent messages to the Greek and 
Turkish Covernments asking for restraint in the _are The Organis­
ation appeared almost indifferent to the task of salvaging the con- 
(47)
flict. Whereas the crisis broke out on 15 July, the supreme NATO
(43)
body, the North Atlantic Council, was not used until a few days later. 
Moreover, although it became obvious that the Greek military regime 
was behind the Cyprus coup, NATO restricted itself in relation to restrain­
ing Turkey from invading Cyprus by playing a secondary rol
|50)
Anything
short of an active NATO involvement, to return the situation as near to 
the status quo as possible, would have been considered, by Ankara, as 
a NATO tilt towards the Athens regime. Hence the fear that the Greek 
Junta might have consolidated its position on the island, along with the 
prevalent anti-Junta mood in Western Europe, probably contributed to 
the Turkish decision to invade the island.
As the recent intra-EEC dispute over energy supplies had shown; 
the foreign policy of the EEC was still in a primitive stage of develop­
ment >'lnd put an end to misleading assumptions about its in­
creasing political influencef^^ In its attempt to influence the outcome 
of the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the EEC's inherently weak position
became detectable once again. The conflict was only of 'peripheral'
( 52^
interest to the organisation. ' Since neither its economic, nor political 
interests stood to suffer directly from developments in Cyprus.
The involvement by the EEC was essentially an experiment
in political mediation by the Nine who viewed the latest Cyprus crisis as an 
opportunity to develop its system of consultation on foreign policy issues.
Throughout its diplomatic intervention, the EEC did not venture 
bsyond declarations^^However despite its secondary importance the Cyprus 
crisis led to considerable discord within the European Community. 
Differences of opinion developed (especially between Germany and France)
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over approaches to the problem. The breadkown in political co-operation 
was reminiscent of the recent inter-European disputes. Following the 
invasion of Cyprus, President Giscard d'Estaing of France called upon 
the EEC to take an active part in the solution to the crisis, and sug­
gested that they should use all means available to them - and in par-
(54)
ticular economic pressure - to restore peace. The policy of Germany,
however, was at variance with that of its French partner. Official
spokesmen in Bonn did not expressly condemn the unilateral military
actions^^as was done, in contrast, in the resolution adopted by the
Security Council on the French proposals^?^ The German government
officials refused to define their stand toward the French initiative
arguing that Bonn had not been asked beforehand. The clash of policy
was evaluated by analysts as a contradiction to the official statements
concerning the closest contact of Bonn with the countries of the EEC
(57)
and NATO. Moreover, in contrast to the French stance, Germany did 
not lift the ban on arms supplies , directed against the Greek Junta, 
even after installation of a civilian regime.
With the return to power of the 'Francophile' Karamanlis, the 
Giscard d'Estaing government now saw Greece as a likely sphere of di­
plomatic influence. The intense French mediation was also in line with 
its policy of re-asserting its role in Mediterranean affairs.
Besides the French perception of its role in the Mediterranean, 
the remainder of the EEC states lacked .a common political purpose. The 
inability of the EEC to reconcile their divergent interests and per­
spectives also negated any possible bilateral approach with Greece or 
Turkey over Cyprus by an individual member state.
Without access to classified NATO documents, it is not possible 
to pinpoint, with absolute certainty the causes for NATO's ineffective 
mediation over Cyprus. Despite this limitation, however, an examination
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of N ATO’s consultative network precludes the hypothesis that lack of 
advanced warning prevented a decisive NATO involvement. The nexus of 
N A T O’s machinery in 1974 was composed of a military and political con­
sultation network that more than adequately monitored political and 
strategic developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. As figure 5:1 
illustrates, the NATO circuit linked its headquarters in Brussell^^ 
with the major areas of diplomatic activity: Washington, London,
Athens and Ankara. At least 3 days prior to the Turkish landing,
*
NATO had concrete evidence regarding the preparation on an invasion 
force at Adana, Mersin and Iskenderum. In particular, COMLANDSOUTH- 
EAST at Izmir and CINCSOUTH headquarters in Naples had more than suf­
ficient proof of the Turkish preparations. That the information was 
readily available has been documented by military as well as reliable 
public sources. The chiefs of the Greek Army Officers assigned to 
COMLANDSOUTHEAST, Brigadier Sotiriadis and Brigadier Xalkias, on 
18 and 19 July continually warned the chief of the Greek armed forces, 
General Bonanos, about the Turkish expeditionary f o r c e ^ ^  Similar 
reports reached the Greek Pentagon from its officers stationed at 
CINCSOUTH. Similarly on 18 July, New York Times defence correspondent, 
Drew Middletorl^^ reported in detail on the Turkish b u i l d u p ^ ^  It is 
also probable that General Goodpaster, as SACEUR, besides NATO intelli­
gence, would have also had direct access to DIA (Defence Intelligence
o \
Agency) and other US intelligence reports. The United States with
C-130 and F-4 electronic and photographic reconnaissance planes based 
at Athens International Airport and in Turkey at Incerlik air base 
(located outside the city of Adana), plus its high flying U-2 spy air­
craft operating off Akrotiri, was dt a vantage point to collect accur­
ate dataf*^ On 19 July, the assistant Greek military attache in London, 
Lieutenant Colonel Perdikii^^ reported to the Greek Pentagon that a
Whitehall official had informed him that Ecevit had warned the British
Government that Turkey would intervene in Cyprus.
(66 )
The United States dominant stance in NATO, particularly over
the Southern periphery, and Western Europe's reluctance to get involved
in areas beyond the central front region, were the cavcsaj factors
for NATO]ineffectiveness during the 1974 crisis.
Over a period of nearly three decades, the USA through NATO and
(67)
a number of bilateral agreements, had succeeded in turning the 
Eastern Mediterranean into an American domain. As has been shown, with 
the emergence of East-West detente, the US came under criticism from 
most West European states over political and economic matters. In 
the area of security, however, its position had remained relatively in­
tact, especially in Greece and Turkey. Within the NATO framework, the 
United States’ direction of issues concerning NATO's posture in the 
Mediterranean-was accepted by most West European states.
In general, the 'central front' states of NATO such as Germany 
have not concerned themselves a great deal with South European security 
matters. Their emphasis has been placed on the security situation in 
Central Europe. Nevertheless, policy towards the flanks (southern and 
northern) had caused latent differences between the US and NATO. It 
has been argued in the past that Greece and Turkey contributed little 
to the NATO defence in a military sense because their forces were essent­
ially for self defence. Nor did the nations of Central Europe contrib-
( 68 )
ute much to the flanks. Overall the relationship of Continental NATO
(60 )
States, with the southern flank, was of a loose nature. To close the 
gap, the United States reinforced the intergrated military organisation
* ^
through bilateral measures.
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American Strategic and Tactical With-hold
In 1974, American political will and determination to intervene 
was not forthcoming?^ Without the Nixon administration taking the 
lead, the organisation remained indifferent to the escalating political 
developments. In earlier crises both the Secretary-General and the 
Supreme Allied Commander had played key political mediatory r o l e i ? ^
In most previous cases, however, NATO officials intervened only at the 
requests of the American government, and only after they had its full 
diplomatic backing. This created a political vacuum which undermined 
NATO's capacity to intervene and exposed, once again, the limitations 
of its crisis management mechanism. Without American leadership the 
organisation resorted only to appeals for moderation. As Deputy
Secretary-General Cedronio conceded after the crisis,^its efforts did
* 7 2 )
not bare the fruits that were hoped. He blamed the limits of the
organisation for this.
In 1974, American policy over Cyprus was characterised by what
(73)
Hill has termed strategic with-hold. The US engaged in negotiations
with third parties to the dispute without consulting or considering the
interests of other alliance members in making its unilateral decisions.
Only through high level intervention of the kind experienced during the
1960's crisis had NATO come close to effective arbitration over Cyprus.
However, even during those interventions NATO only managed to forestall
a Greek-Turkish war. From its foundation the organisation lacked effec-
(74)
tive consultation of the conciliatory kind.
Without America's all embracing influence, NATO could not reach
• >
a consensus over collective crisis management tactics. In 1974, the 
North Atlantic Council adhered to the unanimity rule, and it squandered 
valuable time by seeking to find a solution by compromise in order not 
to alienate either of its member s t a t e d  J 1 The Council's approach
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resulted in the problem becoming deliberately delayed.
From a different perspective it can be argued that N A T O’s ability 
to forestall the crisis was limited by its policy of supporting the 
Colonels’ regime throughout the period 1967 — 1974. The United States, 
within NATO forums, used its privileged position to eliminate any 
criticism of the military regime from building momentum. It was a 
clear case of America's military dimension within NATO being used to 
censor any political stance that threatened US national security 
objectives. . By with-holding and defending the Athens regime, Washington 
preserved its flexibility and freedom of manoeuvre in Greece. ilavcver, 
its tactical with-hold and bilateral NATO approach had the tendency of 
totally isolating any multilateral NATO approach with Greece. Without 
the US, which had decided and implemented in a unilateral manner the 
organisation’s approach towards Athens, NATO lacked the means and deter­
mination and considered itself inappropriate to commit itself.
It can also be assumed that, with a military regime in power, it 
would have been easier to use a military envoy, such as General Goodpaster, 
as a troubleshooter. That option, however, probably would not have been 
an effective diplomatic channel in 1974.
Throughout the period 1967-1974, the United States government had 
used both key political and military leaders to placate and defend the
regime. Despite the fact that the Junta had been plagued by internal
(76)
dissension, and its military capabilities had been severely rundown, 
the Nixon administration, particularly through its SACEUR c h i e f P  
continuously defended it. The appeasement of the Colonels had the 
effect of imprinting upon the Ioannides Government the illusion that 
Greece’s role was paramount within the Alliance. The exaggerated 
perceptions contributed greatly in the decision to overthrow Makarios. 
Moreover, having a month earlier outlined the importance of Greece to
118
NATO, the position of General Goodpaster, had he been called upon to 
mediate, vc.-u.1d have been weak in confronting the extremely naive and 
overconfident Ioannides regime.
Greece’s misperception of its NATO role had cemented the idea upon 
the Colonels that the US and NATO would firstly not harrass them, and 
secondly that they would intervene to prevent the Turkish invasion.
Karar,anils ' s Ambivalent Gaullist Withdrawal
A combination of domestic, strategic and diplomatic factors 
ppomp-fW fhe transition :I Kar<inianlis government to decide upon an 
equivocal withdrawal from NATO.
As the Greek Premier noted, his regime was from the very first
(70)
a captive of the accomplished facts of the crisis. Following the 
August Turkish operations on Cyprus, anti-American and anti-NATO 
hysteria swept the country. In order to appease the desperate and
humiliated Greek populace the traditionally pro-Western leader had no 
alternative option, but to implement some form of anti-Western policy.
He was disappointed with NATO for its oversight to stop the Turkish 
onslaught, particularly phase II.
Instead of constructive mediation following the collapse of
./
the Junta, the US claimed that NATO emerged from its trial by fire in
(8 0)
the Cyprus conflict with increased strength.' ’ The premature and
exaggerated State Department. '! a i m , showed much the American Govern­
ment had systematical]" failed to accurately assess the difficulties
that would emerge as direct repercussions of the crisis. From 24
a
July until 14 August no effective pressure was applied on Ankara, 
by either the US or NATO. During this critical period NATO Secretary- 
General Luns did not initiate any NATO mediation, in the_ form of either
himself travelling to Angara or sending a high-ranking official to
(78)
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persuade Ecevit to terminate his Cyprus venture. Instead as he revealed 
later on, he resorted to council-chamber diplomacy and quiet conversations. 
An avenue too distant, however, and unable to penetrate the corridors 
of power in Ankara.
George Mavros summed up the Greek mood that prevailed at the 
time. "The crisis of Cyprus has proven the bankruptcy of all international 
institutions.’ Greece found itself in the need to withdraw from the mil­
itary alliance of NATO. The reasons are obvious. When a defence alliance 
is not in a position to prevent an armed conflict between two of its mem­
bers then how can one possibly believe that it could protect it? members
( S I )
from attack by a third country?"
The anti-American and NATO feeling was a reaction against the US 
for its overt course of action towards Greece during the Colonels' rule,
which was in line with US policy of planning short term military con-
(82)
siderations ahead of long term political interests. Secondly it was
an expression of latent anti-NATO sentiment for its failure to prevent
the Cyprus calamity.
In earlier Greek-NATO rifts over Cyprus, there did not emerge a
consensus between the government of the day in Athens, and the opposi- 
(83)
tion forces. In 1974 the extent of the anti-American and NATO mood 
was so high that the left and right for the first time rallied in sup­
port of Karamanlis. If the Greek Premier had a united front in the 
political spectrum then why was there an ambiguous approach towards 
NATO and at the same time a continuation of cordial bilateral relations 
with the US?
In previous disputes with NATO, Karamanlis had taken cautious
• >
and conciliatory positons, which from the outset appeared strictly as 
an elaborate charade designed for internal political effec£^^
In a deviation from established policy the Greek Premier in 1974
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introduced an "Hellenic” version of Gaullism, by using the French
precedent of 1966 as a blueprint for his selective withdrawal. Their
greatest similarity was based upon the fact, that both had used the
alliance to register their anti-American grievances. Comparatively
Karamanlis had less room to manoeuvre than his French counterpart
had in 1966. The consequences of a total military exodus would have
been different for Greece. For example, NATO's forward defence forces
(85)
in Germany interposed a shield between France and the Soviet Union. 
Greece on the otherhand had a common frontier with communist countries 
Likewise the French had an independent nuclear deterrent, and a 
sophisticated arms industry. In contrast Greece did not possess a nu­
clear capability and its armed forces were completely dependent on 
Western, mainly US, supplies.
It can be assumed that in order to achieve maximum diplomatic 
and political leverage against Turkey, Karamanlis needed to carry 
through with an outright withdrawal. Such a tactic might have 
strengthened the Greek position in the sense that it would have forced 
NATO and the United States into coercing Ankara to abandon its 
intransigent position. There was an element of risk however, that 
the United States might have adversely tilted more tov:ards Turkey in 
retaliation to such a move. In addition the Ford administration could 
have also terminated arms shipments towards her, which would have
/ o 7 \
further undermined Greece's strategic position.
The possibility of Karamanlis tilting towards the Soviet Union 
was also not on the cards for the following reasons: firstly Greece 
was clearly within the boundaries of the Western sphere of influence, 
and it was unlikely that Moscow would have jeopardised the spirit of 
detente by making inroads into Greece. Secondly like its superpower 
counterpart it considered Turkey, as strategically more important than
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Greece. Hence it seems most unlikely that it would have abandoned its
slanted neutralist policy towards Ankara, in order to try to win over
an insecure transitional regime with a pro-Western leader. Thirdly
in order that his regime could survive the Greek Premier could not
have formulated a pro-Soviet policy or accepted any Soviet initiatives.
In August 1974 he had not yet consolidated his position and the former
military rulers were still waiting restlessly in the wings. Any openly
pro-Soviet move by Athens ran the risk of being misinterpreted by the
military as a shift to the left, and used as a pretext to regain power.
Similarly a total cut off from NATO could have resulted in extremist
pro-Western officers seeing it as a radical departure from the Western
camp, and thus grounds for staging a coup against him.
Within the NATO framework the decision to withdraw resulted in a
thinning out of Greek participation in NATO bodies. Reportedly the
NADGE (the NATO early warning system) was switched off, and Greek ter-
(89)
ritory was no longer made available for NATO manoeuvres. Greece
also withdrew its representatives from Izmir as well as the Hellenic
first army from NATO control and the Hellenic 28th tactical airforce
from SIXTAF's control. On 11 September 1974 Greece also formally
(91)
withdrew from NATO's Defence Planning Committee. Politically,
Karamanlis justified his government's withdrawal on the basis that NATO 
had shown total indifference to the Cyprus crisis. Greece he emphasized 
"could review its position in NATO only after the 
reasons which imposed its withdrawal from the military 
structure of the alliance are lifted. These reasons 
are linked to the elimination of the causes which 
created the crisis and led to the Greek-Turkish 
conflict for which Turkey, after its operation in
(93)Cyprus is solely responsible."
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He cautiously noted that :
"the Greek decision does not imply that Greece shall
break her political and mental ties with Europe to
(93)
which she belongs."
In the meantime Karamanlis also warned the Greek Cypriots that they 
must "obtain unity of the soul," or risk endangering all Greeks. This 
was a clear reference to the continuing divisions among the Greek 
Cypriots. Traditionally, Greece has supported the Greek Cypriots. 
However, the liaison between Athens and Nicosia has been far from 
perfect. Since independence the Makarios administration had demon­
strated a high degree of independence from Athens. As already shown 
above, attempts by various Greek governments (especially by the 
military regime from 1967 to 1974) to impose their particular policies 
on Nicosia had usually produced intra-Greek rifts.
The Karamanlis administration, conscious of the previous schisms 
between Athens and Nicosia, was apprehensive of being involved directly 
in the issue. Since 1974 it pursued a policy which assumed that the 
solution of the Cyprus problem lies not in Athens and Ankara but in 
Nicosia. In the meantime, Athens fully supported the Greek Cypriots 
in their diplomatic campaign to gain support for their position in 
international forums. Policy priorities, national security and diplom- 
matic tactics also underlied Greece's unprecedented low profile on the 
Cyprus question. Greek entry into the Common Market, reconciliation 
between Greece and Turkey and Greek re-entry into NATO ranked above 
Cyprus in the priority list of the Athens government. In the mean­
time, by rejecting the Turkish demand to elevate the Cyprus issue to 
the level of Greco-Turkish relations, the Greek government improved 
its diplomatic and strategic position over Turkey. By rejecting the
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offer Greece enhanced the chances of the US arms embargo against Turkey
being prolonged. If it had agreed to the Turkish demand the arms
embargo would have probably been lifted earlier. The Treaty of Paris
of 10 February 1947 prohibited Greece from fortifying the Dodecanese
(94)
and other islands close to Turkey. Athens, however, used the
Turkish invasion of Cyprus as a pretext to militarise the islands, im­
proving further its diplomatic leverage on the "Aegean issue."
To balance the agreement (Washington made) with Ankara, the US 
offered Greece almost $1 billion for continued access to US facilities 
which the Greek government threatened to close in retaliation against
the administrations' "Turkish tilt." Negotiations over the status of
(95)
US facilities continued throughout 1975 and 1976. The Karamanlis
government stalled for more than nine months before it initiated the 
new American-Greek defence agreement on 28 July 1977. Although the 
Greek deal was ready for initialling by October 1976, Greece opted to 
delay ratification. It was worried that if it went ahead, it might 
ease the way for the American-Turkish treaty and the lifting of the 
embargo, which Greece perceived as one of the few levers that it 
could apply to influence Turkish policy over Cyprus and the Aegean 
dispute. The ambivalent nature of Greece's official withdrawal from 
NATO and its decision to reach agreement with Washington, sparked a 
political storm in Greece. At the same time Greco-Turkish relations
took a new and perilous turn for the worse as their territorial and 
mining dispute in the Aegean intensified. Taking the dispute before 
the World Court in the Hague, and the UN Security Council, Greece
alleged that Turkey threatened peace in the region by violating Greece's
t . . * , (97)
sovereign rights m  the Aegean.
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At the Greco-Turkish Summit at Montreax on 10 and 11 March 1978 
the Cyprus problem was officially separated from bilateral Greco- 
Turkish relations. In 1978 the Karamanlis administration under the 
assumption that the embargo would be repealed, withdrew its diplomatic 
support for the embargo and concentrated its efforts on securing 
military aid that would minimize the impact of the repeal. For the 
Athens government relations with Washington now ranked higher in 
priority than the Cyprus issue.
The Greek government seemed to accept the Carter view that the 
embargo, no matter how well intentioned, simply did not work to in­
fluence Ankara. Second, the intensity of the Carter administration 
effort to repeal the embargo meant that Greece would find increasingly 
hostile feelings from the White House if Athens insisted on supporting 
the embargo. Third, the death of Archbishop Makarios in August 1977 
meant the removal of a political force with which Karamanlis had 
always to reckon with. The Archbishop had influence in Greece; no 
Prime Minister, could ignore Makarios. President Kyprianou, no matter 
what his political skills, is not a Makarios, and he cannot realistic­
ally pose a political threat to the "New Democracy" forces even if 
there were a public spirit between Greece and Cyprus. Fourth, the 
usefulness of the embargo for Greece had diminished. The embargo was 
very useful for Greece in its bilateral confrontation with Turkey in 
the 1975-1977 period. The Greek army was both demoralized and badly 
equipped after the junta years. It needed time to rebuild. The 
embargo provided this respite. But by early 1978 it was much less 
likely that there would be a military confrontation with Turkey. For 
these reasons, the Karamanlis government decided not to contest the 
Carter decision to repeal the embargo. Instead, the government
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ordered its Washington embassy to protect Greek interests even while
(98)
those of Cyprus were being undermined;
With the government under political pressure from the ascending 
opposition leader, Papandreou, who would like to pull Greece entirely 
out of NATO and who holds a hawkish position on the Aegean issue, 
Athens has been forced to harden its stance on the Aegean dispute and 
over the protracted deliberations in NATO about the special status 
requested by Greece. Turkey, however, has made its consent to this 
arrangement conditional on a redistribution of NATO's operational 
jurisdiction in the Aegean sea and air space which had been left under 
Greek control.
In 1980 the new Athens government of Premier Eallis negotiated 
the re-entry of Greece into NATO, despite the fact that the criteria 
his predecessor had outlined for Greece's re-entry into NATO, had not 
yet been fulfilled, i.e. removal of occupying Turkish troops in 
Cyprus, and a termination of the de facto partition of 40 percent of 
the island.
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THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST 
TURKEY
Following the second Turkish military offensive on 14-17 
August 1974 a consensus of Congressional opinion emerged in 
favour of imposing an arms embargo against T u r k e ^ P  Subsequent 
Congressional developments concerning the drafting and enactment 
of the arms cutoff caused a heated debate between Congress and 
the Executive. This temporarily institutionalised the Cyprus 
issue in US foreign policy, contributed to the collapse of the 
Ecevit-Erbakan coalition government, and undermined Turkish- 
American relations, culminating with the closure of US bases in 
Turkey in July 1975.
Congress V's The Executive
M
In the aftermath of US involvement in Cambodia, Vietnam and
'Watergate' , Congressmen recognised that they were able to impose
«(2 )
their will upon the Executive in key areas of foreign policy.
The move for an arms embargo against Turkey was the first test 
case in the "post Nixon" era, precipitating a serious confront­
ation between Congress and the Executive over the control of 
foreign policy making. On 15 August 1974, in a meeting with
Kissinger, a group of Greek-American Congressmen led by Representative
(3)
Brademas criticised him for mismanaging the Cyprus crisis . J
Kissinger conceded that the crisis had not been handled by his 
department in the highest traditions of diplomacy. He, however, 
stressed that the resignation of President Nixon and other crises, 
plus the inauguration of the Ford administration had prevented 
him from giving much attention to the problem^ He also partly 
blamed Callaghan for the collapse of the second Geneva c o n f e r e n c e . ( 5 )
CHAPTER VI
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At the meeting Braderaas put forward the proposal that the United 
States cutoff its military assistance to Turkey until its troops 
were withdrawn from the islanct^ But Kissinger replied to 
Brademas:
"Some political and strategic exigencies are more import­
ant than the L a w s . " ^ ^
Contrary to Kissinger, on 18 August 1974 Secretary of Defence 
James Schlesinger critised the advance of the Turkish forces and 
said that "the United States would have to re-examine its mil­
itary aid programs for Turkey . . . the Turkish moves at this
point have gone beyond what any of its friends or sympathisers
(8 )
would have anticipated, and I to accept."
In the wake of Watergate a large percentage of Congressmen
were "not in a frame of mind to accept Kissinger's arguments.
The cornerstone of their thesis was that the rule of law also
applied to the conduct of foreign policy by the Executive branch.
Frank and Weisband assert that"congressional distrust of the
Presidency and a determination to 'get a handle' on foreign policy
decisions intimately affecting American interests, rather than
any profound commitment to one side or the other in the Cyprus
(9)
crisis, informed and motivated the majority of members.
On 19 September 1974 Kissinger, while addressing the Senate 
Democratic Causus, was asked by Senator Eagleton to comment on 
the legality of Turkish use of military equipment supplied by the 
United States in the Cyprus crisis. Kissinger replied that "the 
dominant interpretation within my legal department" agreed with 
Eagleton's view that further aid to Turkey was illegalf?^' He, 
however, went on to explain that:
"foreign policy considerations obtained against applying
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the penalty the law provided: suspension of further aid."
Under provisions in military aid legislation, US supplied weapons 
could be used only for defensive purposes. Congressman Solarz's 
comments reflect the view prevalent at the time about the rule 
of law and US foreign policy:
"... the movement out of the beachhead in August 1974 did 
appear to violate the restrictions of the Arms Export Con­
trol Act and thus required the cutoff of all new American 
arms to Turkey - if for no other reason than demonstrating 
to all the nations of the world that the United 1 was
serious about the restrictions in American law7. Indeed, 
it seems clear that once Turkey had occupied 40 percent 
of Cyprus, the credibility of American law was at stake.
If the United States had not acted at that time, others
would have been put on notice that they could use our arms
„(12)
with impunity regardless of their agreements with us.
On 24 September 1974 the House of Representatives voted 
(307 - 90) to ban military aid to Turkey until the President
u
certified that "substantial progress toward agreement has been
113 )
made regarding military forces in Cyprus. When continuing
resolution authority 1131 was tabled in the Senate it was passed,
despite President Ford's conviction that "it would destroy any
hope for the success of the initiatives the United States had
already taken or may take in the future to contribute to a just
settlement of the Cyprus dispute ... the United States will have
,j,15)
lost its negotiating flexibility and influence. A .Joint
Congressional conference committee drafted an Amendment, the text of 
which was similar to the defeated Mansfield and Rhodes amendment. 
However, on 7 October the House of Representatives rejected by 291
(11)
12S
votes to 69 the advice of its leadership and amended the contin­
uing resolution which required an immediate cessation of all US 
military assistance to T u r k e y ^ ^  Ford once again cautioned 
that the amendment if passed by the Senate would imperil America’s 
relationship with Turkey and weaken the position of the US in the 
crucial Eastern Mediterranean. On 9 October the Senate rejected 
F o r d’s advice and passed a similar a m e n d m e n t 9 ^  On 14 October 
1974 Ford vetoed H. J. Resolution 1131, arguing that if the resol­
ution was"' enacted it would undercut his ability to assist the
governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus to negotiate a peaceful
(18)
settlement of the Cyprus dispute. Following Ford s second veto
of an identical cutoff to a new funding bill in the House of
Representatives, both the House and the Senate passed a modified
resolution (H. J. Resolution 1167) which was more moderate on the issue of
(19)
US aid to Turkey. It permitted the President to suspend until
10 December prohibitions in the resolution itself as well as making
the grace period conditional on the Turkish government sending no
American supplied arms to reinforce its forces on Cyprus. The
measure was signed with serious reservations by Ford on 18 0ctobe^?0)
The six week grace period was permitted to encourage further
negotiations. Congress agreed to-the delay after the Ford
administration, and particularly Kissinger, encouraged Congress
that it would use that time period to put pressure on the Ankara 
(21)
government:. Another reason for consenting to the delay was 
to give the new President a chance to act decisively to end the 
Turkish military presence and to rectify the consequences of the 
August military move. Since no negotiations took place, the cutoff 
began on 10 December and lasted until 31 December 197^, 
when an amendment re-enacted it but suspended its effect until
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February 1975 when it was reimposed. In an attempt to forestall 
the implementation of-the embargo, Kissinger initiated a series 
of meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, 
who were attending the UN General Assembly meeting in New York. 
Kissinger, however, failed to live up to his promises to Congress 
that he would achieve meaningful progress towards an eventual 
resolution of the crisis.
Collapse of the Ecevit Government and Failure of Kissinger’s 
Initiatives
The collapse, on 18 September 1974, of the Ecevit-Erbakan 
coalition and the subsequent leadership crisis in Turkey compli­
cated the efforts of Kissinger and the international community 
in their search for a breakthrough on the Cyprus situation partic­
ularly during the period October 1974 to March 1975. Although 
many contentious issues had plagued the fragile coalition it was 
policy differences over the Cyprus problem that contributed most 
to the fall of the Ecevit-Erbakan government. In 1975 Ecevit 
offered the following explanation:
"... insurmountable dissension and conflict arose between 
us and our coalition partner on the subject of Cyprus and 
also the general perspective on foreign relations. We 
reached a point where we could no longer conduct foreign 
affairs in co-operation with our partner...We realized 
that our coalition partner’s stand did not and would not
allow this. It is this realization that forced us out
<= - . ..(22) of government.
The Turkish Prime Minister envisaged a situation for Cyprus to 
remain a federal, independent state with the two communities 
on the island to have zones or geographical regions where two
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independent separate Greek and Turkish administrations would
function. Ecevit's position was moderate in comparison to
Erbakan’s who called for the annexation of all Cyprus or at least
(23)
the 40% under Turkish occupation. Ecevit used the pretext of a
(24)
planned visit; to Scandinavia to terminate the partnership. He 
refused to name Erbakan as acting Prime Minister during his planned 
absence. However, Erbakan claimed that as deputy Prime Minister 
he had every right to be acting Prime Minister as well, and refused 
to sign the government decree authorising Ecevit's trip. In re­
taliation Ecevit dissolved the coalition and proposed new elections*'.-'^ 
Besides the clash with Erbakan, Ecevit, conscious that his 
decision to intervene in Cyprus had elevated his popularity status 
to that of a "National Hero", wanted to politically exploit it 
to strengthen his party’s parliamentary position. The scheme, 
however, misfired. Most of the right wing political parties, believ­
ing that an early election would result in a victory for the 
Republican People's Party, opposed Ecevit’s efforts in seeking 
a parliamentary majority for dissolution. In the ensuing cabinet 
crisis the Prime Minister failed to form a new coalition or to 
secure a mandate for the dissolution of Parliament. From 18 
September to 6 November 1974, he continued to govern but only 
on a "caretaker basis".
In the'meantime the embargo campaign was gathering mor.entum 
in Congress. This alarmed Ecevit who was in agreement with 
Kissinger tha*t some form of progress had to be made on the Cyprus 
situation. On 1 November Kissinger warned the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Gunes that:
"If the Cyprus problem is not ir-.cdiately drawn into an
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atmosphere of negotiations it will ossify. In future you
will not be able to take the steps that you could easily
take now. You will appear as conceding to the public
opinion and you will become the captives of domestic
policy.. .-Turkey was at the moment in a stronger position
(26)
and it rested with Turkey to make the first gesture."
However Ecevit’s caretaker status and the rigid opposition of
his political opponents prevented him from introducing any new
foreign policy initiatives. Contrary to the Prime Minister,
Erbakan and the other political leaders ignored the pressure
applied by Kissinger and some West European leaders, and opposed
their suggestion that Turkey should implement a more conciliatory
posture over Cyprus. They feared that Ecevit's electoral position
would become even -stronger if they supported him in securing a pol-
(27)
itical breakthrough in Cyprus.
On 1 November 1974, Kissinger in a move to create a favourable 
atmosphere for negotiations proposed to his counterpart, Gunes, 
the following plan which he believed would be an appropriate 
good will gesture to break the stalemate.
* "Turkey would unilaterally withdraw five thousand troops.
(These being the five thousand paratroopers on the island 
whom Kissinger argued had completed their mission.)
* Turkey would return a small pocket of territory which would 
in the meantime be evacuated by Turkish troops further than 
previously planned.
* The Greeks would be allowed to return to a few villages 
around Louroudjina.
* The owners of Varosha Hotels and the technical Greek personnel 
lacking in the Turkish region would be able to return (under
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Turkish rule and administration).
* The port of Famagusta and Nicosia Airport would be opened
* . . „ :,(28)
for joint use.
Following the above gestures Kissinger’s scenario also 
included a disclosure by the Greek Cypriot leader, Clerides, of his 
acceptance of the "bi-regional federation" principle which vrould 
be concluded after Greece stated that it also favoured the re­
sumption of talks. To secure the implementation of his initiative 
Kissinger arranged to visit Ankara on 8-9 November 1974.
After examining Kissinger’s plan, defence and foreign
ministry officials advised Ecevit that the plan would not undermine
Turkey’s strategic and economic position. Moreover, they concluded
that the resumption of talks would improve the g o v e r n m e n t ' s  foreign
policy posture by removing the Cyprus problem from the forefront
of world public opinion and reduce the condemnation and growing
(29)
opposition to Turkey. Finally it would help forestall the
imposition of the US arms embargo. Ecevit was prepared to form 
a minority government to implement the Kissinger scheme. However, 
when Ecevit consequently put forward the US scenario for endorse­
ment by the Turkish National Security Council it was vetoed by 
E r b a k a n ^ ^  The decision was a turning point for both Turkish and 
American policies towards the Cyprus issue. Following Erbakan’s 
rejection, Ecevit asked the Turkish President Koruturk to permit 
him to form a minority government, as a means to by-pass the 
National Salvation Party’s opposition to the Kissinger plan.
The Turkish President rejected Ecevit’s proposal and terminated the 
Ecevit caretaker administration. On 7 November Kissinger cancelled 
his scheduled visit to Ankara, because of the non-existence of 
a responsible government in Turkey. In the absence of any other 
coalition securing parliamentary support, Koruturk, in mid November,
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installed another caretaker cabinet of technocrats and a -number
(31)
of politicians headed by independent Sadi Irmak. (But it failed 
to secure a vote of confidence from the Chamber, and collapsed in 
March 1975.)
The Cabinet crisis meant that an opportunity was by-passed
for a Kissinger-led breakthrough to materialise. The absence in
Ankara of both a formidable leader and government until 31 March 1975,
alarmed the Ford administration which in turn considered that it
was now necessary to provide greater diplomatic support towards
Turkey. Kissinger skillfully exploited the Turkish crisis, to delay
the imposition of the arms embargo by Congress. He argued, that with
Turkey in a transitional phase it was difficult for him to apply
(32)
any effective pressure on the Irmak government.
Since no negotiations took place during the "Congressional"
grace period, the cutoff took effect on 10 December and lasted
until 31 December. In the meantime, during the NATO Foreign
Ministerial Council meeting in Brussels on 11-13 December, Kissinger,
had a series of talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers
which led in turn to the resumption of discussions between Clerides
(33)
and Denktash on Cyprus on 19 December. The Ford administration 
used the Brussels breakthrough to intensify its lobbying efforts 
in Congress, conveying that suspension of the cutoff was needed 
to provide an additional interval for the resolution of the 
•«. .* ( 3 4 )Cyprus situation.
Beneath the surface of the Brussels initiative, orchestrated
• >
to have a maximum impact upon Congress, Kissinger was drafting the 
Ford administration's new position on the Cyprus conflict.
Under the new guidelines the "central issue of Cyprus was to be
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relegated in order of priority. Indeed, the administration
would concentrate on bilateral relations and national security
issues associated with arms aid to Turkey, and during his
Brussels efforts to secure an Athens-Ankara initiative, Kissinger
completely by-passed the reinstated Makarios. Perhaps had he
included the Archbishop in his scheme, Kissinger might have
achieved some point of convergence. However, he eluded such
a scenario, opting instead for a partisan policy towards Ankara.
During the Brussels talks he embarked on a course that seemed
to aim at formenting trouble among the ranks of the Greek Cypriot
side rather than pursuing for a peaceful solution. During his
deliberations with the Turkish Foreign Minister he
advised him as follows:
"If you are going £o play your cards on Makarios think
twice. To ask for the Archbishop to become interlocutor
means to increase his powers. Let Clerides handle the
talks. He is a more reasonable man. Let Makarios back
him. The disagreement cropping up among the two men will
„(35)
make your position stronger
As a precondition for talks Esenbel demanded that the Greek 
side accept the bi-regional federation as precondition. Kissinger 
concluded that the Turkish proposals were too unreasonable and 
bought up other issues. In return for the 20,000 Turks held in 
the British bases, to pass to the north, Kissinger noted whether 
Turkey would accept also to take that many Greeks, and that it 
either accept a strong central government, or reduce its regior^,
• • ^
Kissinger managed to manoeuvre Bitsios into accepting the 
resumption of the talks without preconditions and supporting 
Clerides. He emphasised to Esenbel
"As our position is also the same, leave the Makarios
136
element aside. If Makarios adheres the agreement to be
concluded, it is good. If he does not adhere to it we
(36)
will support Clerides's stance"
While trying to extract from an adamant Esenbel a commitment that 
Turkey would make concessions Kissinger reportedly stated:
"Instead of working on plans to deteriorate the relations 
between Makarios and Greece, by your insistance you are 
creating an opportunity 'for Greece to renege on the guar-
U . ..(37)
antee that it gave to me...
Despite his influence in Ankara, Kissineer failed to follow 
through any of the moves that he initiated in relation to Cyprus, 
to secure substantial concessions from Turkey. Unable to play 
the role of the "honest broker" because of his low standing with 
the Greek Cypriot side, he emerged in his deliberations with 
Turkish officials as the reluctant patron. Kissinger refused to 
sustain the pressure on Turkey to put forward a set of concessions, 
in case any overt intervention on his behalf threatened the 
status of the fragile Ankara government, which in turn might have 
threatened the status of US National Security interests in 
Turkey.
Kissinger's diplomatic manouevres of by-passing His Beatitude, 
and then presenting him with Athens-Ankara guidelines for talks 
increased Makarios's apprehensions about any US initiated moves.
The Secretary of State's decision to place greater emphasis on 
Athens rather than Nicosia was underlined by his assumption 
that the new "Karamanlis" regime had sufficient leverage to 
impose a solution on a reluctant Makarios. However, Kissinger, 
ignored the fact that with a civilian regime in Athens a reverse 
relationship existed between the two Greek leaders. In the 
event of a serious clash of interest with Karamanlis, Makarios
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had the option of overriding the Greek government and appealing 
directly to the Greek electorate, which held him in high esteem, 
for support. Moreover, at a period of tense Greco-’lurkish 
relations the decision to focus his efforts in a solution emenating 
from a US backed Athens-Ankara diplomatic accord was both ill- 
conceived and badly timed. With both its allies engaged in an 
arms race and the state of their relations at an all time low 
it did not appear plausible that any Greco-Turkish dialogue 
could at the time impose a Cyprus solution.
Kissinger rejected alternative avenues of channeling 
American endeavours through the Security Council, arguing that 
such a move would have created an opening for Soviet involve­
ment or supporting any new diplomatic initiative by Britain pri­
marily because he believed, that Whitehall was partially respon­
sible for the 1974 debacle and the collapse of the Geneva talks.
Foremost, however, Kissinger limited his personal intervention 
because he calculated that the Congressional momentum for an 
arms embargo would eventually disappear. Secondly on philosophical 
principles he believed that the threat by Congress to impose an 
embargo was improper. Developments in January-February of 1975 
refuted Kissinger's perceptions, and showed that he had under­
estimated the strength of the post "Watergate" Congress while at 
the same time he had failed to conceive the outcome that would emerge 
from the heated power struggle between established Congressional 
power brokers and emerging "Young Liberal" representatives. Kissinger 
as* Stern has ^written, "seriously misapprehended the temper of 
Congress on the Cyprus issue. He sought to deal through the 
traditional leaders ... the senior chairman who held the est­
ablished political franchises on Capitol Hill." However with the 
advent of the 94th Congress in January 1975 came a major decentralisation
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(33)
of the power structure.
The 94th Congress included seventy-five freshmen congressmen with
(40)
strong liberal convictions, who formed their own caucus to challenge
the former leadership system in both chambers, by contesting some of
(41)
the committee chairmanship positions. As Abshire observed:
"For decades, freshmen members of Congress had played pliable
roles before committee chairman and majority and minority
leaders, especially in matters of foreign policy. Consultation
(42)
when it did exist, tended to be at the top."
Reforms were introduced in 1973, with the objective to dissolve the
monopoly power of the congressional elites," by dispensing power
more evenly among all the members made it possible for the freshmen
to challenge the status of the old power alignments. For example,
the 1973 change allowing a secret ballot in the Democratic Caucus
,,(43)
to elect Committee Chairmen. With the Democratic opposition
having a two thirds majority in the House of Representatives, the
"impact of the freshmen caucus on the Democratic caucus threatened
(44)
the overturn of the very power structure of the House itself."
A move that clearly undermined the Republican administration of
(45)
President Ford.
The Ford Administration and the Embargo
On 5 February the embargo was reimposed. Following the
formulation of a new ^coalition government by Demirel in March 1975, 
heightened the Turkish reaction towards the US. In order to placate 
Ankara the Ford administration urged a total lifting of the embargo 
Contrary to Congressional opinion, Ford argued that it had created 
a number of problems, calling into question the ability of an ally 
to continue to fulfil its essential NATO responsibilities, thus
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undermining N A T O’s strength in the Eastern Mediterranean;
jeopardizing vital common defence installations which Turkey and
the US jointly maintain; contributing to tensions which are not
helpful to Greece; and, reducing American options to move the
Cyprus negotiations toward a peaceful conclusion acceptable to all 
(47)
parties.
With the support of the powerful Greek lobby, the House, on 24 
July 1975, voted 223-206 to continue the embargo on arms shipments 
to Turkey, despite heavy lobbying by Kissinger and a last minute 
plea from the President. Ford and Kissinger conversely tried to 
divide the question of lifting the embargo against Turkey from the 
question of a Cyprus settlement. Ford remarked critically that the 
action by the Congress actually delayed, hampered and hindered the 
negotiating capabilities that the United States had at the time to 
work with both the new Greek government of Karamanlis and the Turkish 
government under D e m i r e l . ^ ^  Under Kissinger’s pressure Congress 
partially lifted the embargo on 2 October 1975.
The Regional Implications
Ford categorically stated that the embargo would not make for 
an improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey without which 
a Cyprus settlement could not be reached. Twofold security interests 
prompted the Ford Administration to condemn the Congress-imposed 
embargo. Firstly, the Congressional action prolonged the Cyprus 
dispute, by continuing to have harmful effects on the triangular 
relations between Turkey, Greece and NATO. Secondly, it threatened 
the tenure of major installations, vital to US national security 
interests in terms of both nuclear deployment and US influence in 
the Middle East region. Ford stated that at a time of uncertainty
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in the Middle East America should consider carefully any action
which could add to the tension that already existed. He stressed
that facilities in Turkey and mutual defense arrangements played a
(49)
vital role in the security of the area. Defense Department
strategists assumed that US military influence in the Middle East 
would suffer substantially if Turkey were to turn her back on the 
U S . (5°> Washington-policy-makers concluded that, taken in their 
entirety, US intelligence facilities in Turkey were extremely 
valuable and to a significant degree irreplaceable. America used 
these facilities to monitor Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement, 
and needed their renewed availability in monitoring Soviet compli­
ance with the pending SALT II agreement. The embargo altered 
radically the spirit and the content of Turko-American relations. 
Turkey considered the Congressional attempt to link the subject of 
aid with the subject of Cyprus a grave error. It warned that this 
attempt at duress was doomed to produce the very opposite result, as
it was determined to protect the rights of the Turkish Cypriots under
.... (52) 
any conditions.
Ankara in response closed down the American bases. At a time
when Turkey was shaken by a severe economic crisis and political
tensions arising from both foreign and domestic problems, Demirel
(53)
had no option but to defer to the political opposition, who
demanded a strong line in dealing with both Americans and Greeks. 
Overall the embargo was a bitter blow for the Demirel government 
which had staked its political future on the Western alliance and 
which had great difficulty in surviving with a narrow-based
(54)coalition. Moreover, at a time when Greece and Turkey were
waging an arms race over the disputed Aegean seabed, the embargo had
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a short term effect of decreasing Turkey’s strategic leverage 
against Greece. The unfavourable development also increased Turkish 
inflexibility in the Cyprus negotiations.
Maintaining that the intelligence gathering facilities were 
essential to US security, and that some could not be duplicated,
Washington sought to salvage continued access to them through 
negotiations. In the meantime Ankara, looking for a "congress 
proof" arrangement, reached in March 1976, a Defence Cooperation 
agreement with the Ford Adminiprrarion. whereby Turkey would receive 
one billion dollars in aid over a four-y=.ar period. With this 
agreement the link between Turko-American relations and the Cyprus 
problem and Greco-Turkish relations was severed.
With the psychological obstacle of the embargo, Turkey hardened
I
its foreign policy line. Fully realizing that Congress might still 
refuse to ratify the accord, Ankara warned that if such a step was 
taken it would end its special relationship with the US. It also 
emphasized that it did not undertake to make concessions in Cyprus 
in exchange for the new agreement. Kissinger warned that for 
Congress to relate the Cyprus question to Turkish-American military 
relations would lead to disastrous consequences. Casting consider­
able doubt on both Ankara’s and Kissinger’s claims that no linkage 
should be made between the two, although politically there was a 
connection, Congress re°ia ined steadfast n ci r e i t e r a t e d  that v.i r. hour. Cyprus
concessions there woulr: 1 e no arrv; agreement. The US-Turkish agreement threa
j u u i  c • , . (37)ened to upsej: the balance or power in the Aegean .
By the end of 1976, the embargo rather than the Cyprus issue 
had become the major issue. "It had superceded Cyprus, which was 
now the last priority. In the Turkis’n-Ford construction, the aid
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relationship between the US and Turkey, instead of the situation in
(58)
Cyprus which had precipitated change."
The Carter Administration and the Cyprus Conflict
Makarios and the Greek government were convinced that the 
election of Carter, who as a candidate strongly supported the 
embargo and criticized Kissinger for trying to repeal it, was a
(5'change for the better in the American stand on the Cyprus problem.
In February 1977 Carter appointed Clark Clifford as a special emis­
sary to the Cyprus area. The results of his fact-finding mission 
were the basis on which Carter formulated his policy towards this 
region. The new President seemed more determined than his pre­
decessor to take an active interest in this area, to coordinate his 
moves with Congress, to appear genuinely impartial between Greece 
and Turkey and to use American influence to resolve the Cyprus 
dispute.
The Carter administration attempted to link aid to Turkey to 
concessions from Turkey on Cyprus, but the immediate Turkish re­
action was a return to a tougher position, Demirel arguing that his 
weak coalition government and impending national elections made con­
cessions impossible. The Carter approach represented a departure 
from the Kissinger policy of separating the Cyprus issue from 
Turkey’s key NATO role, in that it linked ratification of the pro­
posed four-year $1 billion military aid deal for Turkey to progress 
on Cyprus, and asked Congress to defer action on the agreement, 
making significant progress toward a Cyprus settlement a condition 
of Congressional approval of the treaty.
Throughout 1976-1977, Makarios called for a "long struggle."
It meant trying to internationalize the Cyprus problem by recourse
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to international forums, like the UK General Assembly and the Non-9 f
Aligned Conference. Although the diplomatic campaign helped 
mobilize international opinion, Makarios was aware that in reality 
the US was indeed the country which could exert pressure on Turkey. 
The Archbishop reiterated in July 1977 that the role of the US for 
solution of the problem could be very decisive. Furthermore,
he added, that if the two superpowers were in agreement as to the
(61)
solution of the Cyprus problem, they could help solve it. He was
afraid, however, that tnuy were not iu rw eii.cn t and consequently 
would not cooperate for its solution.
The sudden death of Makarios in August 1977, and the continuing 
climate of political uncertainty in Ankara, heightened tensions in 
the area. By the end of 1977 the Carter administration reduced the 
pressure on Ankara. Instead it resorted to playing down the embargo 
dispute. The consolidation of Spyros Kyprianou as President of 
Cyprus, Ecevit's return to power in Ankara, following the collapse 
of the Demirel government, and Karamanlis' new mandate at the 1977 
polls, introduced new determinants in the multi-sided dispute.
In 1978 the Carter administration switched positions, returning 
to the Kissinger-Ford guidelines on the arms embargo, because it 
believed that it had not succeeded in forcing Turkey to withdraw 
its 30,000 troops from Cyprus. A number of factors prompted 
Washington to shift. Foremost, Ecevit's adoption of a "mult.i- 
lateraliy dynamised’ foreign policy, a more independent and flexible 
yet tougher approach than his right-wing predecessor, Demirel. Ecevit 
stated that there would be no change in Turkey’s position on the 
Cyprus issue until the US Congress raised its embargo. Although 
the Turkish Premier allowed it to be understood that Turkey had no 
intention of deserting NATO or of accepting Soviet arms, he did
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specify that Turkey was considering changing its relationship with
( 62^
the Western allies. Ecevit concluded that even if the embargo
was finally ended, Turkey would undertake a new defence policy that 
inevitably would reduce its military contribution to NATO. He did
however blame the American embargo for contributing to the Turkish
, •. (63) 
economic crisis.
The US administration believed Turkey to be too strategically
important to cut adrift. Carter now accepted the Kissinger line
that preserving the strength of a NATO ally outweighed the moral
considerations that Turkey breached agreements with the US and
committed human-rights abuses in Cyprus. Secretary of State Vance
maintained that"the Turkish forces had seriously deteriorated
through lack of spare parts and new arms, weakening the southern
flank of NATO. General Alexander Haig, the supreme allied
! I
commander in Europe, had revealed that due to the embargo, certain 
parts of the Turkish military machine were operating at an effici­
ency of less than 50 percent of their former capabilities'!
A number of US officials warned that eventually Turkey might 
turn to the Soviet Union for aid, if the US continued to deny it. 
According to its CIA estimate, the Soviet Union had committed $650 
million of economic assistance to Turkey in 1975. Ecevit's
statements that he felt no threat to his country from the Soviet 
Union, led key American officials to argue that if America continued to
coerce Turkey it would abandon the US and would go to the Soviet
(67) "
bloc. Lewis believes the scare-mongering about Soviet influence
was, moreover, a Washington-inspired campaign to muster Congressional
" (68 )
support to repeal the embargo. With a resolutely anti-communist
Turkish high command such a scenario seemed most unlikely. As Lewis 
has pointed out, few in Turkey wished to join the Soviet orbit, as
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they knew that this would mean a status at best like that of 
Finland. ^  The real danger for the US was not the triumph of a 
pro-Soviet force inside Turkey, but rather a gradual drift towards 
de facto non-alignment.
On 13 April the Turkish Cypriots presented a description of 
new proposals to the UN Secretary General. They followed this up 
with a new offer over Varosha involving the return of 35,000 Greek 
Cypriot refugees to their homes to take effect as soon as inter- 
communal negotiations were resumed. The timing of the Turkish plan 
was seen as an effort to influence the US Congress in its decision 
on Carter’s request to end the arms embargo. Whereas the British 
government did not regard the Turkish Cypriot plan as an acceptable 
basis for the resumption of negotiations, Carter commended the new 
proposals as a positive and forthcoming step. Emphasizing that 
a significant gap continued to exist between the two Cypriot parties, 
the President categorically stated that'if talks were not resumed at 
an early date, opportunity for progress on the issue might well be
delayed for some time to come, and the unfortunate de facto division
„(70)
of the island could further solidify.
With the ratification of the Panama Canal treaty and the Saudi 
arms deal, Carter perceived the lifting of the Arms Embargo as one of
most important foreign policy issues facing his adminis-r
f t
tration in 1978. The President asserted that the points that the 
Congress intended to underscore three years earlier, when the em­
bargo was imposed, had all been made, but now the embargo was neither 
contributing to a settlement of the Cyprus dispute, nor helping to 
improve US relations with Greece and Turkey. . . . .  it had 
driven a wedge between those two countries and had v:eakened the 
cohesiveness and readiness of NATO. Congress responded to
the
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Carter's lobbying tolift the ban. On 25 July the Senate voted.to repeal the
embargo by 57 votes to 42. Similarly on 2 August the House of representatives
( 1 2 )
voted by 208 votes to 205 to lift the sanctions.
However, Congress tied the flow of arms to Turkey to 
progress on seeking a solution of the Cyprus dispute.
It asked the Carter administration to report to it
every 60 days on what progress had been made towards a settlement of the
i
Cyprus problem. In Congressional terms the new directive gave President 
Carter sufficient discretionary powers to lift the arms 
b an.
The embargo decision received a mixed reaction. Opponents from 
the "Greek lobby" who included Senators Kennedy, Sarbanes and 
Eagleton, rejected this as being no compromise at all, but a tilt 
towards a pro-Turkish position. On the other hand, the Carter administrat ion
I
viewed the outcome as a recovery of executive authority in foreign
The Greek government was dissapointed with the result and Karamanlis stated 
that the deci-sion to lift the sanctions could have unfavourable repercussions on the
evolution of the Cyprus issue as on other Greek-Turkish differences related to 
security and peace in the region. ^ "^Athens’feared that one possibLe conse-
quence of the decision might be that it could alter the military balance 
in the Aegean. The Kyprianou government warned that the d e c i s i o n  wouId 
encourage further Turkish intransigence and render more difficult
progress towards a solution. Although the Turkish Prime Minister 
conceded that Congress had made a "positive" move towards mending 
Turkish-American relations, he suggested .that the terms on which the
embargo was being lifted would still hinder the prospect of negotiation of a Cyprus
(74)
settlement.
The American government proposed in November 1978, a twelve- 
point plan for a solution of the Cyprus dispute.^  ^ Britain and
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Canada also took part in putting the twelve-point approach together. 
The US initiative was the outcome of shuttle diplomacy, by Deputy 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The Americans proposed a 
genuine and workable federal constitution under which defence, 
foreign affairs, economic and fiscal policy, and trade, would be 
the responsibility of the central government; a viable federal 
legislature; and "considerable" territorial concessions by Turkey, 
including the return of Varosha (Greek Famagusta). The draft
also called for freedom of movement, settlement and ownership to be 
written into the constitution. Finally, the US plan proclaimed that 
a necessary part of the final solution (in addition to the specifi­
cally agreed one) would be the withdrawal of the non-Cypriot military 
forces from Cyprus, and suggested that the disarmament and demili­
tarization of the Cyprus Republic could also be studied. On 24 May 
1978, President Kyprianou had made a similar proposal. While 
speaking at the UN Special Session on Disarmament, he proposed total 
demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus.
The American initiative was designed to break the deadlock 
which developed after the Turkish side had submitted what the Greek 
Cypriots considered were tough peace terms. The realistic guide­
lines presented an opportunity to break the stalemate towards a
peaceful settlement. The plan, however, was plagued by a number of 
(78)
limitations. The draft in many parts was not precise in detail.
For example, it stated that the Turkish Cypriots "will agree to sig­
nificant geographic changes in favour of the Greek-Cypriot side,"
■ •»
but did not specify how much. The Greek Cypriots have argued in the 
past that the Turkish army of occupation is non-negotiable, in any 
final solution. The Turkish Cypriots on the other hand stress 
that its presence is a positive deterrent. Without it, Turkish
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Cypriot leverage would be eroded, and in all probability, their 
status would once again be threatened by the more numerous Greek 
community.
Following the failure of the November 1978 initiative, the 
Carter administration returned to America's traditional foreign policy 
position of placing its security interests, as well as its interest 
in improving relations between Greece and Turkey in the name of NATO 
cohesion, ahead of a search for a solution to the Cyprus problem.
The incumbent Reagan administration is adhering to the same p o l i c y .
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR A 
SETTLEMENT
The 1974 developments radically transformed the political 
and physical parameters of Cyprus. This change in the status 
quo and the subsequent appearance of new determinants have re­
sulted in more complex deadlocks. A wide range of international 
bodies, in particular the United Nations; the Commonwealth; 
the Non-Aligned Movement; the Islamic Conference; The Council 
of Europe; the European Economic Community have been preoccup­
ied with attempts to resolve the impasse. The degree of in­
volvement has varied from symbolic intervention to permanent 
diplomatic initiatives.
The role of the world community in the search for a sol­
ution arouses intense feelings in Cyprus with the key actors 
embracing diametrically opposite views on the role and effect­
iveness of these organisations. This chapter will concentrate 
on analysing the involvement of these international actors in 
search for a settlement. Particular emphasis will"be placed 
on identifying and evaluating the issues that they have added 
to the problems of the dispute from those that have construct­
ively enhanced reconciliation efforts.
The Commonwealth
The Cyprus question featured on the agenda of the Common­
wealth Heads'of Government meetings at Kingston (1975) London
(1977) and Lusaka (1979). This can possibly be attributed to
( 1)
the diplomatic initiatives of President Makarios. It was in 
line with his foreign policy guidelines in post 1974 of .resorting
CHAPTER VII
to the mobilisation of the world community as a means to secur­
ing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus, by 
constantly trying to influence these bodies to pressure 
Ankara to remove its occupying forces from the island.
Makarios also sought to use the Commonwealth to strengthen 
his government's linkage with the African block, whose vote 
was crucial in the UN forum, by closely aligning with the 
African regimes' platforms. ‘ At the London meeting he declared 
"Cyprus joins in the condemnation of the violation of the fund­
amental rights and freedoms of the peoples of Zimbabwe, Namibia
and South Africa and in urging the adoption of measures
( 2 )
for the elimination of these anachronistic policies".
The Heads of Government decided at Kingston "as a concrete 
expression of their interest and concern for a fellow Common­
wealth country'^^ to set up an eight-nation committee,^ whose 
mandate was "to follow developments concerning Cyprus, make
recommendations and assist in every possible way towards the
,(5>early implementation of United Nations resolutions .
The Commonwealth Committee on Cyprus
The institutional mechanism that emerged from the Kingston
meeting was entrusted on the Commonwealth Secretariat. However,
political and structural limitations restricted the Committee’s
operations. Mr Ramphal, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, summed
up the predicament: "The Commonwealth's capacity to influence
events in Cyprus was extremely limited, but, indirectly, members
a
•
could influence the situation in other international forums like
( 6 )
the United Nations." Moreover the lack of any prior involvement 
by the Commonwealth, largely a by-product of successive British 
Governments’ opposition, supported by persuasive diplomacy, handicapped
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the Committee’s performance.^^
In its first two years the Committee held nine meetings, 
but put forward no recommendations, and circulated only a 
confidential memorandum to all Commonwealth Heads of Government.
A revival of diplomatic pressure over the issue by Britain, which 
held reservations over any Commonwealth intervention, eroded the 
Committee’s political consensus, restricting its manoeuvrability 
and credibility. A British commitment was a prerequisite for 
any Commonwealth initiatives having even a slight impact on the 
issue. However, in the aftermath of 1974, British interest in 
the Cyprus situation continued to diminish. The official explan­
ation for the erosion in influence was justified as follows "Cyprus 
...does not have the relationship to Britain that it had in the
1950’s and it is not in the British interest that we should repeat
/o )
that relationship.’ James Callaghan’s biographers vividly depict 
Whitehall’s readiness to leave the problem to the American Govern­
ment, on the premise that no British policy on Cyprus could
(9)
run counter to Dr Kissinger’s. Some British diplomats have con­
ceded that over this issue London followed Washington’s lead even
( 1 0 )
for trivial decisions. Following the Vienna talks of 1975, British 
behind the scenes diplomatic initiatives rapidly declined, elim­
inating any traces of an independent British involvement. One 
explanation offered is that the US had far more leverage with 
Turkey and could have been more effective in persuading it to 
make concessions.
According to another perspective the British failed to play 
their card, precisely because one side was too intransigent 
or, worse, that both sides did not desire an ad hoc solution and. 
preferred to prolong the problem for years
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The enmity towards the Commonwealth could also be ascribed 
to the British Labour Government’s trying to protect their pol­
itical flank over the issue. In 1976 Callaghan attempted to strip 
the Select Committee on Cyprus of its power "to call for persons 
and papers". Only through the casting vote of the chairman, Arthur 
Bottomley, did the Select Committee not include the sentences:
"The Foreign Secretary’s policies are totally negative.
*
His pessimism and lack of ideas or initiatives is profoundly 
depressing."
Despite Britain's status as a guarantor and its prestige as 
the supreme Commonwealth power, it delayed ten months from July 
1974, before it considered the possibility of a Commonwealth 
commitment. In order to avoid a possible confrontation with the 
British Government, the Commonwealth Secretary-General refrained 
from including in his agenda the question of a visit by the Common­
wealth Committee to Cyprus, for one year. Agreement for the trip
(13)was reached in principle on 6 January, 1977, and it was felt
that there would be value in undertaking a goodwill mission to the
(14)
island provided all parties would be willing to receive it.
From its conception the Committee was viewed merely as a liaison 
body with the UN Secretary-General. Its complementary status and 
weak terms of reference were additional factors inhibiting its role. 
That after one and a half years the Committee had not formulated a 
policy on how it could best assist international efforts simply 
emphasised the predicament that confronted it.
Ramphal'cautiously noted that "the Commonwealth was not 
the only mechanism for achieving a solution and must indeed be 
wary of being too grandiose in its efforts." To the extent 
that the Commonwealth could act as a catalyst, he added, "the
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Secretariat stood ready to put its mechanism into action if
and when r e q u e s t e d ^  ** The Committee could be activated at the
initiative of member states. In the meantime the Secretariat
made it clear that it was up to member governments to make use
(16)
of the machinery they had established as they saw fit Committee
members, however, were reluctant to take the initiative. In
many cases it was only persistent requests by the Cyprus Government,
and its regional neighbour, Malta, that prompted the organisation
into some follow-up action. Commonwealth expressions of solidarity
with the Government of Cyprus and re-affirmatiors of support for
, (17)
United Nations resolutions had at least some symbolic value: 
for example, when the Turkish Cypriot side threatened a unilateral 
declaration of an independent Turkish Cypriot state (UDI), the Com­
mittee decided that "it would be useful and appropriate to recommend 
to all Commonwealth Governments that they take such action as they
deem appropriate with a view to averting UDI or any other action by
(18)
any of the parties which would jeopardise the inter-communal talks.
Within the UN framework the Commonwealth's role also fell short 
of its stated intentions. Although it comprised approximately 
twenty-five per cent of United Nations members, the Commonwealth, 
as a group, did not jointly sponsor any new resolutions or under­
take any major liaison functions.
A number of explanations account for the shortfalls in 
Commonwealth commitment. With the exception of Malta, Cyprus was 
not of regional importance for any of the Commonwealth states.
African problems such as the "Rhodesian" question, had pre-emminence 
over Cyprus. Furthermore, whereas Britain had abandoned its commitments 
over Cyprus, it had become deeply engulfed in the Rhodesian problem.
For nearly two decades it had continuously ranked on the forefront
of Whitehall's policy priorities'^^ After 1974 African problems 
edged Cyprus out at Commonwealth meetings. Britain's refusal to 
deal with the latter, while simultaneously it urged the body to 
search for a solution to the Rhodesian question, illustrated the dif- 
ference^ in its priorities over two problems in which it was at least 
legally, equally entrenched. The security and political implications
of the African problem for many of the member states led to tactical
( 20 )
moves over the issue by the African bloc . At the Lusaka confer­
ence the future of Zimbabwe was the central item discussed. Cyprus 
remained on the periphery, securing the traditional gestures of sol­
idarity and support, but failed to obtain a pledge for a more active
role by the Commonwealth, which emerged from the conference claiming
(21 )
greater relevance. Whereas the organisation contributed to the 
partial resolution of one of the most sensitive international issues, 
it continued to follow a negative policy over Cyprus. In their review 
of the role of the Committee on Cyprus, the Heads of Government em­
phasised that the Committee could play a more constructive role. 
However, while making the gesture they did not introduce any more 
effective terms of reference, which was tantamount to confirming 
their continued reluctance to increase the institution's r o l L ^ ^
The Non-Aligned Movement
Since the developments"b’f 1974, the Non-Aligned Movement 
through a series of explicit undertakings has periodically made 
a significant impact on the Cyprus dispute. A fragile network 
of intricate political relationships plagued by an element of
•
controversy have underlined the Movements involvement. Its 
timely interventions have nonetheless rallied an overall consen­
sus from the Non-Aligned states, at a period when the Movement 
was confronted with major ideological schisms and plagued by 
f actionalism^'^
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Cyprus' traditionally strong links with the Non-Aligned
(25)
partly explains the latters intervention. In terms of foreign
policy objectives, Makarios had always interpreted the Movement
(26)
"as a moral force and an instrument of peaceful progress." As 
a pragmatist however, he embraced no exaggerated illusions about 
its limited powers, but he perceived its great liaison value 
within the United Nations.
*
The Non-Aligned Movement's support was shown by their adoption
and issuing of a number of declarations both by the group itself
and by the Co-ordinating Committee. Mr Rahal of Algeria summed
up their posture: "The attack against Cyprus, against its sovereignty
and national unity, is felt by the entire group as an attack against
the Non-Aligned countries and as jeopardising the very policy of
Non-Alignment ... the Non-Aligned group would like to assure the
Cypriot people of its total solidarity, being ready to do anything
which would permit the rapid restoration of peace on the island and
(27)
facilitate an agreement between the two communities."
(28)
The Co-ordinating Committee set up a contact group composed of 
Algeria, Guyana, India, Mali, and Yugoslavia. Given a mandate to 
closely monitor developments and to offer its Good offices for recon­
ciliation, the group managed to influence events a great deal more 
than observers had initially expected. During the 29th session of the 
UN intense diplomatic activity by the contact group led, on 1 Nov­
ember, 1974, to the unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of
Resolution 3212, which was endorsed on 13 December, 1974, in Security
(29)
Council Resolution, 365, and laid down the framework and principles 
for the solution of the conflict in agreement with the position of 
the Non-Aligned countries. The resolution was evaluated by diplomatic 
observers overall as a positive and constructive document.
(24)
At the Security Council meeting called after the Turkish 
Cypriot leadership’s unilateral action on 13 February 1975, the 
Non-Aligned members of the Council participated in the drafting 
of resolution 367, which inter-alia provided a mechanism for the 
resumption of the talks between the two communities.
Subsequent undertakings by the Non-Aligned have received 
a mixed reaction from the interested parties to the dispute. A 
number of Western powers such as the United States and its ally 
Turkey, have been hyper-critical of Non-Aligned initiatives.
Diplomatic vigilance by Greek Cypriot foreign policy makers 
succeeded in excluding any participation by Turkish leaders at
(31)
Non-Aligned forums.
In Non-Aligned meetings, Greek Cypriot representatives repeat­
edly made reference to the unilaterial actions of Turkey and its 
forces of occupation. To consolidate further the solidarity and 
co-operation of the Non-Aligned states the officials outlined
their country’s independent foreign policy and undeviating
(32)
principles of non-alignment. Commenting on the strongly worded
resolution on Cyprus adopted att. the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers’
(33)
conference in Belgrade in July 1978, the Turkish Prime Minister 
stated his dismay at Yugoslavia and India for co-sponsoring the 
resolution, and concluded that "... the resolution has underlined 
one major fact ... that we have to explain ourselves more resolutely
/  o  f  \
and we have to foster our relations with the non-aligned bloc."
Ecevit also stressed "I believe that the resolution did not contribute
(35)
anything to the settlement of the Cyprus question."
Denktash admonished the Greek Cypriot leaders by charging that 
they were: "shutting their eyes to realities by thinking that they 
can get their way by taking us to international conferences."
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The Cyprus government's diplomatic achievements were a constant
reminder to the enraged Ankara policymakers, of Turkey's internation-
(3
al. isolation, and foreign policy failure with the 89 country movement.
The Greek Cypriot regimes had through their tactics managed to pene-
(38)
trate every corner of the organisation.
Makario.s's prestige in the Third World and his web of close ties 
with leaders of established radical Non-Aligned states such as, Castro
*
(Cuba), Boumediene (Algeria), Assad (Syria) and with influencial mod­
erates such as Tito (Yugoslavia), Sadat (Egypt), Ghandi (India) coun­
tenanced Greek Cypriot efforts. His Beatitude's successor Kyprianou,
while lacking the international stature of Makarios, formulated his
( 3 0 )
foreign policy upon the s a m e  principles and criteria. ’ The Larnaca 
airport incident between PLO and Egyptian forces in 1978, tarnished 
the previously excellent relations between Nicosia and Cairo. In 
exchange for support from the Non-Aligned Movement, Cyprus skillfully 
cast its vote whenever it was required by the mechanics of Non- 
Aligned bloc ballots in the UN. Only a small group of Islamic states 
such as Oman, Kuwait, Tunisia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia stated reserv­
ations over some of the Non-Aligned group declarations over Cyprus,
Their gestures were basically symbolic and did not spark off any pro­
tracted opposition or cause any major division.
The drafting of UN Resolution 34/30 in 1979, by the contact 
group, with its controversial paragraph 13 which inter alia stated 
that in the' event of the Secretary-General reporting lack of progress 
in the negotiations he was authorised to appoint an ad hoc committee 
composed of 'no more than seven member s t a t e s ^ ^  added new dimensions 
to the intervention of the Non-Aligned Group. Foremost^ the resolution 
received a hostile reaction from the United States and other Western 
powers. In the past, Washington policymakers, had opposed such a move
because they feared that it could drastically increase the proba­
bility of some form of involvement by the Soviet Union via the 
auspices of the UN. The Carter administration.stated that it fully 
supported the efforts of the United Nations, and that it had consis­
tently backed the Secretary-General1s efforts and would continue to 
do so. However, when UN undertakings such as paragraph 13 seemed
to offer the possibility of attracting Soviet participation the
(411
US retracted from its stated position. Ideally the US would have 
preferred any international deliberations over Cyprus to be continued 
within the Western sphere.
The State Department enlisted the support of its European
allies in applying intense diplomatic pressure on the Kyprianou
(42)
government, not to insist on the formation of the ad hoc commit-
(43)
tee if the talks did not resume.
The Islamic Countries Conference
In a planned move to counter the initiatives of Greek 
Cypriot diplomacy in the Third World, the Turkish side in 1976 
focussed its attention at the 42 country strong Islamic group. 
However, a combination of factors caused Ankara’s "pro-Islamic 
policy" to fall short of its calculations. From the outset, Ankara's 
approach was handicapped by its commitment to the Kemalist ideals 
of "secularism", its alignment with NATO, a predominantly Christian,
Western alliance, and its past role as an imperial power in the Middle
(44)
East region under the Ottomans.
Neither of its neighbouring Middle East states, Syria, Iraq
• ^
and Iran (post Shah) were pleased by the pro-Western posture of 
successive Ankara regimes, and viewed Turkey's role in the region 
with caution and reservations. Relations between Ankara and Damascus, 
Baghdad and Tehran on many occasions have been less than cordial.
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In the 1970's, efforts by Iraq's Ba'athist leadership to defuse its
(45)
Kurdish problem by offering a series of proposals that envisaged 
a degree of autonomy (rejected by the Kurds of, Iraq) created a rift 
with Turkey, which feared that such accords of "autonomy" could 
spread and destabilise further ics own Kurdish population (officially 
3.5 million - unofficially 8 m i l l i o n ^ ^ S i m i l a r y  until recently, 
the compulsory levy imposed by Ankara on trucks crossing Turkish- 
Iranian borders had led to a deterioration of relations between 
the two regimes. Since the fall of the Shah its former CENTO ally 
Ankara-Tehran diologue and regional co-operation has declined, 
with the "Khomeini" Islamic goverment not impressed by Turkey’s pro- 
Western posture. Ankara’s ambivalent stand on the Arab-Israeli 
question has also kept relations with the Assad government at a 
low level.
As the host of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers held in Istanbul between the 10 and 16 May 1976, Turkey 
secured on the agenda the appearance of Denktash. At the end of
the conference the group drafted a vague resolution on the Cyprus 
Question and the cause of the Turkish Moslem Community of Cyprus.
The resolution affirmed that "until the Cyprus problem is solved 
the rightful claim of the Turkish Moslem Community of Cyprus for 
the right to be heard in all international forums where the Cyprus 
problem comes up for discussion, on the basis of equality with the
/ / o \
Greek Cypriot representative". However, the majority of the 
Islamic states that attended, did not honour their commitment at 
the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo and later in the UN debate 
on the Cyprus Question.
ihe Cyprus Government's long record of friendly relations with
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Middle East states, and in particular its close ties with the more
(49)
radical regimes, and organisations in the area such as Syr-ia and the
PLO, was a influencial lever in the decision by Islamic Goverments to 
rejecting the Turkish inroads and to uphold, their support for the 
Greek Cypriot position, by adopting objective resolutions. Arab 
leaders have.objected to successive Turkish regimes making symbolic 
statements of support for the Palestinian cause while tilting its 
support towards Israel rather 'than the PLO. The training of Leftist 
Turkish guerilla groups by the PLO underlines Turkish policy of up­
holding a double-edged posture in the dispute. This clash of interests 
however, has blocked Turkish efforts to mobilise Islamic support 
for the Turkish Cypriots. At the 10th Islamic Foreign Minister’s 
Conference held in Fez in June 1979 the Turkish Foreign Minister,
Guaduz Okcun, and Denktash, addressed the conference but failed 
to secure recognition for Turkish Cyprus for the third consecutive 
time. Instead the conference called for both communities to "co­
exist and join forces to achieve a truce leading to a peaceful sol-
(52)
ution through negotiations".
Conflicting policy preferences also undercut the efforts of 
the Turkish side. The Aegean crisis, the US arms embargo, and 
Turkey's search for international monetary loans in the face of its 
huge deficit ranked higher in order of priority than lobbying for 
unreliable Islamic votes. Moreover, with internal political in­
stability, too close an identification with the Islamic conference 
increased the probability of some reaction by advocates of Kemalist 
ideology who already were dissatisfied with the increased influence
•
of Islamic fundamentalists such as Erbakan. Ankara has since been
(53)
content to pass over the Islamic initiative to Denktash. With
the Iran-Irak war, Afghanistan, and the Arab-Israeli question 
dominating Islamic forums, in the meantime frustrated Denktash's
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efforts of lobbying for Islamic support. At the 11th Islamic 
Countries Foreign Ministers conference held in Islamabad between 
16-22 May 1980, the Afghanistan crisis dominated the proceedings 
Despite the by-passing of the Turkish Cypriot case, Denktash's 
vigilance in attending the Islamic forum is in line with his policy 
goal to secure a basis of support in the event that he might call 
for UDI.
The European Economic Community and the Council of Europe
On 17 September, 1974 the EEC Foreign Ministers
called for "political co-operation for a negotiated agreement of
"(55)
the Cyprus issue." A week later the then President of the Council 
of the European Community stated: "Troubled by this conflict and 
anxious to restore harmony on Cyprus and between two countries link­
ed to the European Community by the same tie, the Nine have felt it 
to be their duty during the course of several meetings to add their 
efforts to those of the Security C o u n c i l " ^ ^  The EEC was specific 
that the UN forum must exercise its influence to prevent the 
crisis from deteriorating and seek an acceptable settlement.
On 13 February 1975, the EEC announced its willingness to 
hold talks with the leaders of all the interested parties in the conflict. 
Furthermore the EEC offered its services as a mediator on the issue 
but was rejected by Turkey. After this setback, EEC interest 
in the dispute gradually declined. The escalation of tension be­
tween Greece and Turkey over the Aegean, and the imposition of an 
arms embargo against Turkey were probably key factors in precluding any 
new efforts by the Nine.
The EEC's approach to the question was subsequently 
heavily influenced by American policy towards Greece and Turkey.
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On many issues concerning Cyprus the N ine’s policies were a blueprint 
of American guidelines. With the exception of France, in 1976 
the Nine decided to abstain on UN resolutions over Cyprus, abandoning 
their previous UN stance of condemning Turkish policy and unanimously 
supporting the Greek-Cypriot side. Officially, some member states explained 
that their abstention was a tactical move designed to increase their 
role in the search for a solution by enhancing the community’s image 
as an honest broker in Ankara. According to Western diplomat's con­
tinuation of support for UN resolutions w o u l d  only have exacerbated 
further th^ ■’"■ r^nsigence of Turkish policy-makers over the issue.
The Nine decided to avoid a confrontation with Ankara , ■ concentrating 
their energies at seeking a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, 
and abstaining from any initiatives over Cyprus which could have threat­
ened their go-between diplomacy. Occasionally the Nine issued care­
fully worded statements calling for moderation. In a statement de­
livered by Britain on behalf of the Nine "the EEC hoped that concessions 
on both sides, taking into account the legitimate interests of the 
two communities, wTill result in an equitable settlement as regards 
both territory and institutions."
The Community’s lack of political cohesion ruled out the possi­
bilities of concerted mediation over either problem. However, as
a powerful economic entity the EEC was in a position to exert con-
(58)
siderable influence on both Greece and Turkey. (Both associate 
EEC members at the time).
With Turkey suffering from a severe economic recession, 
aggravated by, the economic effects of the arms embargo, the West 
European States were in a strong position to offer Ankara 
monetary assistance,in return for political concessions 
over Cyprus.
However, the Nine rejected the option that in exchange for economic 
assistance they should insist on greater Turkish flexibility 
over Cyprus because the EEC believed that such an arrangement 
would be counter productive. The decision not to tie EEC aid to Turkey to 
concessions over Cyprus was partly due to an intense diplomatic cam­
paign by the State Department and the West German government to
(5 9)
rally West European support for the ailing Ankara regime. Securing 
the appropriation of international credits for Turkey, however, 
resulted in a clash of policy interests over Cyprus. The Nine by­
passed this dilemma by deciding to chart a policy of reaipolitik 
which meant an oblique tilt towards Turkey, and at the same time a 
retraction of interest over the Cyprus issue.
The community was also instrumental in limiting any developments 
in the European sphere that appeared to focus on Turkey’s adverse 
Cyprus policy. The controversial proposal sponsored by EEC governments, 
postponing publication of the report of the Council of Europe’s Human 
Rights Commission ^ ^ o n  alleged Turkish atrocities in Cyprus, was prompted 
by hopes that the suppression of this embarrassing document would induce 
Turkey to make concessions that would facilitate moves towards a settlement^
The report was submitted to the Council on 10 July, 1976. The 
Makarios and Karamanlis administrationspressed for a decision, accept­
ing the report condemning Turkey and recommending drastic action
/ / ' O N
against it including expulsion from the Council of Europe.
A series of resolutions shelved any ruling on the report by the 
Council/ In October 1977 a committee of 18 Deputy Foreign Ministers 
met in Strasbourg, and postponed a^py decision on the report. Instead 
they called for an early resumption of the deadlocked inter-communal 
- talks.
A two-thirds majority was needed for the committee to adopt a
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resolution condemning Turkey's policy on Cyprus. The Jeading opponent of 
such a resolution was West Germany.
During talks held in Ankara on 3 August 1978, with the Secretary-
General of the Council of Europe Herr Kahn-Ackermann, the Turkish
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister told the Council leader that
Turkey would reject all rulings on the Greek Cypriot complaint.
There were some reservations at the time that the Ankara government
might retaliate and resort to severe measures such as leaving
(6Q)
the council, if faced with an unfavourable ruling.
In a move to appease Turkish officials who viewed the report 
as an indictment against Turkish policy, the Council's Committee of 
Ministers adopted a resolution based on the report, which refrained 
from issuing any rebuke, urging only that "measures be taken in
(65)
order to put an end to such violations as might continue to occur."
Controversy also surrounded the report on the Cyprus issue sub­
mitted on 27 April, 1978 to the Consultative Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, by Austrian parliamentarian Franz Karasek. In contrast 
to its objections over the earlier human rights report, Turkey approved 
the contents of the Karasek report. On this occasion it was the 
Greek side that challenged the report’s findings. The Greek repre­
sentatives alleged that the report had been drawn up from a unilat­
eral viewpoint. Proposals for amending the report submitted by 
French and Greek parliamentarians were rejected. Greece’s failure 
to have the report amended was considered a major diplomatic setback.
To recapitulate, American diplomatic pressure and a strict 
adherence to realpolitik prevented Western Europe from playing 
an assertive part over Cyprus. With economic leverage over both 
Greece and Turkey,EEC states and in particular Germany, could 
exert concessions from all the interested parties. However, only
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by securing American co-operation could the EEC states
effectively intervene, but with America's global security interests and 
realpolitik, the prospects of such a scenario appear bleak.
Negotiations, Deadlock
In November 1974 Makarios declared, "I c a n’t recognise a fait
accompli, I c a n’t legalize with my signature a situation created
by the use of f o r c e " . H o w e v e r ,  with Turkish troops occupying 40 per
cent of the island, the local balance of power had shifted for the
first time in favour of the Turkish Cypriot minority. This change
in the status quo blocked the road co any form of effective
reconciliation. Insecurity, formerly a Turkish Cypriot preoccupation;
had now become a mutual concern for both sides, raising the level
of intransigence between the two camps. The new developments created
an obstinate negotiating atmosphere resulting in a vicious circle of
negotiating failures and recurrent stalemates in the UN sponsored
inter-communal t a l k s . O n  10 February, 1975, talks between the
two sides resumed for the first time since the abortive Geneva
(6ED
talks in August 1974. In the ensuing five rounds of talks held from
28 April, 1975, to 21 February, 1976, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
negotiators failed to reach agreement or achieve a breakthrough
of any significance. A former negotiator reflecting on the Vienna
series remarked that negotiations never actually started and that
the meetings were "two separate monologues of the deaf - talking
(69)
for the record". Procedural problems on many occasions prevented 
the commencement even of pre1iminary negotiations.Emphasis centred 
on procedural matters because there was a lack of confidence in 
substance of the issues.^^The fact that the parties rarely sat around the 
conference table for longer than one week highlighted this problem!
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With the sides unable to reach a point of convergence, the talks 
became increasingly tied up with diametrically opposed differences 
over semantics and the clash of principles. At the opening 
session in Vienna, the Greek Cypriot negotiator proposed a bi-communal
reaeracion. % A t  tne second round the Turkish side set out its views 
on the powers and functions of the central government, but refrained,
to the Security Council on 9 June, 1975, Secretary-General Waldheim, 
who also was chairman in the Vienna talks, reiterated, "the deadlock 
over the fundamental basis of a settlement persists. One of the 
principal difficulties in the talks so far has been a difference of 
opinion on the priority to be given to the different aspects of the 
future settlement mentioned above, one side wishing first to establish 
the powers and functions of the central government, the other wishing 
first to clarify the territorial aspects of a future settlement, 
which has, of course, among other things, a vital bearing on the 
refugee problem. Prior to the 3rd round of the Vienna talks
Denktash submitted to the Greek Cypriot negotiator a document entitled 
"Turkish Cypriot proposals for a transitional joint government." 
Clerides replied the proposals were entirely unacceptable and could 
not even form a basis for negotiations. They aimed at the abolition 
of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which enjoys international 
recognition, and at the continuation of the occupation of 40% of the 
territory of the Republic by the Turkish forces. Denktash’s contem­
plated at depriving the Greek Cypriots of their trump card by also 
becoming partners in their international relations. At the 3rd round, 
preliminary discussions were held on-the powers and functions of a 
federal government and a discussion of the geographical aspects of a
(72) The Turkish side proposed a bi-regional
however, from making any meaningful breakthrough. (74) In his report
future settlement.
In the absence of concrete proposals, the 4th round of
talks held in New York, between 8-10 September, 1975, were adjourned. 
They were not resumed until the 17 February, 1976, when the 5th round 
began in accordance with the Proces-Verbal agreed upon by the Foreign 
Ministers of Greece and Turkey in Brussels on 12 December, 1975. 
According to one observer the negotiations had failed to resume because 
they were not isolated from'preconditions. While the Greek side insis­
ted that, to begin with Turkey should produce a map and give priority 
to the discussion of the territorial issue, the Turkish side insisted 
that the "regional federation" should be accepted in principli^^ At 
the end of the 5th round, the two communities agreed to exchange writ­
ten proposals, through the Special Representative in Cyprus of the 
Secretary-General within six weeks from 21 February, 1976.
In accordance with the agreement, both sides submitted proposals 
to Mr Perez De Cuellar (the UN special representative on Cyprus).
The Turkish Cypriot side presented proposals containing "General 
Principles concerning the establishment of a Federal Republic" and on 
powers and functions of the central government. Denktash outlined the 
proposal that Cyprus should be a Federal Republic composed of two 
Federated States one in the North for the Turkish National Community
r p I \and one in the South for the Greek National Community. v '
The Greek Cypriot representative Mr Papadopoulos (who had re­
placed Clerides) rejected the Turkish draft proposal on the grounds 
that it was "not only contrary to the Resolutions of the United 
Nations ... but constitutes a further attempt to promote the arbitrary 
and unilateral action of the Turkish Cypriot side to set up a,
"Turkish .Federated State of Cyprus". With regard to proposals on the 
territoral issue Denktash claimed the Greek Cypriot offer was false
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and contained misleading references, and noted that any proposals
by the Turkish Cypriot side would be made only "with a view to ad-
(82)justing line between the two Federated States . The Greek Cypriot 
negotiator evaluated the offer as completely negative and concluded 
that, "the deliberate omission of the Turkish side to present any
concrete proposals on the territorial aspect precludes a ’package
(83)deal’ approach to the problem".
These developments resulted in the postponement of the next 
negotiating round. In the meantime Makarios emphasised "Turkey’s 
negative and unreasonably intransigent stance is constantly under­
mining and torpedoing the effort to open the way to the resumption 
of talks on Cyprus that is being made by various circles", adding 
that, "we recognize and we do not underrate today’s difficult sit­
uation. But realism should not mean recognition and acceptance of 
faits accomplis and our surrender to the Turks" . ^  On 7 June 
Denktash voiced "we pledge and take a solemn oath on the territory 
of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus ... we have already charted
our course. It is the extension of the bridge built between Cyprus
j . . . „ (85) and Anatolia.
In a move to find a way out of"the stalemate that had led to a 
complete breakdown of the talks on 12 February 1977, a meeting took
place in Nicosia between Makarios and Denktash in the presence of
(86)Dr Waldheim, for the first time the two leaders reached an agreement 
in principle regarding four basic guidelines for further negotiations 
through the inter-communal talks. The first point stated that the 
two sides were seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal, 
Federal Republic.
The acceptance of a bi-communal federal state was seen as a 
major concession by the Greek side. The hopes of achieving a
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rapprochement, however, quickly diminished as both leaders detracted 
from their stated commitment. The Turkish Cypriot leader resorted 
to his earlier position that the bi-zonality of the federation was 
not subject to bargain by offers, and qualified it to mean anything 
which would jeopardise the security of the Turkish community, any­
thing which would put them under the economic, administrative dom-
(88)ination of the Greek community. His Greek Cypriot counterpart 
emphasised that an agreed solution due to necessity would mean com­
promises. Any compromise undertaken, however, must guarantee fully
(89)the unity and territorial integrity of the state. According to 
Makarios, Denktash’s reneging statements diminished the optimism 
created for an agreed solution.
At the first round of the new series of inter-communal talks 
held in Vienna under the aegis of the UN Secretary-General,
Papadopoulos put forward written proposals on the territorial issue, 
together with a map showing the two regions proposed to come under 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot administration. The Turkish Cypriot side 
presented detailed constitutional proposals, while the Greek Cypriots 
did not offer detailed constitutional proposals but only submitted 
certain principles which should govern the constitutional structure 
and made substantive comments on the Turkish draft, on the other hand 
their Turkish counterparts refused to submit any territorial counter
proposals'?^ The meeting failed to bridge the considerable gap between
(91)the views of the two sides. The Greek Cypriots team argued that 
the Turkish offer of a confederation of two sovereign and equal states 
with a very weak central government was contrary to, and incompatible
with, the guidelines of 12 February, especially those which required
(92)unity of the state.“ The Turkish Cypriot negotiator Mr Onan admitted 
during the proceedings that what his side was proposing was in fact 
a "federation by evolution'^.' ^  On his behalf the Turkish interlocutor
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rejected the Greek Cypriot proposals as creating a unitary, not a
1 - - I <9*>-federal state!
The United Nations Secretary-General and Real Initiatives 
A Critical Appraisal
On 12 March 1975, the Security Council by adopting resolution 
367 empowered- the Secretary-General with a mandate to "undertake 
a new mission of good offices and to that end convene the parties 
under new agreed procedures and place himself personally at their 
disposal, so that the resumption, the intensification and the pro­
gress of comprehensive negotiations carried out in reciprocal 
spirit of understanding and of moderation under his personal
auspices and with his direction as appropriate, might thereby be 
(95)facilitated." The Delegation of Powers formulated (continued by 
subsequent resolutions) to help the Secretary-General achieve 
a peaceful settlement and the extension of UNFICYP peace-keeping 
operations by the Security Council have made the United Nations 
the most important international organisation despite the extensive 
powers of intervention available to Dr Waldheim and the suitable 
conciliatory framework, the United Nations efforts to resolve the 
dispute have been plagued by inherent weaknesses. In some instances 
the limitations of Dr Waldheim and his senior diplomatic staff have 
undermined the search for a solution, as much as the level of intran­
sigence by the parties to the dispute outlined earlier. Hc-wcver, 
to what degree the initiatives by Dr Waldheim or his special rtores- 
entives have added to the stalemate is a contentious issue. One 
school of thought argues that if Dr Waldheim's efforts have so far 
failed, it cannot be blamed on any deficiency in intent on the part 
of the Secretary-General but rather on the entrenched positions 
adopted by the conflicting parties^ On the other hand the
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the Secretary-General's chairmanship status, performance and dir­
ection of United Nations peace initiatives over Cyprus have with 
some reservation^ come under severe criticism.
The decision by the Security Council to entrust Dr Waldheim 
with "good offices", the lowest terms of reference, immediately 
limited his scope for diplomatic manoeuvres . Prior to the Secretary-
General* s appointment, the Turkish side objected to the role of
(97)Dr Waldheim. The objections that the Turkish Cypriots raised con­
cerning the terms of reference of UN mediator Galo Plaza, and 
their refusal to accept or implement the recommendation of his 
report, in 1965, weighed-heavily in the Security Council’s decision 
to reject the status of "mediator" or the higher term of reference 
of "arbitrator"^ ^
According to some Greek Cypriot officials Waldheim’s limited 
mandate and his impartial chairmanship despite his prestige and 
stature has not succeeded in conclusive peace making efforts.
In 1977 Papadopoulos in an evaluation of Dr Waldheim's performance 
noted that the role of the Secretary-General had not been very 
evident in the talks, stressed that "I would very much hope that 
the Secretary-General’s role in the talks would be strengthened, 
that the present ambiguity as to his role would be cleared, because 
there is an ambiguity as to his role; we like to consider him as 
a chairman at these talks. The other side likes him to be something 
of a glorified clerk sitting there simply to arrange the meetings ...
but with not much right to make any suggestions of his own or to
(99)make any comments on what passes".
While the Secretary-General’s terms of reference permitted his 
bi-annual report to the Security Council to outline any factors
that hindered UN peace initiatives, he has refused to make a report that 
stated that the responsibility for the talks leading into deadlock or not 
resuming rested on the Greeks or on the Turks.
In adhering to his sensitive role of politician, diplomatist and civil 
servant the Secretary-General has not submitted any proposals unless both 
sides have agreed in advance that the proposals are acceptable for 
discussion. However, Waldheim has conceded, that; despite his approach of 
trying to put everything in an impartial position and his intensive efforts, 
he had been unable.to bridge the gap between the two communities. He has 
concluded that his involvement in the Cyprus problem had been one of the 
most frustrating experiences of his career as Secretary-General.
Although the Secretary-General has no other power in this dispute 
beyond persuasion,he holds one diplomatic trump card, the threat to report 
to the United Nation? Security Council, any ir.trsr.sigence that undermined 
his deliberations with the two parties. On 19 May 1979, Waldheim 
threatened to use this ultimate sanction when he put forward a new set of 
proposals to Kyprianou and Denktash. The application of pressure paid off 
with the two Cypriot leaders, after an impasse of two years, reaching a 
ten-point agreement for resuming t a l k s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y  five days 
after the talks began on 15 June a dispute over two words,"priority" and 
"bi-zonal", forced the talks to be recessed on 22 June 1 9 7 9 . ^ ^ ^
Kyprianou reacted by once again taking the Cyprus issue to the United 
N a t i o n s . i n June 1980, the Secretary-General's special envoy 
Mr Javier Perez de Cuellar, after sounding out both leaders on re-opening 
the talks, managed to secure their endorsement. However, Mr Denktash 
withdrew his endorsement of the UN statement defining the common ground 
already agreed between the two sides as soon as it became apparent that the 
Greek Cypriots were prepared to accept the statement. The UN envoy 
publicly condemned the volte-face - the first time that a UN representative 
had been prepared to place the blame squarely on one side after yet another 
attempt at mediation had collapsed. ^ * ^ T h i s  assertive move helped to 
overcone the persistent difficulties that had stood in the way of the 
resumption of the intercommunal negotiations process.
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C O N C L U S I O N
In retrospect, it can be a s s e r t e d  that the abrupt 
e vents of 1974 i n s t i g a t e d  a set of c omplex political 
d e v e l o p m e n t s .  The 1974 Cyprus crisis illus t r a t e d  that the 
n e g l e c t  of the c o n s u l t a t i v e  pr o c e s s  p r i o r  to 1974 had w e a k e n e d  
the c r i s i s - m a n a g e m e n t  m a c h i n e r y  in the w estern 
a l liance. A t  the h e i g h t  of the crisis N ATO was thus 
p o w e r l e s s  to act. The a l l i a n c e  f ailed to make any 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e  decisions, and w i t h o u t  US support the prospect 
of N ATO m e m b e r s  i n t e r v e n i n g  e f f e c t i v e l y  as mediators 
a p p e a r e d  bleak. It was also the t u r n i n g  point that: 
s p a r k e d  off a h e a t e d  debate b e t w e e n  Congress and the 
E x e c u t i v e  ov er  the cont rol of US f o reign policy; led to 
s u d d e n  shifts in G reece and T u r k e y ' s  foreign and defence 
po licies; induc ed a r e n e w e d  arms race between the two Aegean states; 
caused the withdrawal of Greece, from NATO that resulted in a longterm 
i n t r a m u r a l  crisis; u n d e r m i n e d  A m e r i c a ' s  M e d i t e r r a n e a n  
p o l i c y  a fter n e a r l y  t h irty years of u n d i s p u t e d  supremacy; 
j e o p a r d i z e d  the future status of US strat egi c interests in 
G r e e c e  and Turkey; and a t t r a c t e d  the involv eme nt of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b odies in search of a pol it ica l formula, that 
w ould p e r m e a t e  the i n t r a c t a b l e  nat ure  of the dispute.
W h i l e  i n i t i a t i n g  the o v e r t h r o w  of the Ioannides 
r e g i m e  and the r e t u r n  of .civilian rule, the events of 1974 
also left the new K a r a m a n l i s  g o v e r n m e n t  with no a l ternative  
o p t i o n  but to carry out a new appr a i s a l  of Gr ee ce' s defence 
a l i g n m e n t s ,  and adjus t its forei gn p o l i c y  posture. In a 
ra d i c a l  d e p a r t u r e  from the p o l i c y  adh ered to by suc ce ssi ve 
G r e e k  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  (that p l a c e d  the Cyprus issue at the
(173)
(174)
f o r e f r o n t  of t heir ex ter nal  relations) K a r a m a n l i s  ou t l i n e d  
that  his g o v e r n m e n t ' s  p o s i t i o n  toward  Cyp ru s now ass umed that 
the s o l u t i o n  to the Cyprus p r o b l e m  b e l o n g e d  not in Athe ns 
and A n k a r a  but in Nico sia . The d e c i s i o n  to detach  Greece 
from the C y prus p r o b l e m  coupled w i t h  the strong sen timent 
of ’’a n t i - A m e r i c a n i s m "  that .now p r e v a i l e d  in the elec t o r a t e  
also p r o v i d e d  K a r a m a n l i s  with an o p p o r t u n i t y  to dive r s i f y 
G r e e k  f o r e i g n  p o l i c y  b eyond the n a r r o w  con fin es of the 
A t h e n s - W a s h i n g t o n  nexus, that had d o m i n a t e d  its foreign- 
p o l i c y  sin ce the a p p l i c a t i o n  of the T ruman doctrine.
He took a d v a n t a g e  of the w i d e r  room for m a n o e u v r e  to
b r o a d e n  the h o r i z o n  of Greek for eign policy, by :
f o r m u l a t i n g  new p o l i c i e s  towards W e s t e r n  Europ e while at
the same time p l a y i n g  down G r e e k - A m e r i c a n  relations? laying
the f o u n d a t i o n s  for i n t r a - B a l k a n  co op era tio n; and form u l a t e d
new p o l i c i e s  to w a r d s  the Soviet U nion and the Mid dle East.
M o reover, K a r a m a n l i s  ma de use of the Cyp rus  d e v e l o p m e n t s  to
( 1 )
imp ro ve G r e e c e ' s  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  with the US. In 
p a r t i c u l a r  he m ade use of his lev erage with the US pen t a g o n  
to redr ess  the s t r a t e g i c  gap in the A e g e a n  and to u n o f f i c i a l l y  
secure that US m i l i t a r y  aid to Greece, was p e g g e d  on a 7:10 
ratio of A m e r i c a n  aid a p p r o p r i a t e d  for Turkey. The strong 
a n t i - A m e r i c a n  st ance taken by the eff e c t i v e  and ascendi ng 
o p p o s i t i o n  leade r Papandreou, also had an impact on shaping many 
of Karair.anlis' b de ci sions.
In the case of Turkey, its 1974 i n t e r v e n t i o n  and 
s u b s e q u e n t  o c c u p a t i o n ,  damag ed its di pl omatic, strate gic  
and eco n o m i c  interests. It isolated Turkey  in the world 
c ommun ity , and t r i g g e r e d  the US C ongress to impose an arms
(175)
embargo for four years; severed Ankara's relations with the US and 
depleted the capabilities of its armed forces.
The embargo institutionalised American involvement in the
Cyprus conflict. However, successive US administrations formulated their
tactical approach to the problem not upon a policy that examined Cyprus
per se, but upon issues that revolved around America's security interests
towards Greece and Turkey. State Department diplomats under constant
pressure from Pentagon officials, failed to draw up a coherent policy,
that grasped the complicated parameters of the dispute. The inherent
contradictions in US policy led on a number of occasions to badly timed
interventions that hampered rather than assisted peace efforts. In
trying to walk the political tightrcpe between Athens, Ankara, and
Nicosia, America failed to utilize its leverage with Turkey to extract
concessions. It also hindered attempts by the UN, by not applying
sufficient forward diplomatic movement, in support of the Secretary- 
iGenerals initiatives. Had it not been for the embargo the US would 
most probably have only shown a temporary interest in the problem. With 
the lifting of the embargo US foreign policy has returned to its 
traditional position of placing its security interests,as well as 
improving relations between Greece and Turkey, ahead of a search for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem. The arms embargo also illustrated that 
unless supported by both congress and the executive, its effectiveness 
as a coersive diplomatic tool is very limited.
Throughout the latest phase of the Cyprus dispute the Soviet 
Union has followed a double-edged policy. While giving all out support 
to the Greek-Cypriot side at the UN,on the other handit implemented a 
policy of "good neighbourliness" toward Turkey. Its two fold approach 
required Moscow to follow a policy that did not offend Ankara. Thus, 
the Soviet Union's lack of flexibility over Cyprus, made it as
negative a diplomatic force as the United States. Both
superpowers in terms of their priorities, put their global strategic
considerations in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East far ahead
of searching for a resolution of the Cyprus problem. But then that is the
nature of international politics where larger problems - strategic and
political - tend to take precedence over smaller local issues; and great
powers, whether in the regional or the global sense, are more concerned
with improving their own strategic and political positions in their
respective operational arenas and have little time to spare to contribute
to a solution of primarily local issues - that is until another crisis is
triggered off in the region as a result of the non-solution of what might
have appeared a minor problem. Cyprus provides no exception to the rule.
The sudden death of Makarios in 1977 was a major set back to
the UN sponsored peace-making. His Beatitude was the only Greek-Cypriot
leader who could master consensus politics, and the only figure with a
clear mandate to ratify an agreement with the Turkish-Cypriots. Both key
factors, to a final solution. The Archbishop's powerful political base
wieldenabled him to/undisputed control in,the National Council, the supreme 
decision making body. None of the Council members ever publicly opposed 
Makarios, over his handling of the issue. Even in the event of a 
confrontation, the Archbishop, had the option to by-pass the Council and 
take the issue directly to the people by referendum. This avenue meant 
that his huge public support would have defeated any motion that challenged 
his control. His successor, Kyprianou, has been unable to close the 
political vacuum left by Makarios's legacy. He has neither the charisma
and leadership qualities of the late Archbishop, nor a strong political
(2 )
base. His weak position has led to sporadic leadership crises, that have not
enhanced the progress of the intercommunal talks.
In relation to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership the events of 1974 
augumented the position of Denktash. During the parliamentary crisis in
(1 7 6)
A n k a r a  he m a n o e u v r e d  to secure support from all the 
political parties. At the same time^Denktash increased his flexibility
by developing close ties with the Turkish high command. However, with
the presence of the Turkish army and his administration's total dependence
Ankara for economic assistance, has led to a situation where, 
the Turkish government is always the final arbitrar  ^^ .
Peace-keeping operations by UNFICYP will continue as a necessary 
deterrent against renewed conflict, so long as a fragile status-quo 
dominates the political arena of Cyprus. For a breakthrough to occur 
it is essential that: a symbolic gesture be made by the Turkish- 
Cypriot side - such as the return of Varosha (without any preconditions); 
the Greek-Cypriot leadership exercise political will on the issue, 
rather than being concerned with protecting its political flanks;
Ankara radically shift towards a more conciliatory foreign policy 
over Cyprus; the super-powers and all the interested countries focus 
their policies on strengthening the role of the UN; and the US, West 
Germany and the Soviet Union use their diplomatic leverage in Ankara 
into encouraging the Turkish government to implement a more conciliatory 
line over Cyprus.
Unless some or all of the above policies are implemented, 
the Cyprus problem will continue to remain a dangerously unresolved 
dispute. To recapitulate, the intercommunal talks are the only fcrum 
for an equitable solution, and every effort should be made to enhance 
their progress and prevent them, from drifting into another impasse.
(176a)
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danger of aggression in the Middle East from the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union is too much tied up with its difficulties in the 
Eastern European countries. Even otherwise, nationalism is a far 
stronger force in the Middle East than any other.'"
Eisenhower, op.cit. , p.181.
Glubb Pasha points out that no Middle East government was 
threatened by communist invasion. The danger, he stressed, lay 
in the deliberate attempts made by Russia and Egypt to stir up 
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"The Cyprus Conflict," Orbis, Vol.8, No.l, Spring 1964-65, pp. 
66-70.
85 R.P. Barston (ed.), The Other Powers: Studies in the 
Foreign Policies of Small States, George Allen and Unwin, London, 
1973, pp.202-203.
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President Johnson's reply, see Deportment of State Bulletin, 23 
March 1964, pp.446-448.
93 President Johnson stressed that "It is the task of statesmanship 
to prevent the danger in Cyprus from exploding into disaster."
Department of State Bulletin, 16 March 1964, p.399.
94 While Lemnitzer was dispatched to Athens and Ankara to prevent a 
showdown, Sir Alec Douglas-Home flew to Washington to see 
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force.
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recruited peace-keeping force of- 10,000 men would be under 
British command with political guidance from a North Atlantic 
non-NATO country to bring about a political solution. The United 
States offered to send 1,200 combat troops for its share. For a 
detailed account of the plan, see: P. Windsor, "NATO and the 
Cyprus crisis," Adelphz Papers, No.14, November 1964, pp.13-14.
The Times, 10 February 1964.
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Britain, France, Greece and Turkey that any move against the 
island would be "the source of international complications 
fraught with grave conséquences" inserted the Soviet Union into 
the Cyprus issue, and reinforced Makarios’ opposition to the NATO 
plan. "N.S. Khrushchev’s message onCyprus," USSR Mission
to the UN, Press Release No.4, 7 February 1964.
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The Government of Archbishop Makarios wanted to exert every 
possible influence on Turkey not to intervene militarily. This 
interest was one of the main motivations behind the Archbishop’s 
insistence that the UN be the only international arrangement 
directly involved in maintaining peace on the island and in 
seeking to resolve the crisis. Mill er ibid
It should be emphasized that besides Makarios’ stubborn
position and the strong Soviet opposition to the NATO plan, 
the rejection of the plan by Germany and France with the alliance 
was also crucial in the transfer of the crisis to the UN. The 
British Government after the failure of the plan for either a NATO 
or a Commonwealth peace-keeping force, recognized that there was 
little choice but to place the Cyprus problem before the UN.
In order to: (1) Secure a guarantee against possible, if remote, 
Turkish invasion; (2) Get the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee 
nullified; (3) Make the United Nations directly responsible for 
the solution of the Cyprus problem; (4) "Escape from.the strait- 
jacket of new negotiations with the three guarantor powers alone"; 
(5) Isolate the Turks who have fewer friends at United Nations 
headquarters in New York than at NATO headquarters in Paris; (6) 
Rule out partition; and (7) Pave the way for a unitary state with 
majority [read Greek Cypriot] rule.
For an excellent account of the role of the UN in the crisis, see: 
J.A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, Ohio State 
University Press, Columbus, 1968, pp.57-58.
The sovereign state of Cyprus had its sovereignty limited by the 
treaty which created it. The Soviet Union, while most reluctant 
to approve further UN peace-keeping operations not subject to its 
veto, was seeking to gain influence in the region. It could not 
oppose Makarios, who insisted on precisely this intervention.
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quire for overt military intervention by the US in "just other"
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reached Cyprus, and the Soviet Union abstained on the December
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of emphasis in the appraisal of the national interest. There 
were also mistakes. I. Giritli, "Turkish Soviet Relations,"
India Quarterly, Vol.26, 1970, p.16.
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75 International Herald Tribune, 30 November 1978.
76 For outline of plan see Perspectives on NATOrs Southern Flank, 
Senate delegation Report 3-13 April 1980, A Report to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June 1980, 
pp.44-46. ■
77 Text of Speech by President Kyprianou on UN Special session 
on disarmament 24 May 1978.
78 Firstly, as the Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandhis, pointed out, 
the emergence of the US plan was badly timed, being sandwiched 
between the meeting of the General Assembly and that of the 
Security Council concerning the Cyprus problem. Secondly, the 
plan which had started as "top secret" was leaked to the press 
creating an atmosphere that would eventually torpedo it. Thirdly, 
the Cyprus government had made it clear on many occassions that
it would only accept initiatives on behalf of countries as long 
as such intiatives were taken under the auspices of the secretary- 
general. Therefore the Nimetz plan was a "non-document", as it 
was not politically expedient for Kyprianou, to be seen accepting 
strictly a Western set of proposals. Moreover, unlike his 
predecessor Makarios, who had undisputed power, Kyprianou lacked 
the kind of popular support that would permit him to make any 
unilateral decision over the American proposals,without at the 
same time undermining his power-base, which depended upon the 
support of the anti-Western EDEK (Socialist party) and 'AKEL 
(Communist party).
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CHAPTER 7 - END NOTES
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cultivating leaders of key nations such as India, United Kingdom, 
Zambia, Kenya.
2 Text of speech by his Beatitude at the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting in London, 9 June 1977.
3 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, (CHOGM), Kingston,
6 May 1975, Communique, Par. 10 and 11.
4 Ibid. The designated member countries were: Australia, Britain, 
Guyana, India, Kenya, Malta, Nigeria and Zambia.
5 Ibid.
6 Commonwealth Secretariat, Record atid Background Papers of the 
Meeting of Senior Commonwealth Officials held in Canberra, 26-28 
May 1976, p.38.
7 See John Dickie, "Cyprus: A Case for Commonwealth Concern", Paper 
presented at Commonwealth Communications Symposium, Nicosia, 8-12 
May 1978, pp.51-58.
8 Testimony of British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan before The 
Select Committee on Cyprus, 19 February 1976, Report from the 
Select Committee on Cyprus Session 1975-1976, HMSO, London, April
1976, p.61. See Appendix (N).
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initiative they would want a report from their man on the spot on 
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Cypriot^political leader with many years experience in dealing with 
British diplomats, Nicosia, February 1980.
12 Select Committee on Cyprus, op. cit.
13 Report of the Commonwealth Secretary General 1977, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, p.20.
14 The Secretary-General visited the Island in July 1975, in an 
exploratory capacity. While he received assurances by both sides 
that a visit by his committee would receive total co-operation, 
there was a reluctance in some Commonwealth quarters to having 
any intervention by the Commonwealth while meetings between the 
two communities were conducted. Dickie, loc cit. , p.56.
15 Commonwealth Secretariat Record and Background, op. oit. , p.39.
16 Ibid.
17 Lusaka CHOGM Communique, 7 August 1979, para. 27 to 31.
18 Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 1977, op. cit. , p.19.
19 For recent accounts see M. Bailey, Oilgate: The Sanctions Scandal, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1979; Lord Saint Brides, "The 
Lessons of Zimbabwe - Rhodesia", International Security, Vol.4,
No.4, Spring 1980, pp.177-184.
20 The Rhodesia issue had regional implications for the following 
Commonwealth countries; Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia. The above bloc contributed to the constant liaison with 
the UN, and the Organization of African Unity and other organiz­
ations concerned with the problem.
21 Commonwealth Heads of Government Ministerial Statement by
Mr Malcolm Fraser, Foreign Affairs Backgrounder, No.201, 29 August 
1979, p.l.
22 Lusaka CHOGM Communique, 7 August 1979, para. 31.
23 On the pressures against the unity of the non-aligned movement.
See Josip Broz Tito, "The Non-aligned Countries: The development 
of stable and democratic world relations", Vital Speeches,
Vol. XLIV, No.23, 15 September 1978, pp.706-708; F. Ajami, "The 
Fate of Nonalignment", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1980/81,
G.A. Dally (Assistant Secretary for International Organization 
Affairs), "The US and the Non-Aligned Movement", Current Policy,
No.138, 4 February 1980. United States Department of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs.
24 While Cyprus was still a British colony Makarios attended the 
Bandung Conference and presented the Cyprus independence cause, 
as an observer, to the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries which had 
committed themselves to anti-colonialism. In 1961 he attended 
the founding meeting of the Non-aligned in Belgrade and thus 
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also built close friendships with the founding fathers, Tito,
Nasser and Nehru.
25 The group had also played a less important role in the 1964 crisis. 
See Chapter 1.
26 Statement at Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non- 
Aligned Countries at Colombo, August 1976, quoted in Cyprus and 
the Non-Aligned Movement, PI0, Nicosia, October 1979, p.6.
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27 Quoted in Cyprus and the Non-Aligned Movement, ibid., p.5.
28 It held a number of meetings with Makarios, the Foreign Ministers 
of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, and representatives of both Cypriot 
communities during the course of which a text of a resolution was 
drafted.
29 UN Doc. S/RES 365, 13 December 1974.
30 The Ministerial Session of the Non-Aligned in Havana, 23 March
1975, declared that: "any unilateral action like the one by the 
Turkish Community is regrettable and should not prejudice the 
final political settlement". Bandaranaike Centre for International 
Studies, ed., hIon-Aligned Conferences: Basic Documents 1971-1975, 
Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, Colombo, 1976,
pp. 127-38.
31 The Yugoslav and Romanian Presidents, Tito and Ceausescu, had 
promised in 1976 that they would support Turkish participation 
either as a guest or as an observer at the Colombo Conference. In 
the end, however, Romania (a member of the Warsaw pact) was 
admitted, whereas Turkey was excluded from the Conference. "Is 
Turkey's Attitude Toward Third World Countries Changing?" Neue 
Zuercher Zeitung (Zurich), JPRS/T/WE/, 14 October 1976.
32 See for example the speech by Ambassador Iacovides before plenary 
ministerial meeting of The Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Bureau held 
in Havana from 15-20 May 1978. PIO, Nicosia, Press Release No.7,
21 May 1978.
33 The resolution called for the immediate and unconditional with­
drawal of the foreign arm^d forces. It also considered that the 
UN should take all appropriate measures, including, if necessary, 
measures under chapter VII of the chapter.
34 Interview with Istanbul daily Milliyet, DR/WE/P.TI, 15 August
1978.
35 Ibid.
36 Interview with Rauf Denktash, in Nicosia, 1 February 1980.
37 From their position they asserted that the Greek Cypriots had 
diverted the attention of the international community from the 
essentials of the problem, by striving to postpone the issue and 
gain time, so as to try again to internationalize the conflict 
and bring the issue before international bodies not fully informed 
on all the intricacies of the problem. Turkish Foreign Policy 
Report, No.7, 1 October 1975, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 
p . 9.
38 Besides securing resolutions of support at the Summit meetings at 
Colombo (August 1976), Havana (September 1979) and the Foreign 
Ministers’ meetings in Havana (March 1975), Lima (August 1975) 
and Belgrade (July 1978), Cyprus also succeeded meetings of the 
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and Permanent levels). For greater detail see Final Communiques 
and reports of New York (September 1974), Havana (March 1975), 
Algeria (June 1976), New Delhi (April 1977), New York (March 1977). 
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See Speech by the President of the Republic Mr Spyros Kvprianou,
28 February 1978, PIO, Nicosia, press release No.l, 28 February
1978.
U.N. A/RES/34/303 20 November 1979.
This point was constantly highlighted in my interviews with Senior 
State Department Officials, Washington, December 1979.
Interviews with Senior Cyprus Foreign Ministry officials and 
Government leaders, Nicosia, January-February 1980.
Denktash indicated that he did not consent to hold talks even 
under the shadow of such a resolution. UN Secretary-General's 
Report to the General Assembly on developments concerning the 
resumption of the Inter-communal talks, 3 April 1980, quoted in
Cyprus Bulletin, 12 April 1980.
This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1.
A. McDermott, "The Current Crisis" in The Kurds, Minority 
Rights Group, Report No.23, February 1975, pp.19-23.
Periodic border incidents have complicated further the tangled 
relationship. The latest clash occurred on 1 June 1980, in the 
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Turks. For greater detail see translated text of reports by 
Ankara Domestic Service, in Turkish) DR/WE/T1-T2, 5 June 1980.
The Syrian leadership has not forgotten that during its internal 
crisis in 1957, Turkey came close to a military intervention.
Paragraph 4 of Resolution on the Cyprus Question and the Cause 
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by Turkish mission to the United Nations, New York.
For example Dr Vassos Lyssarides, the leader of the Greek Cypriot 
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and the return of the refugees to their homes and properties". 
Interview with Libyan publication Al-Jamahir, quoted in Cyprus 
Mail, 1 April 1979.
It should be pointed out that in comparison with the long-estab- 
lished P,L0-Cyprus government relations, Denktash did not offer 
to authorize the PLO to open an office in the Turkish north until 
14 May 1979; Middle East Economic Digest, 18 May 1979.
Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish DR/WE/P.TI, 10 May 1979;
Middle East Economic Digest, 11 May 1979.
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53 Denktash attended the extraordinary Islamic Conference in 
Islamabad between 27 and 28 January 1980, after which he stated 
that the Turkish Cypriot community would find itself in the 
Islamic world. News Bulletin, PIO (Turkish Cypriot) Nicosia,
30 January 1980.
54 The Economist t 24 May 1980. At the conference Turkish policy 
over Cyprus was opposed by the PLO representative Mr Abu Mayzer 
and other members from the "rejectionist front", led by Syria, 
Algeria and South Yemen. As a result the political solution 
proposal put forward by the Turkish side for a "federal state 
system Was rejected. Milliyet, 30 May 1980, quoted in Cyprus 
Bulletin, 14 June 1980, p.2. Commenting on the resolution of 
Cyprus issued in a communique at the end of the conferences 
Greek Cypriot government spokesman noted that the resolution 
was very objective. I Simerini, 28 May 1980.
55 See Table 1 in Appendix (V).
56 Text of address by Jean Sauvagnargues, French Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, UN General Assembly, 23 September 1974.
57 Cyprus Mail, 18 February 1977.
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61 The Times, 3 November 1977.
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Report of the Commission (adopted on 10 July 1976) Vol. I and
II.
63 The Guardian, 25 October 1977.
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State in violation of the Constitution of which Turkey is a 
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1979. The report was classified for three years under a rule 
assuring secrecy for a period of time which the offending 
govermment is expected to redress the situation. International 
Herald Tribune, 1 September 1979.
66 Makarios interview with Oriana Fallaci, November 1974 in 
Interview with History, translated by John Shepley, Liveright,
' New York, 1976, p.315.
67 Moves toward getting substantive negotiations under way were 
first put into motion by Kissinger at the NATO Foreign Minister­
ial Council meeting, in Brussels, on 12 December 1974. He 
managed to persuade the Greek and Turkish representatives 
Bitsios and Esenbel into giving him assurances that they would 
re-activate the talks. The American Secretary of State acted 
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momentum for an arms embargo against Turkey, that tangible 
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from "Diyet". Miltiyet, 6 December 1970, op. cit. , text 
Secretary Kissinger’s letter to Senator Kennedy and the sub 
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68 Several meetings between Clerides and Denktash took place in 
Nicosia’from 14 January 1975 to 7 February 1975, in the presence 
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For detailed account see UN Secretary General's Special Report 
on developments in Cyprus, UN Doc. S/11624, 18 February 1975.
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February 1980.
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ing. Details of the respective position appears in Z.M. 
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■
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Cypriot stance: "A bizonal solution, in other words, a division 
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translated in DR/WE/p.Ro, 22 May 1975.
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made similar claims every time the Makarios administration took 
its case to international forums.
75 Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation 
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Doc. S/11717, 9 June 1975.
76 For complete text of Turkish Cypriot proposals, see M. Necati 
Munir Ertekun, Intercommunal Talks and the Cyprus Problem,
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, Nicosia, 1977, pp.108-110.
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InterccvvKxnal Talks, PIO, Nicosia, October 1979, pp.15-16.
78 Text of Final Communique on Cyprus issue by Conferees after 
third round of talks in Vienna, in Crisis on Cyprus 1976:
Crucial Year for Peace, A Staff Report of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, US Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 19 January,.
1976, p.74.
79 Denktash had given an undertaking during the end of the third 
round to submit concrete and comprehensive proposals by the end 
of August. After his failure to put forward any proposals, the 
New York talks resulted in an impasse. text of Communique 
on Fourth Round of Talks by Conferees on Cyprus Issue, ibid., 
p. 75.
80 Birand, Diyet, in Milliyet, 11 December 1979. The Brussels 
accord was agreed upon after Kissinger had persuaded Bitsios.
The framework was an attempt to inject new impetus in order to 
get the intercommunal talks out of the stalemate of procedural 
arguments by re-starting the talks without prior conditions 
with a view of arriving at a package deal. For complete text 
of Brussels accord, see, Necati Munir Ertekun, op. cit. , p.104.
81 "Proposals of the Turkish Cypriot Side on Various Aspects 
of the Cyprus Problem", in Political documents: The proposals 
of the two communities on the various aspects of the Cyprus 
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82 "Denktash's letter to Perez de Cuellar", dated 17 April
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83 letter by the Greek Cypriot negotiator, Papadopoulos, to 
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April 1976, ibid., p.12.
84 In a speech in Klirou, 30 May 1976.
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took place in the presence of the UN Secretary-General's Special 
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Economist, 19 February 1976. For text of letter see Necati Munir 
Ertekun, op. oit. , p.110.
87 For complete copy of guidelines, see Report of the Secretary- 
General Persuant to Para. 6 of Security Council Resolution 401 
(1976) UN Doc. S/12323, 30 April 1977, p.2, para. 5. Territory 
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the Turkish Cypriot community. Finally the powers and functions 
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88 See text of Denktash press conference on meeting with Makarios 
in Turkish Cypriot News Bulletin, PIO (Turkish Cypriot),
Nicosia, 17 February 1977.
89 Makarios' interview with, I Kathimerini, 20 February 1977.
90 For complete text of proposals see Cyprus Intercommunal Talks:
New Series First Round3 Vienna3 31 March to 7 April 1977• PIO, 
Nicosia, April 1977. Also annex B, C and D of UN Doc. S/12323,
30 April 1977.
91 Ibid.
92 Loc cit.
93 Necati Munir Ertekun, op. cit., p.19.
94 On the constitutional structure provided inter alia that
the territory of the Federal Republic, constitutes, a single 
and indivisible whole, and shall consist of the territories of 
the region. The state power of the Federal Republic shall be 
exercised throughout its territory on all persons therein. There 
shall be one sole citizenship for the whole of the Federal 
Republic. UN Doc. S/12323j op. cit.
95 UN Doc.,S/RES 367 (1975), 12 March 1975, para. 6.
96 Brigadier M. Harbottle, "The strategy of third party inter­
ventions in conflict resolutions", Intematio>ial Journal, Vol. 
XXXV No.1, Winter 1979-80, p.121.
97 UN Doc. S/6253, 26 March 1965, para. 121-123.
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Report see UN Doc. S/6267, 2 April 1965, and UN Doc. S/6279,
9 April 1965.
99 Speech by Tassos Papadopoulos, representative of the Greek- 
Cypriot side at the inter-communal talks at the International 
Symposium of Journalists on the Cyprus Problem, Cyprus Journalist 
Union, Nicosia, 1978, p.128.
100 Interview with The Middle East, May 1980, p.11.
101 For complete text of agreement see appendix (U).
102 During their 19 May agreement, Kyprianou and Denktash had agreed 
that "priority" would be given to the question of the handing 
back of the Greek area of Famagusta known as Varosha. When the 
talks becan, however, the Turkish Cypriots argued that Varosha 
was the fifth point and would be discussed fifth and only 
thereafter given priority. The Turkish side also insisted that 
before substantive talks could begin, the Greeks had to accept 
the "bizonal" nature of the island - without stating what the 
Turkish team meant by "bizonal". The term had been used in a 
loose way publicly, by the late Archbishop Makarios.
The Economist, 30 June 1979; The Guardian, 16 August 1979;
UN Chronicle, No. 8 »September-October 1980, pp. 30-31.
103 See pp. 157-158.
104 Mr Denktash was branded publicly as intransigent and obstructive.
The Guardian, 9 June 1980.
105 On 9 August 1980, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative 
in Cyprus, Hugo Gobbi in pursuance of the good offices mission 
secured an agreement that the talks would begin in Nicosia on
16 September 1980. Until August 1981, the negotiations have 
continued without leading to any new impasse so far.
UN Chronicle, September-October 1980, pp. 30-31.
(257)
1. In the face of strong popular objections to the continued 
American military presence, the government has broken off the 
five month long negotiations with the Americans over the future 
of the fcur American bases (two near Athens, two in Crete) in 
Greece. The government has stipulated that the original 1953 
agreement should be revised in a way that would help preserve 
the balance of power between Greece and Turkey and ensure the 
inviolability of Greek frontiers in the Aegean. Questions at 
issue in the talks included the extent of command and control of 
the Greek officer to be put' in formal command of each base, and 
whether the bases should ever be used for purposes other than 
those connected with strictly Nato obligations. The Greek side 
was reported as making progress on all these issues, and 
especially on the key question of the ratio between US aid to 
Greece and that to Turkey, but in June the Greeks asked for a 
kind of bonus outside this agreed scale, of about $200 to $300 
mn worth of sophisticated military equipment, as a condition 
for allowing the USA to go on using the bases. This request was 
turned down by the Americans, and it is hard to avoid the 
inference that it was made in the hope that they would: in other 
words, the government for electoral reasons was looking for an 
excuse to put the whole question into cold storage.
Quarterly Economic Review of Greece : 3rd Quarter 1961,
The Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 12 July 1981, p. 8.
2. In the House of Representatives elections held on 24 May, 1981 
Kyprianou's Democratic Party gained only 19.5% of the total vote, 
compared with 31.8% received by the conservative Democratic 
Rally|led by Mr Clerides and 32.7% by AKEL. In the elections 
held in the Turkish Cypriot sector, Denktash was re-elected 
President of the TFSC after he managed to win 51% of the vote. 
However, the pro-settlement Socialist Salvation and Republican 
Turkish parties doubled their numbers.
3. Ankara has drafted (and continues to draw up) most of the 
proposals of the Turkish Cypriots. At the Vienna talks in 1978, 
Mr Ecevits' constitutional expert Professor Soysal, made all the 
negotiating for the Turkish Cypriot side.
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APPENDIX A
No.701 - Treaty of Peace, signed at Lausanne, 24 July 1923
1924 Leatfuc. of Nations —  Treaty Series. ‘25
f Article 18.
Turkey is released from all undertakings and obligations in 
regard to the Ottoman loans guaranteed on the Egyptian tribute, 
that is to say, the loans of 1855, 1891 and 1894. The annual 
payments made by Egypt for the service of these loans now forming 
part of the service of the Egyptian Public Debt, Egypt, is freed from 
all other obligations relating to the Ottoman Public Debt.
Article 19.
Any questions arising from the recognition of the State of Egypt 
shall be settled by agreements to be negotiated subsequently in a 
manner to be determined later between the Powers concerned. The 
provisions of the present Treaty relating to territories detached 
from Turkey under the said Treaty will not apply to Egypt.
Article 20.
Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed 
by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.
Article 21.
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 
5tli November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the 
conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their 
Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for 
Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of 
the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve 
months after having so opted.
Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming 
into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired 
or are in process of acquiring British nationality, in consequence 
of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also 
thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.
It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled 
to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being 
Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality 
without the consent of the Turkish Government.
Article 22.
Without prejudice to the general stipulations of Article 27,
Turkev hereby recognises the definite abolition of all rights and 
privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under the 
Treaty (*) of Lausanne of the 18th October, 1912, and the 
instruments connected therewith.
(4j British and Foreign Stutc l ’upt-rs, Vol. 1<H>, page 
No. 7U1 [12299] c 3
(i) The deposit of the instrument of ratification took place by Greece,
11 February 1924; by Turkey, 31 March 1924; by the British Empire, 
Italy and Japan, 6 August 1924.
Source: League of Nations - Treaty Series, Vol. 28, No. 1 , 1924, p. 12299.
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APPENDIX B
DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGAN ISAT ION : SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1958
Introduction
The Cyprus question was discussed in the North Atlantic Council at the 
lime of the statement of policy on Cyprus (Cmnd. 455) made by the 
Prime Minister in the House of Commons on June 19. 1958. Further - 
discussions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation look place before 
the Prime Minister’s visits to Athens and Ankara for discussions with the 
Governments of Greece and Turkey, which led up to the further statement 
of policy issued by Her Majesty’s Government on August 15.
2. The Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Monsieur Spaak, after \isiting Athens on September 23, put forward to a 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council on September 24 a paper (Document 
No. 1) containing certain proposals on the question of C>prus. Monsieur Spaak 
also proposed that an earlv conference should be held, between the tnree 
Governments with the participation of representatives of the two main Cypriot 
communities and of some neutral parts, on the basis of his paper.
3. The North Atlantic Council at a number of subsequent meetings has 
considered the proposal tor a conference in the light of Her Majesty’s 
Government’s statements of policy and Monsieur Spaak’s paper. The 
discussions were concerned with the terms of reference and agenda of a 
conference and also with its composition and the place where it should be held.
4. In the couise of the discussions the two following papers were drafted 
for consideration by the Council and discussed by them: —
(a) a minute (Document No. II) recording the muin points established in 
the Council’s discussions and the attitudes of the three Governments 
principally conccrned;
(b) a covering letter (Document No. Ill)  for the Secretary-General to send 
in transmitting the minute (Document No. II) to the Permanent 
Representatives of Member Governments.
5. These documents were substantially agreed b> the North Atlantic 
Council. Document No. II still contains two alternative paragraphs 8. 
The United Kingdom Permanent Representative on the Council indicated that 
Her Majesty’s Government could accept either of these alternatives.
6. It will be seen from the documents that Her Majesty’s Government 
agreed that
(a ) Her Majesty’s Government’s policv should be discussed at a conference.
(b) Modifications or additions to the policy agreed upon bv the three 
Governments at the conference could be incorporated.
(c) The discussions of a linal solution should also appear on the Agenda 
of the conference.
(J) Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives might participate, and if 
Archbishop Makarios attended as representing the Greek C)priots 
Hi'r Mai estv’s Government would not ohiivt
(< i ii,ie cv.>1 1 > j i 1 1 1 ig me cOitleieiit.e tiieni^eives. Her Majesty s Govern­
ment were readv to invite the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic 
I reatv Organisation to take the C hair.
i»' It the conference were held in Paris, the Secretary-General could at his 
di'crction report to the North Atlantic Council, or convene the Council 
to consider the position reached, nevertheless, if it was desired that a 
representative of the Government of the United States, and of another 
Member Government, should be present as well as the Secretary - 
(icneral. Her Majesty’s Government would not object.
On October 29 the Greek Government confirmed through their 
P.i h.anent Representative that in the present circumstances they abandoned 
the attempt to convene the conference.
Source: Command Paper, 566 (Misc. No.14), HMSO, London, 1959.
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D ocum ent  N o . I
A confcrencc wiil lake place as soon as pebb le  between the British. 
Greek and Turkish Governments and representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
C > priot communities.
1 he Secretarv -General of NATO will otfer his good ollices.
1 he document which could serve as a basis for discussion would be as 
follows: -
Part I
The C>prus problem must be settled. This must be done for the good 
of the inhabitants and in order to restore understanding and friendship 
between Great Britain. Greece and Turkey.
2. It would obviously be highl> desirable for the solution reached to 
settle the problems raised once and for all. This, unfortunately, seems 
impossible because of the passions roused by events and because of the 
political positions recently taken up. '
3. It is therefore necessary to make up our minds to finding a 
provisional solution.
4. But to be acceptable and valid this provisional solution must not 
prejudge in any wa> the definitive solution which must be reached later. 
It is necessary, therefore, that in the application of the provisional solution 
nothing should favour or hinder either directly or indirectly any of the 
solutions hitherto envisaged and this without any exception.
5. A provisional solution must, at the same time, mark important 
progress towards the possibilitv of the Cypriot community governing itself 
and must include all necessary guarantees to protect the minority.
6. A provisional solution must equally safeguard the bases and 
installations necessary for Great Britain to fulfil its international 
obligations.
run II
The principles on which the new institutions should be elaborated are 
as follows:— •
(l> Creation of a House of Representatives for each of the two 
communities having competence in all communal affairs (education, 
religion, justice ever}thing to do with the personal status of the 
individual).
(2) Creation of a representative institution having competence over 
questions of joint interest (internal affairs).
(3) A governmental council presided over by the Governor with a 
Greek C> priot majorit) having competence to deal with internal 
affairs.
(4) Foreign affairs, defence and security will remain within the 
competence of the Governor.
(5) The Governor will be British. He will be assisted in his executive 
task by the Presidents of the two Houses of Representatives.
(6) Either of the Representative Houses will have the right to submit 
to an impartial tribunal an> measure which it considers to be 
discriminatory or unfavourable to one or other of the communities.
(7) The provisional solution will be for seven >ears.
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Documlnt No. II
1 he Council, in its examination of the problem of Cyprus, heard statements 
from ihe representatives of the countries directly concerned.
It took note: —
(1) that the Governments of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey 
accepted the idea of calling a conference at an earl) date;
and that these three Governments looked with favour on the presence 
at this conference of representatives of the Greek and Turkish 
communities of the Island.
It noted that, for the purpose of this conference,
(2) the United Kingdom Government desired that its plan should be 
examined, and agreed that it could be defined or modified on points 
over which agreement was reached at the conference;
(3) the Greek Government, for its part, desired that the suggestions put 
forward by the Secretary-General of NATO on 24th September, 1958. 
should be discussed.
(4) Finally, the Turkish Government asked that the British Plan should 
be taken into consideration but agreed that any amendment could be 
put forward at the conference, and moreover intended itself to present 
such amendments.
(5) The Council notes.
that while these statements of position each present special points of 
view, they are neither contradictory nor irreconcilable;
(6) it also notes that.
the three Governments are in agreement that, apart from the discussions 
proposed above in regard to a temporary solution of the problem of 
Cyprus, the discussion of a final solution should also appear on the 
agenda of the conference;
(7) it therefore recommends that the United Kingdom Government should 
take the initiative in calling a conference in the conditions indicated 
above;
(8) it further suggests that the conference be held in Paris and that the 
Secrctar) -General of NATO should, as representing the Organisation 
as a whole, extend his good ollices to the parties directly concerned.
[Alternative paragraph 3 :
(8) it further suggests that the Secretary-General of NATO, assisted by 
one of the Permanent Representatives on the North Atlantic Council, 
and a Representative of the Government of the United States, should 
attend the conference in order to help the participants by lending their 
good offices.]
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D o c u m en t  N o . Ill
Mr. Ambassador,
I beg to enclose, addressed to your Government, the text of a document 
relating to the calling of a conference having for its purpose the discussion 
of the Cyprus problem, the terms of which have been approved by the North 
Atlantic Council.
In the course of the discussions which preceded the approval of this 
document, the Permanent Representatives of the three countries directly 
concerned clearly expressed their desire that, in addition to the discussion 
of a provisional solution, a free and fair discussion should also take place 
to seek a final solution of the Cyprus problem.
The Government of Turkey indicated for its part that the discussion of a 
final solution could not. however, constitute a prior condition for the 
discussion of the provisional solution, 4
The British Government for its part made it clear that, in discussing the 
elements of a provisional solution of this problem, it would be appropriate 
to assess these in relation to their effect upon the final solution.
Finally, the Turkish Government emphasised that it could accept 
discussion of a provisional solution only on the condition that this did not 
prejudice the final solution.
In transmitting this document to you. I felt it my duty to draw your 
attention to the above declarations.
APPENDIX C 
Treaty of Guarantee
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The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,
I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, 
territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as 
established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, 
are in their common interest,
II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created 
by that Constitution,
Have agreed as follows: —
A rticle  I
The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its 
independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its 
Constitution.
It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or 
economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited 
any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any 
other State or partition of the Island.
A rticle  I I
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings 
of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise 
and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the 
Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic 
Articles of its Constitution.
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, 
so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, 
either union of Cyprus with any other "Slate or partition of the Island.
A rticle  I I I
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the 
integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time 
of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and 
enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights-to be secured to it by the 
Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establish­
ment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day’s date.
A rticle IV
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect 
to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those 
provisions.
In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of 
the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole 
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.
A rticle  V
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The 
original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the 
registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, 
in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Source: Cyprus, Command Paper 1093, HMSO, London, 1960, pp.86-87.
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APPENDIX D 
Treaty of Alliance
The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,
I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security 
of each of them,
II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and 
security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter,
Have agreed as follows: —
A rticle  I
The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common 
defence and to consult together on the problems raised by that defence.
A rticle  n
The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, 
direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity 
of the Republic of Cyprus.
A rticle m
For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object 
mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the 
territory of the Republic of Cyprus.
A rticle  IV
Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so 
established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol 
No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.
The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the 
Republic of Cyprus.
A rticle  V
The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, 
for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, 
who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey 
and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.
A rticle  VI
The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.
The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the 
application of the present Treaty renders them necessary.
The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the 
registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, 
in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.
ADD IT ION A L PROTOCOL 
No. I
I. The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the 
Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non­
commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned 
officers and men.
II. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, 
acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to 
increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.
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III. It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and 
Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their 
juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as 
well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical 
questions concerning the organisation and operation of the Headquarters 
mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall 
come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.
IV. It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set 
up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the 
Mixed Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the 
initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of 
the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish 
contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature 
of the Treaty of Alliance.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 
No. n 
A rticle I
A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, 
Greece and Turkey. It shall constitute the supreme political body of the 
Tripartite Alliance and may take cognisance of any question concerning the 
Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to 
submit to it
A rticle  II
The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once a year. 
In a matter of urgency the Committee of Ministers can be convened in special 
session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance.
Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.
A rticle  in
The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for 
a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold 
its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the 
Chairman’s country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds 
office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and 
special.
The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it 
to be necessary for the fulfilment of its task.
A rticle  IV
The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall 
be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its 
functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee’s ordinary session, an 
annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarter’s activities.
Source: Cyprus, Command Paper 1093, HMSO, London, 1960, pp.88-90.
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Text of 'Operation Hermes' coup d'etat plan
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'Operation Hermes*
«(OOSsjua dXXaY'Jj £x ‘d&v ^poifoptxwv 5-.axaYwv).
d.d. 6 * ; 
d.dLA. 2
AI0IKH2L2 KATAAP0M 2N  
27 *Iav. 1970
AIATATH EIIIXEIPHSEQN 3 
Xdpxai: AEIKQ21A —  K lttlPOS
1. KATAETAUI2
а.’Ex^ptxal Auvdims (’Eotox&pixo; nzpiyuv).
(1) '0  £oo)i£ptxös rcapdY<üv X£y4> £TCixpaxou3r(: ivaa^paXeta; Ix xöv 
Tci£aea>v tgö METQÖOr, KINE1TA1 ar.a^iwoixw; r.pb  ^ aj^dXia'.y 
OuooxTjp^eti); xdaov £x xcu iawx£ptxou &3cv xai £x xcO i^toxspixou, £x 
Siaspöpov jcapaY^vxwv.
(2) !Ex rcX7]p<xpopiwv 5'.£7itaT(i>0Yj r, Orcap-:: Six^«ptov opyavwsfiwv 7:XrjV xoO 
METQÜOr al 6^otat otaftexouv dp:0|iöv 6;:Xt3}i&i} }r/j Suvapivwv v3t av- 
xtaxa€oöv X&ytp Scacpopwv ^itxa^’j xüv 7jY>i‘:öpo)v.
(3) 'ü  iawxspix&s TtapaYiüv Sovaxat vä 57flu&ypY*i3Ti H'-xpoerceioioia o:3t p,:- 
xpöv fyuiowv xupiw; ei; xrjv GrcatOpov, xaxa xa; zpwxa; wpa; xfj; &ri-
X£ipifc£<i>; £i:i ‘Ti£pi(i>pia)jL£vov xP^vov.
б. <I>£Xiai A'jyÄiiet;
(1) A u v i^ :;  KaxaSpc^üv 6a xpoEXisovv äx i 282330 Matvj iv xaxfi’jövv- 
<j£i A ET O ^Q A IA  |ii xeX ixö v  AN SK, xtjv zöX tv  A ErK Q S IA S , xal 
I7ct8i(i) i^5 xaxaXi^j>£(i); x»ux7j; dvaijvaxxii);.
(2) 'AvaxoXtxw; AErK£2SIAS utzoogrfir^ i-'.yjipr^'.v tprftia xoö 18ou 
T.IL. <I)i ox^Siov "ApxEjii;.
(3) Auxtxü; A E r K 2 S IA S  u7io6o7]0T4ar} izi /z iprt3iv x<ftf;|ia xoO 14ou T .Ü . 
d>; ax^&ov K E N T A IT 0 2 .
(4) Bap£'ü)^ A£uxo>a(a; \ir.töQrßri'Tt] ir.:ys:pr4s:v xji%ia xoü 20 TU. w; ox*- 
Siov EAPOENQN.
(5) Noxuü; AErKQSIAS unc^oyjör,^ ir.r/iipr^iy xp-fftia xoO 24cu T.II.
(1); ax^Siov A2TPAHH.
Y- Si4iT;X7jpü4iaxtxai Auvdp,ct;.
(1) 21 EAN
(2) 2 (Auo) Atjioipta: A:aoi6i3£ü)v
(4) 719 ATM .
2. AÜOETOAH
'H M.K. «pofiXaüvouaa (lz.1 AET0‘I>QA1A tt,v 282330 Matsu 1970 rcp6* 
AETKQSIAN, va äroxi^7j SXa; xa; 65:xa; i pxrjp-a; rcöXsw; AErKQXIAH 
xal v& i7:aY0p£ü3T7 ^äsav £Ü3o$ov xai £;oögv cxTjjiixtov xai TtoXtxöv. TfiXtx9j 
£rtSü)/i;i; h xaxdtXrj^i; xfj; 7i6X£ü); xai 6 i^dXuTc; IXeYy^; auxf);.
3. EKTEAESIS
a. *l5ia *EvepYe£a;.
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’Operation Hermes *
(1)
(a) npoiXaT.s ixb  282530 Mafou 1970 In i x<5v xaxcuWvaewv:
1 AEPOAIMHN, MONH KTKKOr, m O H T E IO N  EZ2T EPIKQN  xal 
ic<pi* a*xoo xtipfwv. NOSOKOMEION, OTE (Z IT A ) , ASTTNOMI- 
KOS 2T A 8M 02 n rA H S  nAd>01\ n  AATEIA MET ASA.
2. IIPOEAPIKO MErAPO, APXHrE ION  A ST fN O M IA S , PIK.
(a) Kupta TzpojniOsia £jii xaxeuOtivaeio; «A».
(y ) XuvSuao'ito; Ttpoaitaöstöv.
Tito€oi^t)oc? lvepY£t«S 1*)C M.K. lyBexoy^vws, npbi xatAXr$iv 6Xo* 
xXt)pon xfj; jxiXeoj? x a l npoaTtiwv 5:a lou , 2ou xal 3oo Aiyou 2 a5 M.K. *Eitl 
nXiov 6pt&8s ;  T00 M E T Q H O r £x xoü s^wxcptxoü.
(5) ’Aa^pAXs:a —  K4Xu$ts
1. KaXu^i? ’AvaxoXixoO JzXsupcG Moipa; xaxa xrjv ivepYetav uni x^tiaxwv 
xoö 18ou T .n .
2. KiXu(|n; AuxixoO rcXsup&G Moipa: xaxa xrjv ivspysizv 6nb x^ YjtiA* 
xü)v xoü 14ou T.n.
3. KaXucJn; Bopstov itXeupoO Motpa; xaxa xtjv tv ip y e ia v  vjzb xp/rjiiAxwv xou 
20ou T .n .
4. ICaXu^-; Noziov nXs'jpoO Motpa; xaxa xrjy evepYeiav 6716 x|iTj[Wtt(i)v xoö
24ou T.n.
(s) Xpovtxal ln:8iü>?et5
’EmSkoEi; xaxaX^sw; TidXiw; A E fK Q S IA S  xal d-dXuxo; SXeyx0» tn* 
aüxfj; pixP1 n .O .
(2) T tcotc^ pi^ i;
(a) ’Eawxsptxö; rcap&Ywv (METQnON)
(1) "Aravxs; oi 'jr.oTrrtfi& ns; xrjv hvlpY*tav a-apx'.xrjxws 0a Ivep Y ^ ’JV 
unip aOrfjc.
(2) 0a  ävxYVwpbouv xtjv cvipYS'.xv w; ivaY*a(av Xoyq) xf|? iTtncpaxouoij; 
ivaacpaXei’a;.
(ß) lo? Aoxo«
Nä rrpocXisTj x“i 282330 Maiou cv xt) xaxcjOuvss: AEPOAIMHN —• 
MONH KTKKOr, va xaxaXiorj xa crjy/.poxifoixxa xAv xxipiwv, jU tsXtx^v l- 
Tx:5:a>^ tv xov dz6Xuxov IXeYX0V auxöv.
(y) 20; A6xo;
Na r.potXiarj iv tq xaxsuBvvar. m O l'P rE IO N  ESQTEPHvQN xal 
nfpi; aOxoO xxtpuov, NOSOKOMEION, OTE (ST T A ), va xxxaXiorj xa 
j'jYxpoxr^iaxa xwv xxipiuv ^  xxX-.y.rjv xöv duiXurov SXsyxov
auxtBv.
(5) Bo; A6xo;
N3c icposXdarj iic i 282330 Matsu £v xrj xatsuWvati ASTYNOMIKOS 
STABMOS n rA H S  n A ^ O r  —  nA A T E IA  METASA —  APXH HAE- 
K T P ISM O r —  ASTTNOMIKOS STA0MOS OAOr AAPNAKOS va xa- 
xaXiSif] xa c?:-, xpoxifoiaxa xwv v.xiptwv u l x:Xtxf(v iretSJtD i^v x6v iz6X’jxov 5-
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(3) 4o; A6x°€
Na KpotX&arj izb  282330 Mafcu iv xaxz-jfcivos: IT POE ATI KO MEr 
TAPO —  APXHTEION A2T1*N0M1A2 —  P1K, va xaxaXaSr; xa ^y *P >  
xVftiaxa xwv xxipwuv p.£ xeaixt/V tncSiwc’.v xov a-dXuxov £XcYX°v auxüv.
(Q A6x ©5 6i;o<rn]ptEE(j);.
Na &w&orfrtfTr\ kvipyeiav lou xa: 2ou A&yvo.
(yj) A6x°C Ctotx^sw;
Na fripfoijflVjaTj £v£pyetav Sou xal 4ou Ao/ou.
(e) 21 E A .N .
Td iXa^pd apiiaxa 21 E.A.N. va exxcXouy xzp'.r.ilia; it; xa; xupia; 6- 
8oi>; xf); it6Xeci>s ttexpi -spaxo; aTzoaxoXf;;.
(t) 2 (A60) Atjioipta: Ata6i6xocwy
Nd ^Yxaxaaxa^00v e*s OTE (Sl'TA) xal va Ösaouv ötio xov aitiXuxov 
2Xeyx^v Xü>v ^dcav ti]Xe»o>v:xYjV £TC:x&iv(i)viav ^owxspixou —  £qu)xeptxoü. Na 
ptspijiv^aouv £id xrjv ojiaXrjv XsttoupYtav xt'tv ‘arjXeitmoivcovi&y.
(x) ’E<pe$peJa
4o<; A^xo; 2a; M.K.
Kivou^vc; foiaOev va &xr< -X0i;t6xrjx7. sr.ijtoaaiw; uTiep xwv e{A7ipo<; Xo- 
Xü)V, xal vdc Buvaxai va Ivtpyrjar] xxyjio;, xrj iiaxayfl.
(X) Suvxovioxtxal 65tjy^ xi
(1) A.2.A. (u>; HAPAPTHMA <-A» l y & v j  E H IX E IP H ZE Q N ).
(2) 'Qpa SieXsoasw; ix  xfj; AT.A.
(3) *Op:a.
(4) Oi A6yo*. xaxd xrjv xivrjxv vä XafctoT. '^ixpa dcyaXsta;.
4. AIOEKHTIEH MEPIMNA 
a. TXixd xal Twrjpeatai
(1) *E(fo5tac7^6;
(a) Tp^ixa —  Kauai^a
1. Mexd xöv ivopwv Sjrjpa xpc.^?j ;uä; i$ipa; Sia xaxavdXwaiv xrjv 28t]v 
Matou.
2. Al aTreGfjxat xo>v cx^dxwv va u:: “Xr)pi:; oiv^ivr^.
(ß) nupo*iaXixd
Ta «pcöXejtdiJicva ji*xa x(Lv cnXwv 
(y) ‘TXixd
fQ; 6aaixal iSr/pat erciX£tpVj3sO)V.
(2) Mexa^popixd
(a) Kaxavoji^ 6xr^£xwv AXJML
1. Io; A<5x3; I tj; MJv. 5 öx7^ 1*"* 1
2. 2o; Aöxo; 1 tj; M.K. 5 dy^ia^x  1 \X  .
3. 3o; Aöxo; lrj; M i .  5 öyrfti&'.x T.X.
4. 4o; A6xo; Itj; M.K. 5 cx^taxa T.X.
5. A^ xo; 'l'noaxrjpi^Eü); 6 öx1^ 10^  F.X.
6. Aöx«; A'.otxTpsto; 6 öx^axa T.X.
7. A oini tyfturc* A T M . SiaxsOtör.v 8t4 dv^yxa; M.K. xal Xoitcöv
TJlT^ JldxtDV.
(3) "EXtYXO? xuxXo<popia;
Meplp,yrj ES AK
5. AIABIBASEIS* 
a. *Erctxotv(i>v(ai
(1) ’Aaupjxaxa \Uoa
(a) Z'.yi] daupjidxuv (Ji^ x?' sx^Xtiostoc i7i:yc’.p^a£(i);.
(ß) *Apai; S irH S  Sid xf^ ; ouvBr^axiX^ X^sw; (nE*\APIX)S).
(2) ’Evsüp^axa |iiaa
a: X7]X-sü)v.y.al Tj^y.cual OTE (ZTTA).
6. SxafyLoi Aioixi^tö);
(1) I.A . *Ewxeip^agö>; APXHTEION ASTTNOMIAS
(2) 2.A. Aöxwv dva^ipGwatv ,•
AIOIKHTHI»
APPENDIX F
12 March 1971 Armed Forces Memorandum
1 Parliament and the Government 
with their persistent policy, views and activities have 
pushed (he country into anarchy, fratricide and social 
and economic unrest, made the public lose hope of 
reaching the contemporary civilization level, a target 
set by A taturk, failed to realize the reforms stipulated 
in the Constitution (1961), and put the future of the 
Republic o f Turkey in grave danger.
2 The solutions which would do away 
with (he sorrow and hopelessness felt by the Turkish 
Nation and its armed forces, over this grave situation 
should be considered by Parliament with an under­
standing above Party politics. It is imperative that a 
strong and respected government be formed under 
democratic principles to stop anarchy, take up the 
reforms demanded in the constitution w ith a Kema- 
list understanding and apply those reforms de­
manded in the constitution w ith a Kemalist under* 
standing and apply those reforms.
3 If this is not prom ptly undertaken 
the Turkish Armed Forces will use its legal rights and 
seize power directly to accomplish its duty o f pro­
tecting and supervising the Turkish Republic.
signed Memduh Tagmac. Chief o f General 
Staff
Faruk Gurler, Commander o f Land
Forces
Celal Eyiceoglu, Commander of 
Naval Forces
Muhsin Batur, Commander of Air 
Forces
[the m ilitary members of the National Security
Council 1
Source: Jane Cousins, Turkey: Torture and Political Persecution, 
Photo Press, London, 1973.
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’Top Secret* Greek Foreign Ministry Memorandum on Erim correspondence 
to the Greek Prime Minister.
APPENDIX G
«AKPQS AHOPPHTON
’E? dcqpaXoOc tojy^S rcXrjpocpopoOiMu 5xi 6 II pwOwtoupYi? r  
Toopxia; x. Nix&x ’Eplp. drceaxeiXe ir.ioxoXty up6? xov IIp(i)9u- 
noupyiv xf)c eEXXd5o<;*. II^na56«oyXov 5ti xf); 6zota? xaXelxai 6 
x. IIai:a$67iouXo; Swd? ^owxtqoy) rcieaiv xfj? Ku^ptaxf)«; Ku- 
6epvVjae(i>i; oOxitf; «Saxe auxrj v i  Tcapaxwprjor/ rcpo; xoO? T/K  5i- 
xai(i)[iaxa xaxdxt ittpiooixspa x<I)v juiovacixwv.
’A^ poO 6 x. N tx^x ’Epiji lire^rjYel 5xt xwpa elvai xaip i?  orcox; 
Sieu0STTj9oOv iv rcveujiaxi ouvepYaoia? xa 5ia<popa rcpo6Xrjuaxa xa 
i7taax&Xo0vxa xa? Suo x^pa?, 7ipoa0ixei 5xi at 8uo xoivixrjxei; £v 
Kmtpq) 5^ov vd ?xouv Sixatw^ta va 8ieu0uvoov £auxa? d)? Boo £e- 
Xwpiaxai £0vixai xoiv6x7)xe<; xaxa x6v !ocov xptaov omo; aOxai Bi- 
eutovovxai xwpa -^xoi Sia xf)5 Xuoeu)? xf]? ^vi^touoi^oeax; xoO 7:a- 
p6vxo? xaOeaxwxo? lv Ku7ip(p Be’ £xdaxrjv xo'.voxrjxa. ’Ev £vavx’.a 
Tteptrcxwaet, TipoaO^xei 6 x. ’Epljji i] Xuai? 0a i-ptzt va y ^  6aaei 
xfj<; "5t^X*?); Ivcoaeo)?”  xtjv Brcotav ouxe i] Toupxia oSxe xai ^ rEX- 
Xd? 0d ineOup-ouv.
Kaxa xiv x. Nxevxxd? -fj xpfpiponoirfitlaz yXwaoa fjxo ^aX- 
Xov aOaxirjpa.
'0  x. Nxevxxa? Blv £X:u£ei 5xt r, d a r^ r^ i?  xoO x. ’Epljji 0a 
ytvTj drcoSexxT] xf)? 'EXXdBo? 5c4xt aGxrj 0a IporrrjSYj x6v \ \p -  
Xic7:{3xc7iov 6 6tcoIo<s 0a zapaz^ ji'^  Oeiwt "el; xa? 'EXXrjVixa? 
xaXevBa?” .
Ttvexat dvxiXyjTtxiv 8xt eEXXrjvixy) KuSepvrjai? S£v Sow« 
ax6[.tr< d^dvxrjT.v.
(’jr.OYpa^Tj)
I'evixo? Ai6’j 0'jvxt|?
T tcoupyeio’J "Eotoxcpixtov
14.5.1971
Koiv.: ITp6e5pov xf)? BooXf)? xwv 'Avxircpcmjr.wv 
TcpuroupY&v ra p d  xip Ilpoeopcp 
I'£v'.x6v AieuO’jvx^ v TrcoupYEtou ’Eqoxeptxwv».
Source: N. Kakaounaki, 2650 Meronyxta Svnomosias, (2650 Days of 
Conspiracy), Vol. 2, Papazisi, Athens, 1976.
'Secret’ letter of Ambassador Panagiotacos to Makarios.
APPENDIX H
Source :
BA1IAIKH nPErBEIA THI EAAAA02 
EN KYnPB
'Sv A&uxu0(9 x§ 11ij 'iouviou, 1971.
'lpi0.IlpuT.09lT
AnOPPHTCN
lax  ’ evxoXi^v TT1Ç A .E . XOÜ K. IlpuOuTtOUpfOÛ, EX“  
ïifv x t ^ v  vi tmo0aXw, ouvrinn^ vuç, clr ti^v *Ynex£pav tla- 
xapiéxrçxa OT)iic Cu^ia cioriYnoeuv xr^ç ‘EXXnvixfiç KvfirpvrfaoCi 
aCxwvcç Bd c ô c l ,  xax'aûxrçv, va xP^ôk^cuotooiv ùç 
5 t l  xifv oiîvtaF.iv xîjç ixifioStioon^vriç etc, x<5v DËNKTASH 
iuavxifaeuç.
Al c loriY^ociç  a u x a i ,  «po iév  tv&cXexoîîç ctvuxâ- 
tt^v oxaC^nv iteX^TTiç, 8x^ jiévov xax ’ oûô<fv Oiyotiv xo cviaTov  
Xou Kpâtouç àw’luC xX^ov napaxipnxouv xâç f t ixo to f i inâ*  
{iik&kw£eiç ;ûv  loupKOKuxp Cuv Ma' é^aaaaX CCouv, c ç ’ o jov  
(iefiakuç âxoXifôouv e l ç  a u ^ y v i a v ,  xrîv uaxâXuoiv xoû onue- 
p iv o ü ,  oaipûç ûbxoxo^kKOÛ, xaêcaTÜTOc«
Dcpa ix i f p« , .  a i  l v X<5^y e l a n y n o c k ^  ô ieuxoXuvouv  x^v 
I j iC tcu&iV p i a ç  xOç napaôexx?^  ô i c u ê e x n a e u ç  xat  pâç 
£n ixp i fxouv , xâvxuç0 va àvxkpexun taupev  ano 0<?aeuç r,chr>^ 
î o x û o ^ ,  x^v xepfxxuouv 6kaxonfiç xüv évôoxo ivoxwhüv ouvo- 
piXiûv xoupxinÇ ûitawxitSxritk. -
'tanajo|>Noi *»»»V
AÛxoû îîaxap wdxrtxa, 'Apx^ cnkOKOKOV Kûnpou,
Ilpotàpov ^ Kunpiaxt^ ûr\poxpax Ca ;, 
Kapkov Kûpuov üavaoiov,ENTAYdA
K.n.riAKAriùiAZOE 
nojfopuç xriç, 'EXXaooç
N. Kakaounaki, 2650 Meronyxta Svnomosias, (2650 Days of 
Conspiracy), Vol. 2, Papazisi, Athens, 1976.
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Greek Note to Cyprus of 11 February 1972.
APPENDIX I
Athens A rm ed Forccs Radio in Greek 21.00 GMT 14.2 72 
‘"F u ll of Note :
(1) The Greek Government, having established that a considerable quantity of 
arm s from  Czechoslovakia had l>een im ported, hastened from  the very beginning to 
protest to the Cyprus Government. It reca lled  that Greece has specia l responsib ilities  
in this respect for the security  of Cyprus, both from  the national and the in ternational 
aspects.
(2) The Greek Government, fully conscious of the serious dangers caused by 
the aforesaid  action of the Cyprus Government and a im ing  to avert these dangers as fai 
as possib le , subm itted to the President of the Cyprus Republic the urgent recom m end­
ation to hand over the im ported arm s into the custody of the National Guard. The 
President of the Republic refused to accept this recom m endation .
(3) The President of th f Republic again absolutely re jected a second identical 
and categorical demarche In' the Greek Government.
(4) Follow ing th is, the Greek Government, having in m ind  the specia l security 
conditions in Cyprus and the responsib ility  of the UN Security Council on this question, 
asks tlu- Cyprus Government to place the im ported arm s under the control and the 
custody of tin; I ’N Peace Force im m ed ia te ly .
(5) The acute c r is is  affecting Greek Cypriot H ellen ism  is well known. It
is necessary that recourse to violence be averted. The d is tribu tion  of the imported 
arms for use in the in ternal Cyprus front would be a nationally  disastrous action 
because it would inevitably lead to fra tr ic ide  and destruction .
(G1 Cypriot Hellenism  is p;irt of the nation. This must not be forgotten, 
just as it must not be forgotten that Athens rem ains the national centre . Despite 
this, the Greek Government do».s not intend at this moment to intervene in the internal 
affairs of Greek Cypriot H e llen ism . It appeals to the prudence and patr io tism  of a ll 
responsible people in Cyprus.
(7) The Greek Government believes that the tim e has come for the form ation of 
a government of national unity which w ill include a ll the nationa lis t parties of Greek 
Cypriot H ellen ism , a government which would be the result of the free in itia tive  of the 
political and church leaders. The people in this government should l)e of well-known 
prudence, of independent opinion, free from  intolerance and capable of working for 
the restoration of the disrupted national un ity .
(8) Such a development would make possible the harm onious co-operation and 
mutual confidence between Athens and N icosia . Greece cannot accept any responsib ility , 
in either the international or the national fie lds , for activ ities which are alien to it.
(9) The present Note, handed to the President of the Republic by the Deputy 
M inister of Foreign A ffa irs  Panayiotakos, is not addressed only to the Cyprus 
Government but also to a ll the Cypriot people. Consequently, it is not a secret 
document and it can be released for publication.
Source: BBC/SWB/ME/3916/C/l, 16 February 1972.
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APPENDIX J
Letter from Archbishop Makarios to President Gizikis.
MAKARIOS BLAMES GREEK OFFICERS FOR SITUATION IN CYPRUS 
Nicosia APOGEVMATINI in Greek 6 Jul 74 p 8 M
(Text) This morning President Makarios' letter to General Gizikis was made 
public. The full text of the letter is as follows:
Mr President:
It is with profound grief that I have to set out to you certain inadmissible 
situations and events in Cyprus for which I regard the Greek Government 
as responsible.
Since the clandestine arrival of General Grivas in Cyprus in September 1971, 
rumors have been circulating and there have been reliable indications that 
he came to Cyprus at the urging and with the encouragement of cc.tain circles 
in Athens. In any case, it is certain that from the first days of his arrival 
here, Grivas came into touch with officers from Greece serving in the National 
Guard from whom he received help and support in his effort to set up an 
unlawful organization and allegedly to fight for enosis. And he established 
the criminal EOKA-B organization, which has become the cause and source of 
many sufferings for Cyprus. The activity of this organization, which has 
committed political murders and many other crimes under a patriotic mantle, 
advancing enosis slogans, is well known. The National Guard, which is 
staffed and controlled by Greek officers, has from the outset been the main 
supplier of men and material to EOKA-3, the members and supporters of which 
gave themselves the nice ringing title of "Enosists" and the "Enosis Camp."
I have many times asked myself why an unlawful and nationally harmful organ­
ization which is creating divisions and discords, cleaving rifts in our 
internal front, and leading the Greek Cypriot people to civil strife, is 
supported by Greek officers. And I have also many times wondered whether such 
support has the approval of the Greek Government. I have done a great deal 
of thinking and made n*any hypothetical assumptions in order to find a logical 
reply to my questions. No reply, under any prerequisites and assumptions, 
could be based on logic. However, the Greek officers' support for EOKA-b 
constitutes an undeniable reality. Tne National Guard camps in various 
areas of the island and nearby sites are smeared with slogans in favor cf 
Grivas and EOKA-B and also with slogans against the Cyprus Government and 
particularly uy&elf. In the National Guard camps propaganda by Greek 
officers in favour of EOKA-B is often undisguised. It is also known, and 
an undeniable fact, that the opposition Cyprus press, which supports the 
criminal activity of EOKA-B and which has its sources of financing in 
Athens, receives guidance ana line fror. those in charge c! the Second 
General Staff Office and the branch cf the Grc-ek Central Intelligence 
iervicrt in Cyprus.
It is true th.it whenever 1 have complained to the Crock Government about 
the attitude' and conduct of certain officers, I have received the reply 
that I ought not hesitate to report the officers by name and state the 
specific charges against then: so that they could be recalled from Cyprus.
1 did this only in one instance. This is an unpleasant task for me.
Moreover this evil cannot be remedied in this way. What is important 
is to uproot and prevent the evil and not merely to face its consequences.
I am sorry to say, Mr President, that the root of the evil is very deep, 
reaching as far as Athens.
It is from there that the tree of evil, the bitter fruits of which the 
Greek Cypriot people are tasting today, is being fed and maintained and 
helped to grow and spread. In order to be absolutely clear, I say that 
cadres of the military regime of Greece support and direct the activity of 
the EOKA-B terrorist organization. This also explains the involvement 
of Greek officers of the National Guard in illegal activities, conspiracy 
and other inadmissible situations. The guilt of circles of the military 
regime is proved by documents which were found recently in the possession 
of leading cadres of EOKA-B. Plenty of money was sent from the National 
Center for the maintenance of the organization and directives were* given 
concerning the leadership after the death of Grivas and the recall of Major 
Karousos, who had come to Cyprus with him, and generally everything was 
directed from Athens. The genuineness of the documents cannot bo questioned 
because llio.se which are typewritten have corrections made by hand and the 
'i.nulwrii Ini- til tin1 wi lier Is known. Am evldente, 1 attach one such document .
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1 have always adhered to the principle and I have on many occasions staled 
that my cooperation with the Creek Government for the tir.e being is, for 
me, a national duty. The national interest dictates harmonious and close 
cooperation between Athens and Nicosia. No matter which Government of Greece 
has been in power, it has been to me the government of the mother country 
Hid I had to cooperate with it. I cannot say that I have a special liking 
for military regimes, particularly in Greece, the birthplace and cradle of 
democracy. But even in this case I have not departed from my principle of 
cooperation. You realize, Mr President, the sad thoughts which have been 
preoccupying and tormenting me following the ascertainment that men of the 
Government of Greece are incessantly preparing conspiracies against me and, 
what is worse, are dividing the Greek Cypriot people and pushing them to 
catastrophe through civil strife. I have more than once so far felt, and 
some cases I have almost touched, a hand invisibly extending from Athens 
and seeking to liquidate my human existence. For the sake of national 
expediency, however, I kept silent. Even the evil spirit which possessed 
the three defrocked Cypriot bishops, who have caused a major crisis in the 
church, emanated from Athens. However, 1 said nothing in this connection.
1 am wondering what the object of all this is. I would have continued 
to keep silent about the responsibility and role of the Greek Governuien'. ia 
the present drama of Cyprus if I had been the only one to suffer on the- set:»«.- 
of the drama. But covering things up and keeping silent is not permissible 
when the entire Greek Cypriot people are suffering, when Greek officers 
of the National Guard, at the urging of Athens, support EOKA-B in its crir.ir.a 
activity, which includes political murders and is generally aimed at the 
dissolution of the state.
Great is the responsibility of the Creek Government in the efforc to 
abolish the status of Cyprus as a state. The Cyprus state should be dissolve 
only in the event of enosis. However, as long as enosis is not feasible 
it is imperative that the status of Cyprus as a state be strengthened.
By its whole attitude toward the National Guard issue, the Greek Government 
has been following a policy calculated to abolish the Cyprus state.
A few months ago the National Guard General Staff, consisting of Greek 
officers, submitted to the Cyprus Government for approval a list of 
candidates for cadet reserve officers who would attend a special school 
and then serve as officers during their military service. Some 57 of the 
candidates on the list submitted were not approved by the Council of Minister 
The General Staff was informed of this in writing. Despite this, :nlloving 
instructions fiom Athens, the General Staff did not take the decision of 
the Council of Ministers, vhich under the law has the absolute ri.-.ht to 
appoint National Guard officers, at all into account. Acting arbitrarily, 
the general staff trampled upon laws, showed contempt for the decision 
of the Cyprus Government anil enrolled the candidates who had not been 
a|>|i|ove.| In Mu' officers tr.llnliip, school.
I regard this attitude of the National Guard Central Staft, which is 
controlled by the Greek Government, as absolutely inadmissible. The Nat ionn i. 
Guard is an organ of the Cyprus state and should be controlled by it and 
not from Athens. The theory about a common area of defc-nse between Greece 
and Cyprus has its emotional aspect. In reality, however, the position is 
different. The National Guard, with its present composition and staffing, 
has deviated from its aim and has become a hatching place of illegality, 
a center of conspiracies against the state and a source of supply for 
liOKA-B. It suffices to say that during the recently stepped up terrorist 
activity of EOKA-B, National Cuard vehicles transported arms and moved 
members of the organization who were about to be arrested to safety. The 
absolute responsibility for this improper conduct of the National Cuard 
rests with Greek officers, some of whom are involved up to their necks 
and participants in the activity of EOKA-B. And the National Center is 
not free from responsibility in this connection. The Greek Government 
could, by a mere gesture, put an end to this regrettable situation. The 
National Center could order the termination of violence and terrorism 
by ECKA-B because it is from Athens that the organization derives the means 
'or its maintenance and its strength, as confirmed by written evidence ar.'_
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proof. The Greek Government, however, has failed to do so. As an indica­
tion of Litu inadmissible situation, I note here in passing that in Athens 
alro slogans were recently written against me and in favor of EOKA-B.
Un thu walls of churches and other builidngs, including the building of 
thv.* Cyprus Embassy. The Greek Government, even though it knew the culprits, 
did not seek to arrest and punish anybody, thus tolerating propaganda in 
favor or LOKA-B.
1 have a lot to say, Mr President, but I do not think that I should say 
anymore. In conclusion I convey that the Greek-officered National Guard, 
the plight of which has shaken the Cypriot people's confidence in it, will 
be restructured on a new basis. I have reduced military service so that 
the National Guard ceiling may be reduced and the extent of the evil may 
be limited. It may be observed that the reduction of the strength of 
the National Guard due to the shortening of the military service does 
not render it incapable of carrying out its mission in case of national 
danger. For reasons which I do not wish to set out here I do not share 
this view. And I would ask that the officers from Greece staffing the 
National Cuard be recalled. Their remaining in the National Guard and 
commanding the force would be harmful to relations between Athens and 
Nicosia. I would, however, be happy if you were to send to Cyprus about 
1U0 officers as instructors and military advisers to help in the reor­
ganisation and restructuring of the armed forces of Cyprus. I hope, in 
the meantime, that instruction; have been given to LOKA-R to end its act­
ivities, even though, as long as this organization is not definitely 
dissolved, a niw wave of violence and murders cannot be ruled out.
I am sorry, Mr President, that I have found it necessary to say many 
unpleasant things in order to give a broad outline with the language of 
open trankness of the long-existing deplorable situation in Cyprus. This 
is, however, necessitated by the national interest which has always guided 
all my actions.
I do not desire interruption of my cooperation with the Greek Government.
Euc it should be borne in mind that I am not an appointed prefect or 
locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus but an elected leader of a 
large section of Hellenism, and I demand appropriate conduct by the 
national center toward me.
The content of this letter is not confidential.
V.’ith cordial wishes.
Source: Hearings, U.S. House of Representatives, Pike Select 
Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington D.C., 1976, pp. 1519-1521.
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APPENDIX K
doing-their duly on'{^|ip$y 
She Turkish armed foices wflli 
in Cyprus not for war but for 
an end to a brutal invasion. Ti 
both Use 3Turks and the Greek < 
bring them into the light.
its shadow to «destroy ;ihe
'r«»rvyr. pmasfffnppn
% ~rii ■ ■* i'.'1 - O' V" "/afc
'.m*,
----uL . «.
.. •i i %T' fs>r V  > . k
<t\7*
tt*ia •r»i£M«Mi" *»tt
l iw l j w . w j
Source: BBC/SWB/ME/4657/C/l, 22 July 1974.
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APPENDIX L
& Fellow Greeks, the policy 1 h*ve pursue 
compatible neither wtth tay maiade*no* myhfctori 
by tmperative national necessty and it was acumtx 
do what had to be done according to «hi dictates of tl
Aixn^ d oppoûtion to the Turks In Oypros 
distance and *1» by reason of the accomplished.-iae
f i t  M »
Source: BBC/SWB/ME/4680/C/1-2, 17 August 1974.
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Statements by the U.S. State Department following the change of 
Government in Cyprus and Greece, 24 July 1974.
Folloiriiiff art statement* read to ucirs cor­
respondents on Ju ly  J.f by R o b o t  Anderson,
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press 
Relations, together with the text of a me.s- 
safie so it that day by Secretary K issinger to 
George M arros, Foreign M in ister of the Hel­
lenic Republic of Greccc.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENTS
I have two announcements to make.
The first concerns Cyprus: The United 
States is conducting its relations w ith Mr. n
[Glafcos] Clerides, who, according: to the 
Cyprus Constitution, has the righ t to act as 
President under certain circumstances.
And the other statement concerns Prime 
M inister [Constantine] K aram anlis ’ return 
to A thens: We welcome the new government 
and look forw ard to working: w ith it b ilater­
ally and in the N ATO  framework.
MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER 
TO FOREIGN MINISTER MAVROS OF GREECE
Press rt'lfiisi' "1C dated July 23
July 24, 1974.
D e a r  M r . M i n i s t e r : I wish to extend my 
warmest congratulations to you as Foreign 
M inister of Greece. I t  is indeed a special 
pleasure for me to be able to extend best 
wishes to a valued friend of the United States 
as you assume your difficult duties at this in i­
tia l period. I w ant to assure you that you 
will have my fullest support in your efforts 
to reach an early peaceful settlement of the 
Cyprus problem.
I look forward to working closely w ith you 
in m a in ta in ing  the close and friendly rela­
tions which have trad itionally  existed be­
tween the peoples of the United States and 
Greece.
W arm  Regards,
H e n r y  A . K is s in g e r .
APPENDIX M
Source: Department of State Bulletin, 12 August 1974, p. 267.
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CONCLUSION
66. The tenor of the evidence given by the Foreign Secretary was to 
the effcct that circumstances had so changed that the importance of Cyprus to 
Britain was no longer the same as it was in 1960 when the Treaty of Guarantee 
was signed. However Your Committee consider that Cyprus still matters to 
Britain. It is not only that her geographical position is strategically important. 
It is not only that she is a fellow' member of the Commonwealth with close ties 
with Britain. These factors are important enough. What really matters is 
that Cyprus is a test of Britain’s standing in the world. A country's true 
greatness should not be measured by its military might or its economic wealth. 
It should be measured by its standards of justice, integrity and humanity, and 
by the way it protects the wreak. The Government’s policy and the policy of 
some other Governments to Cyprus raises questions about the credibility and 
authority of the UN and the sanctity of international treaties and law.
67. Your Committee's task is done. It will now be for the House to ensure 
that Britain carries out her practical and moral obligations to all the people of 
Cyprus. Parliament has always been jealous to protect the rights of individuals. 
Cyprus is not just a country. It is made up of human beings whose rights have 
been trampled underfoot. The Foreign Secretary quoted Bismarck to the 
effect that “ the strong are weak because of their scruples He would do well 
to heed wiser words than those of Bismarck. “ Let our strength be the law of 
justice ; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth
SU M M A RY  OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM M ENDATIONS
1. There should be no delay in reappointing Select Committees, nor any 
attempt to restrict the powers normally given to them.
2. The decision of the Turkish Government not to put their side of the case 
directly is to be regretted, as is their decision not to allow Your Committee 
to carry out their appointed tasks in the North of Cyprus.
3. Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation, and the military capacity to 
intervene in Cyprus during July and August 1974. She did not intervene 
for reasons which the Government refuses to give.
4. Her Majesty’s Government should raise with the members of the EEC 
the need for an early solution of the constitutional problems in Cyprus and
invite early consideration of this issue in the European Parliament.
5. A further initiative on Cyprus should be made at the coming Common­
wealth Prime Ministers’ Conference.
6. Britain should urge that all further progress in Turkey’s developing 
relationship with the EEC should be withheld until an agreed solution of the 
Cyprus problem is arrived at.
7. The British Government must seek to ensure the implementation of 
Resolution 3395 of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which calls
on all parlies to undertake urgent measures to facilitate the voluntary return 
of all refugees to their homes in safety and to settle all other aspects of the 
refugee problem.
Source. British House of Commons; Report of Select Committee on 
Cyprus, Session 1975-76, HMSO, London, 1976.
/coni. (Appendix N)
322
8. The decision by the Foreign Secretary to move Turkish Cypriot 
refugees from the Sovereign Base Area was an error of judgment.
9. A  thorough impartial investigation should be held into the fate of missing 
persons.
10. The British Government should give full support to World Bank proposals 
in relation to Cyprus, should hold discussions with the Cyprus Government 
about the provsion of capital aid for development projects, and should initiate 
discussions in the Commonwealth on a programme of Commonwealth 
reconstruction aid.
11. The British Government failed to cope adequately with the problem of 
Cypriot refugees coming .to the United Kingdom in 1974.
12. A permanent unit should be established under the authority of the 
Cabinet Office to coordinate and direct Government action in relation to 
refugees arriving unexpectedly as the result of sudden events in their own 
countries.
13. The Home Office should be more compassionate than hitherto over their 
treatment of Cypriot refugees.
14. The Sovereign Base Areas cannot be handed over to NATO or to any 
individual member of NATO.
15. Every effort should be made to show that the fears of British subjects 
with dual nationality and Greek sounding names that the British Government 
is adopting dual standards are groundless.
16. Her Majesty’s Government should maintain diplomatic pressure on 
Turkey to allow British citizens the rights of freedom of travel accorded under 
the Treaty of Establishment.
17. Without accepting legal responsibility for the damage caused in the unique 
case of Cyprus the British Government should pay a lump sum to every 
family whose claim is registered with and approved by the British High 
Commission ; such a sum should relate solely to those with claims for loss of 
personal propetry and possessions which cannot be recovered through normal 
insurance policies.
18. The Government should provide a sum not exceeding £25,000 to the 
British High Commission to be allocated, in consulation with the United 
Kingdom Citizens Association, to those British residents suffering real 
hardship.
19. The decision to end the supply of British food rations to Anzio Camp 
should be rescinded, an assurance should be given that the camp will remain 
open as long as it is needed, and a scale of contributions to be made by those 
employed on the base should be drawn up between the Sovereign Base Area 
authorities and the Anzio Camp Refugee Committee.
Source: British House of Commons, Report of Select Committee on Cyprus, 
Session 1975-76, HMSO, London, 1976.
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Message of Mr Karamanlis to the Greeks of Cyprus
APPENDIX 0
Greek men and women of Cyprus,
I have promised and I now renew my promise most categorically, 
that the Greek government will do its duty to the full towarcr the Greeks 
of Cyprus. The fulfilment of this sacred duty is not an easy task The 
mistakes which have been made by all sides have created a dramatic 
situation on the island.
The senseless coup of July 15th, has changed the drama to a national 
tragedy, for it has given to our enemies the pretext for invading Cyprus.
With its hands tied the newly established government of Greece 
was called upon to solve this problem in its international dimensions. 
But now it's no time to search for or try to ascribe responsibilities. Now 
it’s time for a national struggle. The whole nation has wholeheartedly 
undertaken to carry out this struggle by all means. The Greeks of Cyprus 
are requested to show unreserved mobilisation as well as confidence, 
prudence and hope.
A disaster may sometimes become the starting point for the renais­
sance of a nation. It’s my belief that in our case this phenomenon may 
well come true.
At this crucial moment endurance as well as determination ‘o face 
the numerous dangers facing us are necessary.
Greeks of Cyprus,
Let one idea, one word throw its life-giving power into our hearts 
and spirits. One word with its sacred meaning: “ Unity"; spiritual unity 
of all who belong to Hellenism. It is only in this way that the suffering 
Republic of Cyprus may gain again its integrity, independence and 
happiness.
August 25, 1974.
CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS, 
Prime Minister.
Source: Cyprus - Today, May-August 1974.
Statement of principles to guide future US-Greek defence cooperation 
initialed at Washington on 15 April 1976 by Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger and Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri Bitsios.
APPENDIX P
1. The Governments of the United States 
of America and Greece will complete as soon 
as possible a new defense cooperation agree­
ment to replace the 1953 United States-Greek 
military facilities agreement and other re­
lated agreements. The United States Govern­
ment w’ill subm it this Agreement to Con­
gress for approval.
2. The new' Agreement will be designed 
to modernize the United States-Greek de­
fense relationship reflecting the traditionally 
close association between the United States 
and Greece and the m utuality  of their de­
fense interests in the N orth  A tlantic  A l­
liance.
3. This new Agreement will define the 
status and set fo rth  the terms for operations 
of m ilitary installations in Greece where 
United States personnel are present. I t  will 
be sim ilar to the United States-Turkish 
Agreement and w ill embody, inter alia, the 
following principles:
(A ) Each installation will be a Greek 
m ilitary  installation under a Greek com­
mander.
(B ) The installations shall serve only pur­
poses authorized by the Government of 
Greece. Their activities shall be carried out 
on the basis of m utually agreed programs.
(C) There shall be participation of Greek 
personnel up. to 50% of the total strength 
required for agreed jo in t technical opera­
tions and related maintenance activities and 
services of the facilities and there shall be 
provisions for the tra in ing  of such personnel 
for this purpose.
(D ) All intelligence information including 
raw data produced by the installations shall 
be shared fully by the two Governments ac­
cording to m utually agreed procedures. A
- jo in t use plan for the United States forces 
communications system in Greece shall be 
agreed upon.
(E ) The Agreement shall remain in efTect 
for four years and there shall be provisions 
for the term ination thereof before its ex­
piration, as well as for its renewal.
(F) W ith in  this framework there shall be 
annexes to this Agreement covering each 
m ajor installation (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, 
Irak lion), the United States element at the 
Hellenikon Greek A ir Force Base, as well as 
annexes dealing w ith status of forces 
(SO FA ), and command and control.
(G) The annex covering Souda Bay will 
be a revision of the 1959 Souda Bay Agree­
ment. Meanwhile it is understood that 
United States operations at this airfield will 
be in accordance writh the 1959 Agreement.
(H ) I t  is understood that, pending the 
conclusion of the newr Agreement w ithin a 
reasonable time, United States operations 
now being conducted from  facilities in 
Greece, w'hich serve m utual defense inter­
ests, will be allowed to continue.
4. As an integral part of the new defense 
cooperation agreement, provision will be 
made for a four-year comm itment to Greece 
of m ilitary  assistance totaling 700 million 
dollars, a part of which will be grant aid. 
This comm itment will be designed to further 
develop the defense preparedness of Greece 
and meet its defense needs in pursuit of 
North A tlantic Alliance goals.
W a s h i n g t o n , April  15, 1976.
Source: Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1976, p. 629.
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Exchange of letters^^ between Kissinger and Bitsios.
Foreign »V.inister Bitsics' Letter, A prii  7
Dkar M r S e c r e t a r y :  A s you are aware, the sign- 
irivr of a new defense cooperation agreement between 
the United States and Turkey creates problems and 
raises serious apprehensions in Greece. In light of 
this development, I will want to discuss with you how 
we should deal with the status of American facilities 
in Greece.
Meanwhile, I would appreciate having your position 
on the United States attitude toward th.- resolution 
of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and par­
ticularly on the danger of a serious deterioration in 
the situation in the Aegean. I would also like to 
know in what way the United States Government en­
visions its agreement w ith Turney as contributing to 
the achievement of a speedy and just solution to the 
Cyprus question in light of previous assurances that 
the United States would make a major effort to this 
effect.
I believe your responses to these questions will 
assist my Government in formulating its policy. I 
hope they will be adequate to dissipate our concern 
to the benefit of both our countries and the Western 
Alliance as a whole.
D im i t r i  S. B i t s io s  
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Greece
1 Texts from press release 180 dated Apr. 15.
Secretary Kissinger's Letter, April 10
D ka r  M r . M in is t e r : Thank you for your letter 
of April 7 in which you posed some questions refnrd- 
ing United States policy in the Eastern Mediter­
ranean. I welcome this opportunity to make our 
tion clear with regard to these issues.
You have asked about our attitude toward th«* re*--»- 
lution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean *nd 
particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I 
should like to reiterate our conviction that these de­
putes must be settled through peaceful proro.iurrt 
and that each side should avoid provocative action* 
We have previously stated our belief that neither »id* 
should seek a military solution to these dispute». 
This remains United States policy. Therefore th* 
L’nited States would actively and unequivocally op­
pose either side’s seeking a military solution and 
will make a major effort to prevent such a course 
of action.
I should like to re-emphasize, with regard to 
Cyprus, that the United States remains fully com­
mitted to the objective of an early and just settlement 
of this issue. As I said in my United Nations addrett, 
the present dividing lines in Cyprus cannot be perma­
nent. There must be just territorial arrangement» 
We intend to contribute actively in the search for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem that will preserve the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Cyprus.
W ith regard to the defense relationship between 
Greece and the United States, I believe it would be 
useful if you could come to Washington to d iw u  
this issue in detail. I would welcome an opportunMf 
to discuss wdth you other subjects of mutual intern! 
as well. A t that time we could agree on the frame, 
work of a new defense cooperation agreement be­
tween the United States and Greece that would bene- 
fit both of our countries and contribute to the mail** 
tenance of peace and security in the Eastern Mediter­
ranean.
W arm regards,
H e n r y  A. K issingdl
Source: Department of State Bulletin, 17 May 1976, p. 630.
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APPENDIX R
GREECE-TURKEY: AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATION OF
AEGEAN CONTINENTAL SHELF ISSUE*
[Done at Berne, November 11, 197 6]
Esrne Agreement
Following is the full text of the ten-noint 
agreement reached in Berne between Greece 
and Turkey on the future procedural treat­
ment of the Aegean continental shelf issue 
(see page 1). The agreement was signed in 
Berne on 11 November 1976 and released 
simultaneously in Athens and Ankara on 20 
November:
1) Both parties agree that negotiations he sin­
cere. detailed and conducted in good faith, w ith a 
view to reai hing an agreement hased on m utual 
consent regarding the delim itation of the Contin­
ental Shell.
2) Goth parties agree that these negotiations 
should, due to their nature, he strictly confiden­
tial.
J ) Both parties reserve their respective positions 
regarding the delim itation o f  the Continental 
Shelf.
•/; Both panics undertake the obligation not to 
use the details ol this agreement and the propos­
als that each w ill make during the negotiations in 
any circumstance outside the context of the nego­
tiations.
on Continental Shelf
5) Both parties agree that no statements or 
leaks to the press should he made referring to the 
context of the negotiations unless they common!\ 
agree to tlo so.
6 ) Both parties undertake to abstain from  any 
initiative or act relating to the Continental Shell 
o f  :he Aegean Sea which might pretudue the 
negotiations.
7) Both parties undertake, as far as their b ila t­
eral relations are concerned, to abstain from  any 
initiative or act w hich would tend to discredit the 
other party.
X) Bt>th parties have agreed to study state prai - 
lice and international rules on this snbiecl with a 
view to educing certain principles and pra< n< <// 
criteria which could be o/ use m the dt'hm ihiiion  
of the Continental Shelf betw een the two coun­
tries.
V) A m ixed commission w ill be set up In this 
end an il w ill be composed of national representa­
tives.
10) Both parties agree to adopt a gradual ap­
proach in the course of the negotiations ahead 
after consulting each other.
*[Reproduced from an unofficial English translation 
provided by the Embassy of Greece at Washington, D.C. 
The translation appeared in Greece, A Monthly Record, 
Vol. II, No. 9 (November-December 197 6).
[The U.N. Security Council Resolution of August 25,
1976, concerning the dispute between Greece and Turkey, 
appears at 15 I.L.M. 1235 (1976). The I.C.J. Order of 
September 11, 1976, concerning the question of interim 
measures of protection in the Aegean Sea continental 
shelf case, appears at 15 I.L.M. 985 (1976).]
Source: International Legal Materials, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1977, p. 13.
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APPENDIX T 
TABLE 1
NATO DEFENCE EXPENDITURE 1971-1977
% of GNP
NATO 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Belgium 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.4
Britain 5.0 5.2 4.9 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.0
Canada 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.2 1.8 1.8
Denmark 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5
France 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.7 3.6
Germany West 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.5 3.4
Greece 4.7 4.6 4.1 4.0 6.9 5.0 5.0
Italy 2.9 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.4
Luxembourg 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.1
Netherlands 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.3 3.6
Norway 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.1
Portugal 7.3 6.9 6.2 6.0 6.0 4.0 3.3
Turkey 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.7 9.0 5.5 5.7
United States 7.1 6.7 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.4 6.0
TABLE 2
% OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING 1972--1978
NATO 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Belgium 10.1 10.2 9.8 10.0 10.2 10.4 n.a.
Britain 13.1 12.9 11.6 11.6 11.0 12.7 11.2
Canada 13.9 12.0 10.4 11.9 10.0 8.8 8.9
Denmark 8.1 7.6 7.3 7.3 7.4 6.7 6.5
France 19.0 18.3 18.4 20.2 20.6 19.2 20.3
Germany West 25.9 26.2 27.0 24.4 23.5 23.9 22.9
Greece 20.8 21.7 25.2 25.5 26.0 20.2 18.3
Italy 11.3 10.1 10.3 9.7 8.6 8.9 7.9
Luxembourg 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9
Netherlands 12.9 11.9 12.0 11.0 9.8 10.9 9.5
Norway 9.9 9.4 9.2 8.2 7.6 9.3 9.6
Portugal 39.3 34.2 39.4 35.2 n. a. 13.3 10.6
Turkey 21.1 21.1 20.5 26.6 29.4 20.8 22.0
United States 31.5 29.2 26.9 23.8 23.8 22.7 23.0
Source: The Military Balance, 1971-1978, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London.
TABLE 3
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AND TURKEY 1946-197 7
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/cont. (Appendix T)
Total MapGrants
F MS 
Credits
Transfers from 
Excess Stocks
Other
Grants
Greece 2,984.3 1,629.4 450.5 451.1 453.3
Turkey 4,689.9 3,240.3 310.0 860.6 279.0
TABLE 4
ARMS TRANSFERS BY MAJOR SUPPLIERS 
FROM 1966-1975 
(% millions)
TO NATO (GREECE, TU RKEY)
n
Total US France FRG Canada UK AllOthers
Greece 1,357 1,094 130 97 7 — 29
Turkey 2,302 2,017 — 154 — 10 121
MILITARY BALANCE
TABLE 5
GREECE TO RKEY NJMBERS 
FROM 1971-1978 
(in thousands)
; IN ARMED FORCES
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Greece 159.0 157.0 160.0 161.2 161.2 199.5 200.0 190.0
Turkey 508.5 449.0 455.0 453.0 453.0 460.0 465.0 485.0
Source: The Military Balance 1971 to 1978 (annually), The Inter­
national Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
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Figure 1
Comparison of Defence Expenditures 1974-1977
$ million
CountryK. 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Grecce 807 1,435 1,249 1,328 1,523
Turkey 1,173 2,200 2,800 2,652 2,286
$millions
Country
Greece
Turkey
$ per head 180
150
120
90
60
30
$ per head
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
90 159 138 126 164
30 55 70 65 54
I
years 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Greece Turkey -----
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% government spending
Country 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Greece 25.2 25.5 26.6 20.2 18.3
Turkey 19.2 26.6 29.4 20.8 22.0
%government
spending 30
25
20
15
10
5
years 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
% of GNP
Country 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Greece 4.1 4.0 6.9 5.0 5.0
Turkey 4.1 3.7 9.0 5.5 5.7
% of GNP 9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1
years 1973
A
\
\
\
1974 1975 1976 1977
Source: Compiled from tables in The Military Balance, 1977-78, 1978-79 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 
London, 1977, 1978.
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Kyprianou-Denktash Communique of 19 May 1979
t. Ii was agreed lo resume llic intcrcommunal talks on 15 
June 1979.
2. The basis for the U'lks will be the Nlakarios - Denktas 
guideline!» of 12 I'ebruary 1977 and the UN resolutions 
relevant to the Cyprus question.
3. 1‘here should lie respect for human right* and fundamental 
freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.
4 The talks will ileal with all territorial and constitutional 
aspects.
5. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettle­
ment of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the 
beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the 
constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive 
settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached 
it will I'.e implemented without awaiting the outcome of the 
discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem.
6. It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeo­
pardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance 
wili be given to initial practical measures by both sides 
to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return 
to normal conditions-
7. The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, 
and matters relating thereto will be discussed.
S. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non- 
alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed 
against union in whole or in part with any other country 
and against any form of partition or secession.
9. The intcrcommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing 
and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.
!(). The intcrcommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.
Source : Public Information Office, Nicosia
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APPENDIX V
Recorded Voting Positions of EEC Member States on Cyprus Question
in United Nations General Assembly
TABLE 6
Member State
Resolution Number
3212 
1 Nov 
1974
3395 
17 Nov 
1975
21/2 
12 Nov 
1976
32/15 
9 Nov 
1977
33/15 1 
9 Nov 
1978 1979
★
1980
Belgium Y Y A A A A
Denmark Y Y A A A A
France Y Y Y Y Y A
Ireland Y Y A Y Y A
Italy Y Y A A A A
Luxembourg Y Y A A A A
Netherlands Y Y A A A A F>
United Kingdom Y Y A A A A
West Germany Y Y A A A A
Note: "Y" - Yes; "N" - No; "A" - Abstained
, . . n *»* Consideration of the Cyprus Problem was deferred
in view of the recommencment of the intercoiranunal talks.
Total Recorded Vote on Cyprus Question in 
United Nations General Assembly
Source: UN General Assembly, Resolutions and Decisions, 1974-1979.
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